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By 2013, nearly 95% of the 250 largest companies in the world, and 71% of the top 
100 companies across the Asia Pacific region used sustainability reporting as a tool 
to inform and manage the impacts of their activities on society, the environment, 
and the economy. There are now over 400 sustainability reporting instruments 
being used in 64 countries, 80% of which are introduced by governments. However, 
by the end of 2013, only 17% of the top 100 companies in New Zealand were 
providing a corporate responsibility report and, by the end of 2017, this number had 
not grown much. This is particularly significant when sustainability reports are 
widely viewed as a proxy for corporate transparency. 
This thesis examines the ways in which some of the largest companies in New 
Zealand perceive and react to stakeholders’ expectations for non-financial 
disclosure, and the factors that may have caused the current lack of sustainability 
reporting in this country. It also looks critically into the relative power of 
shareholders and other stakeholders to influence the publication of sustainability 
reports. The thesis draws on a theoretical framework that combines Mitchel, Agle, 
and Wood’s (1997) Salience Model with Zygmunt Bauman’s (2000) concept of 
liquid modernity, to explain how different stakeholders have different impacts on 
target companies, and why that differentiation tends to run counter to theoretical, 
market based expectations.  
Twenty-eight interviews, including those with key representatives of 21 public 
companies (reporting and non-reporting), and seven sustainability professionals, 
were the primary sources of data. Secondary data was gathered from the 
participating corporate reports, reporting frameworks such as the Global Reporting 
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Initiative (GRI), government regulations in New Zealand, and formal 
organisational documents, policies, and regulations. This study applies thematic 
analysis to identify the most important themes to emerge from the interview 
transcripts and other documents. 
The results of the study demonstrate how leading corporations in New Zealand 
perceive different stakeholder groups and their expectations, and how that 
perception affects the way they publish corporate reports. While some companies 
view the lack of stakeholders’ expectation as a barrier for non-financial reporting, 
the findings of this study suggest that there may have been little to no 
communication between these organisations and their stakeholders in practice, and 
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
The focus of this thesis is on non-financial disclosure, more specifically 
sustainability reporting, by public companies in a neoliberal political system such 
as New Zealand’s, and how different stakeholder groups can affect non-financial 
transparency in such a context. Until late 2017, public corporations in New Zealand 
were able to choose whether to disclose non-financial information or not, but a 
majority of them chose not to.  
I begin this introductory chapter by outlining the background and development of 
non-financial reporting on a global scale as well as in New Zealand over the past 
two decades. I then explain the significance of this study, including why I chose 
this topic and why it is important, the research questions which guided this thesis, 
and finally the structure and content of this study. 
1.1. Background  
Sustainability has increasingly become an important aspect of corporate 
communication around the world as societies grapple with and deliberate on the 
social and environmental impacts of corporations (Higgins & Coffey, 2016). The 
concept of sustainability is closely related to notions of transparency and corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) in which stakeholders are central to policy making and 
corporate communication (Ihlen, Bartlett, & May, 2011). Although non-financial 
information has been communicated to stakeholders in different ways (e.g., annual 
reports, or a separate sustainability report) by companies around the world, such 
communication is either by way of compliance with regulations (Nidumolu, 
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Prahalad, & Rangaswami, 2009) or voluntary when companies believe that 
sustainability creates value and competitive advantages (Hockerts, 2015). 
Formal sustainability reporting is less than a few decades old. The idea of socially 
responsible behaviour arose from the works of scholars such as Davis (1960) and 
Beams & Fertig (1971), and the growing pressure from the public for more ethical 
behaviour from corporations (Gavin and Maynard, 1975).  The first separate 
environmental reports came out in 1989 and, ever since, the number of non-
financial reports and sustainability policies have been on the rise globally (Kolk, 
2004).  More recently, scholars such as Gray and Bebbington (2001) have paid 
special attention to corporate social and environmental accountability.  
KPMG has been following the development of non-financial disclosure since 1993 
with The KPMG Survey of Corporate Responsibility Reporting, which is conducted 
every two years. Their research suggests that back in 1993, barely ten per cent of 
the 250 largest companies in the world released non-financial information and 
reported on their activities which affected the environment, society and the 
economy. Today, around 95% of the same group of companies produce a non-
financial report and they consider it as “standard business practice” (KPMG, 2015).  
While European companies used to have the highest rate (71%) of non-financial 
reporting (KPMG, 2011), Asia Pacific companies took the lead (79%) by the end 
of 2015 (KPMG, 2015). Countries such as India, Malaysia, Indonesia, and South 
Africa have the highest rate of reporting globally. In their report “Currents of 
Change” (KPMG, 2015), Adrian King, KPMG’s Global Head of Sustainability 
Services, sees increasing regulations as one of the important factors in the growth 
of non-financial reporting around the world and explains KPMG’s view: 
 3 
What will change the game is the introduction of more regulation requiring 
companies to report non-financial information. I expect to see a proliferation 
of such legislation over the next five years. Non-financial reporting 
will become required business practice. Companies now need to focus on 
what they will report and how best to integrate their financial and non-
financial information. (p. 30). 
Not all of the non-financial reporting instruments are introduced by governments. 
Out of the 400 instruments used globally, 35% are non-mandatory frameworks 
(UNEP, KPMG, GRI, & CCGA, 2016). In New Zealand, the government has 
neither introduced mandatory frameworks nor has it recommended one. KPMG’s 
reports also show little growth of non-financial disclosure in the country. It is 
important to note that I refer to the neoliberal governing system of New Zealand as 
“the government”, regardless of the party in power, as it is a system that has been 
established and maintained by successive governing parties since 1984. 
As will be discussed in greater detail later in this study, the New Zealand 
government’s refusal to make non-financial reporting mandatory may be due to a 
conflict of interest. New Zealand’s small but growing economy (RBNZ, 2018), and 
its stock exchange, which includes only around 170 public companies, needs to 
create an investment friendly environment for foreign investors by reducing the 
number of regulations. In comparison, for other neoliberal countries such as the 
UK, it may be easier to introduce regulations because of their larger and more 
attractive economy. For example, there are currently over 2100 companies listed on 
the London Stock Exchange (London Stock Exchange, 2018), a number that is 
considerably higher than New Zealand’s 170 companies. This puts New Zealand in 
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a relatively weaker position in terms of its ability to introduce and enforce  market 
regulations.  
1.2. Research questions 
The main objectives of this study are to explore what “transparency” means in New 
Zealand, and whether the slow development of sustainability reporting is connected 
to the absence of reporting legislation in the country. More specifically, this 
research seeks to answer the following questions: 
RQ 1: What does 'transparency' mean to some of New Zealand's largest companies? 
RQ 2: What are the motivations and barriers for participating companies to 
undertake sustainability reporting in New Zealand?  
RQ 3: How do some of the largest public companies in New Zealand perceive and 
respond to the influence of different stakeholder groups? 
Furthermore, this study pays special attention to the relationship between 
corporations and the New Zealand government and seeks to understand how 
transparency has been defined in legal terms. Where necessary, comparisons 
between global progress and trends of sustainability reporting and the current 
reporting conditions in New Zealand are made.  
1.3. The Significance of the study 
As mentioned in the background section, sustainability reports and other forms of 
non-financial reporting have been growing fast globally. What makes this topic 
important is the fact that New Zealand and its neo-liberal economic system have 
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fallen far behind other developed countries (below the global average rating for 
non-financial reporting) in addressing corporations’ impacts on society, 
environment, and the economy. This is while organisations such as Transparency 
International (a global organisation against corruption) have ranked New Zealand 
as one of the most transparent countries in the world (currently ranked the most 
transparent country together with Denmark) (Transparency International, 2017). 
Therefore, it is important to understand why the most transparent country in the 
world is doing so poorly in advocating non-financial transparency. 
It is the nature of a neo-liberal economic system to minimise the involvement of the 
State and empower the market. In such systems, decisions are made in favour of the 
market and concepts such as transparency only serve the market’s interest, as the 
most important part of the society (Hansen, Christensen, & Flyverbom, 2015). 
Hence, the market makes decisions that ensure its wellbeing. An example of this 
could be the recommendation of the NZX’s new governance code for listed 
companies (the NZX itself is also a listed entity) to disclose their social and 
environmental impacts, or explain why they choose not to disclose such effects 
(NZX, 2017a).  This “comply or explain” recommendation still gives a choice to 
the companies that do not wish to report.  
While neoliberal proponents, such as Friedman (1970), believe that a corporation’s 
obligation is only to satisfy its shareholders, voluntary organisations such as the 
Sustainable Business Council (SBC) have been recognised as the only solution to 
address the demand for non-financial transparency (Nadesan, 2011). The 
Sustainable Business Council in New Zealand (SBCNZ) encourages its members 
(which join the organisation voluntarily) to submit a sustainable development report 
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annually (SBC, 2016). However, despite its efforts, only around 10% of the public 
companies in the country have joined the SBC. It is also important to understand 
the effectiveness of organisations such as the SBC in the context of a neo-liberal 
system.  
The study is also significant for me at a personal level. I grew up in an 
entrepreneurial family which prompted me to pursue a bachelor’s and a master’s 
degree in business. My interest in non-financial reporting began when I was writing 
my Masters dissertation, which focused on corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
and how customers, purely from a marketing point of view, perceived it. My 
transition from business to communication was also motivated by an interest in 
enhancing my marketing abilities. However, as I researched the current condition 
of corporate sustainability in New Zealand, I became aware of what could happen 
when corporate sustainability is ignored. This is something I had experienced 
before. I am originally from Iran and lived there until I was 17 years old. I then 
moved to the Philippines and stayed there for nearly a decade before moving to 
New Zealand and settling down here. As an Iranian who lived in the Philippines, I 
have seen, felt, and breathed the consequences of the absence of corporate 
sustainability, and its negative social, economic, and environmental impacts. As a 
result, I became really interested in studying what I believe is a huge gap in the 
current literature. What is truly missing from the equation for a fully transparent 
organisational culture in the country? Is it the case that decision makers of public 
corporations in New Zealand are not feeling any pressure from their stakeholders 
to produce non-financial reports? Or is it something else?  
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1.4. Structure of the thesis 
This thesis is divided into eight main chapters: 
Chapter 1: Introduction  
This chapter includes four sections.  It briefly discusses the background on 
sustainability reporting on a global scale and in New Zealand and then introduces 
the research questions that guide this thesis. It goes on to explain the significance 
of the study on an organisational as well as personal level before outlining the key 
features of the chapters to follow.   
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
This chapter reviews and discusses the literature on communication aspects of 
corporate sustainability, including corporate transparency and corporate social 
responsibility (CSR). An overview of neo-liberalism is included in this section, 
together with an outline of corporate transparency applications in such a system. 
Next, communication and information management in organisations are 
considered, as well as the flow of information to internal and external stakeholders. 
A discussion on corporate sustainability and non-financial reporting methods, such 
as triple bottom line, sustainability, and integrated reporting follows. The chapter 
concludes by identifying the gaps in the literature.  
Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework 
A combination of the Salience Model (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997) and liquid 
modernity (Bauman, 2000) serve as the theoretical lenses for this research in order 
to categorise stakeholder groups from a managerialist perspective, and assess how 
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different stakeholders’ levels of power has shaped corporate transparency in New 
Zealand.  
Chapter 4: Methodology and Method 
The methodology and methods of data collection adopted to complete this study are 
explained in this chapter. The thesis draws on a qualitative content analysis 
approach and uses thematic analysis (Owen, 1984) to analyse the findings of the 
research. 
Chapter 5: Findings I. Compliance 
Chapter five is one of two chapters that discusses the findings of this study. This 
chapter explains how top public companies write and organise their corporate 
reports and what corporate transparency means to them. It also explores whether or 
not the participants perceive any expectations from their stakeholders (as evidenced 
in both the reports and interview transcripts) for sustainability reports and looks 
into the participants’ varying opinions regarding mandatory sustainability 
reporting. 
Chapter 6: Findings II. Motivations, Challenges, and Barriers 
The second findings chapter discusses the main drivers that motivate companies in 
New Zealand to publish a sustainability report. It explains the challenges that 
companies are facing in New Zealand, and the barriers, which have stopped some 




Chapter 7: Discussion 
This chapter discusses the findings to explore how transparency is defined in legal 
terms in New Zealand and by public companies and to examine whether or not the 
companies’ perceptions of stakeholders’ expectations has anything to do with poor 
sustainability reporting in New Zealand, or if it is due to something else.  
Chapter 8: Conclusion 
The final chapter summarises the findings and highlights the contribution of the 
thesis to the current literature on corporate transparency. The chapter also notes 
recommendations for public companies and policy makers and lays the ground for 





CHAPTER 2: Literature Review 
Overview and organisation of the chapter 
As outlined in the Introduction, the neoliberal logic of free markets and de-regulated 
business environments has characterised the post-1980s political and economic 
landscape of New Zealand. This chapter examines the current literature on 
transparency within this neoliberal context, focusing particularly on non-financial 
disclosure in New Zealand. The chapter has five sections (Figure 1). The first 
section offers an overview of the concept of surveillance in modern and postmodern 
eras by drawing on concepts such as Panopticism, leading into a discussion of what 
transparency could mean to organisations in a neoliberal system. In the next section, 
I look at stakeholders and different approaches to stakeholder theory, as well as the 
concept of transparency and flow of information within and outside of companies. 
The third section of this chapter pays special attention to non-financial 
transparency, particularly in New Zealand. I then summarise the literature review 
chapter in the fourth section. In the final section, I discuss the gaps identified from 




Figure 1. The flow of the literature review chapter and the topics discussed in each section. 
 
2.1. Surveillance and Transparency 
In his famous work Discipline and Punish, Michel Foucault (1997) describes the 
concept of Panopticism (based on Jeremy Bentham’s letter written in 1787) as “a 
state of conscious and permanent visibility” (Foucault & Sheridan, 1997, p. 201). 
The Panopticon (Figure 2) is conceived as a prison-like construction in which the 
cells are built around a central tower allowing a few guards unlimited surveillance 
and supervising power over many inmates (Bentham & Božovič, 1995). The 
watcher maintains his power through visibility, which not only enables the 
supervisors to see the inmates from the control tower, but also allows them to 
conceal their own presence using blinds. This gives the supervisors in the 
panopticon unlimited capacity for watching their subordinates or for creating an 
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environment where the subordinates (the prisoners) cannot know if, and when, they 
are actually being observed. As Gane (2012) explains, the concept of the 
Panopticon works not because it creates a type of power that can be verified, but 
because it regulates the behaviour of its subordinates, who act like they are under 
surveillance.  
 
Figure 2. In a Panopticon, building the prison cells around the central tower, gives the watcher ultimate 
supervision power. The figure is based on the description of Bentham & Božovič, 1995 of a Panopticon. 
For Foucault, the concept of a Panopticon was more than a method for modern 
prisons; it implied a new form of society “where the few see the many” 
(Mathiesen, 1997, p. 217). The Panopticon in this context explains the relationship 
between the market and the state in the modern era. As Gane (2012) says, Foucault 
sees the Panopticon as a standard power model of governance where the 
government monitors the activities of the market and thus disciplines it through 
very tough regulations, creating a place of “distributive justice” (p. 617).  
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By the 1990s, as neoliberal ideology began to spread, markets began to be 
deregulated and started to encroach upon the traditional domain of the state. As 
Foucault, Davidson and Burchell (2008) point out, in a post-panoptic or neoliberal 
arrangement it is the market that progressively dictates the shape and actions of the 
government. While the emphasis of the panopticon era was on “visibility, not on 
control through publicity” (p. 73), surveillance in post-panopticon times is marked 
by the vigorous involvement of the market in the government and its activities. At 
this point, the market is viewed to have its own reasoning and values and is no 
longer a place for justice (Foucault, Davidson, and Burchell 2008).  
In this new relationship between the market and the state, the market is gradually 
able to create “its own relationship between value and price” while the government, 
progressively, has restrictions placed on its powers (Gane, 2012, p. 617). In such a 
setting, the best way to improve human wellbeing is seen to be through individual 
business freedom based on “private property rights, free market, and free trade” 
(Harvey, 2005, p.2) and the role of the government is seen solely to be ensuring that 
there is an appropriate environment and providing the right market for such 
practice. Other than that, the state is not expected to get involved (Friedman, 2009; 
Harvey, 2005).  
According to Peck and Tickell (2002), neoliberalism blends a guarantee of 
expanding the markets and competitiveness with an intense opposition to 
collectivism. They write: “The constitution and extension of competitive forces is 
married with aggressive forms of state downsizing, austerity financing, and public- 
service reform. And while rhetorically antistatist, neoliberals have proved adept at 
the (mis)use of state power in the pursuit of these goals” (p. 381). 
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Foucault et al. (2008) argue that the neoliberal system works towards defining and 
adjusting society through values that are introduced by the market and that it is 
marked by “permanent vigilance, activity, and intervention”. In the next section, I 
look into how this rise in the market’s power in a neoliberal system has shaped the 
meaning of transparency.  
2.1.1. Neoliberal Transparency  
Neoliberalism actively works towards eliminating government involvement in 
managing social order, and is based on the belief that societal growth should instead 
be managed by the market. Rather than regulate the economy, the responsibility of 
governments in such a system is to create an environment where entrepreneurs can 
easily start a business and compete (Barry & Osborne, 2013; Jankowski & Provezis, 
2014). 
Neoliberalism, and consequently the corresponding corporate behaviour, has 
become hegemonic by virtue of widespread societal acceptance. Hegemony 
(Gramsci, 1971) is described as the “'spontaneous' consent given by the great 
masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the 
dominant fundamental group; this consent is 'historically' caused by the prestige 
(and consequent confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its 
position and function in the world of production” (Mumby, 1997, p. 348). 
According to Gramsci, hegemony is evident when organisational realities are not 
forced on people but are established at all levels of society by virtue of being 
accepted as ‘common sense’. Such acceptance results in the dominated obeying the 
dominant and supports the system even if the interests of the subordinated groups 
are not necessarily the same as that of the dominated groups. In this way, hegemony 
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serves as a concept to explain how a social group establishes and maintains 
supremacy over other groups through “intellectual and moral leadership” (Gramsci, 
1971, p.57). 
Hegemony, thus, is a sophisticated form of power exercised by a dominant group. 
Those in power manipulate the others and get them to accept the dominant 
worldview in such a way that the dominant worldview is regarded as normal. 
Hegemony is maintained by responding to multiple challenges at the margins in 
order to protect the ideological core – which is, in the case of neoliberalism, the free 
market system. Powerful corporations, used to exercising their hegemony by 
manipulating information to their advantage, resist the need to provide information 
on social and environmental issues. When faced with a situation where they have 
to produce social and environmental corporate reports, they strategically create such 
reports. For these corporations, such reports then can become a legitimising tool 
deployed to mislead powerful stakeholders such as governments into assuming that 
corporations are, or are working towards, becoming sustainable organisations, 
while the change they make may be mostly rhetorical (Tregidga, Milne, & Kearins, 
2014).  
Corporate reports in such a context become a mechanism for responding to that 
particular need of defending the free market.  Tregidga et al. (2014) write:  
An obvious danger is that while organisations are able to convey an 
adaptable and ‘changed’ identity to meet the demands of a changed social 
and political context, and thereby maintain legitimacy and avoid more 
stringent regulatory reform, the nature of that ‘change’ is not sufficient to 
provide for social and environmental betterment in the absence of such 
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regulatory reform. (p. 491). 
Hence, in a neoliberal environment, where the power of the government is lessened, 
and privatised organisations (Mehrpouya & Djelic, 2014) work more freely, CSR 
and non-financial transparency concepts are viewed as a problem by the 
corporations (Nadesan, 2008). Social and environmental reporting has the potential 
to uncover what corporations can and cannot do for society, and where society has 
to regulate how companies behave (Milne, Tregidga, & Walton, 2005). 
Nadesan (2011) argues that in neoliberal theories, fiscal transparency discourses are 
designed to ensure well-organised and protected operations in the market. However, 
by highlighting the importance of the availability of financial data, they understate 
the requests of other stakeholders such as environmentalists and social stakeholders 
to access the information they want. A neoliberal government pays more attention 
to financial and trading concerns. As Milne et al. (2005) explain, “Organisations in 
modern capitalism are designed to follow the financial and, to the extent that they 
do not, they will be penalised by the market” (p. 5). In such governance systems, 
non-financial transparency is regarded as optional. Transparency expectations of 
social and environmental stakeholders are, therefore, addressed by voluntary 
institutions.  
There is a link between neoliberalism and voluntary forms of accountability 
(Garsten & De Montoya, 2008), where voluntary transparency is encouraged by 
Non-Government Organisations (NGOs), such as the SBC in New Zealand. 
According to Nadesan (2011), such voluntary transparency advocates are 
characterised as being as effective as government-mandated systems but for 
specific reasons they may not exactly have the power to officially demand 
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information to address social and environmental issues. Firstly, these organisations 
seldom require verification of self-recorded corporate data. Second, they lack the 
executive power to make the corporations follow the rules set by the NGOs or to 
punish offenders, even among their own members. As a result, voluntary 
transparency organisations serve a legitimising purpose that could, in reality, 
deflect criticism of activists by immunising societies against damaging stories of 
bad corporate behaviour. Nadesan (2011) believes that decades of financial 
corruption show that voluntary transparency practices are likely to generate 
opportunities for calculated misrepresentation and fraud.   
Powerful neoliberal advocates such as Milton Friedman and their economistic view 
of how corporations should behave in society has its own followers and critics. In 
his well-known article “The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its 
Profits,” Friedman (1970) argues that a business as a whole does not have 
responsibilities except towards those individuals or groups (shareholders) who own 
the corporation, and that a company’s primary responsibility is to keep them 
satisfied by returning a profit. Furthermore, he writes that the corporate executive 
as an individual may have responsibilities towards his family and society that 
require him to take actions, such as refusing to work for a corporation or spending 
his own earnings on charity or other things to serve the community. He argues that 
these are “social responsibilities” taken on by the executive as an individual and not 
on behalf of the business. Friedman further argues that the executive should make 
as much money for the company as possible, in the best ethical way (Aune, 2007). 
Overall, Friedman (1970) disagrees with the idea of spending investors’ money on 
what he calls a “general social interest” (p.2). 
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While the ‘neo’ in neoliberal is supposed to stand for a concept that the government 
must have a bigger role than it did in the traditional liberalism of the 19th century 
for capitalism to work well (McAllister, 2011), reducing regulations increases the 
risk of having an unstable economy (Masquelier, 2017) and society.  
While business people and regulators endorse transparency, not much is done to 
stop corporations from prioritising business (Hansen & Flyverbom, 2015). Even 
though the prime catchphrases of neoliberalism such as transparency and 
accountability remain popular and have flourished with more expectations than ever 
(Hetherington, 2011), the approach towards transparency and accountability in the 
environment provided by a neoliberal system makes it easier for companies to hide 
their questionable activities (Hansen & Flyverbom, 2015; Zyglidopoulos & 
Fleming, 2011). 
The following section looks into corporate transparency and explains the flow of 
information within and outside of organisations to their stakeholders.  
2.2. Corporate Transparency and Stakeholders 
The term corporate “transparency” can reflect different values ranging from 
standing against corruption to sustaining the environment (Padideh, 2015). Borgia 
(2007) defines transparency as providing information for others to freely examine 
and see what a corporation has really been up to. She believes that transparency is 
found somewhere between the public’s right to know and the right of the 
corporation for privacy. But is there such a thing as a homogenous ‘public’? Few, 
if any would claim that there is. On the contrary, it is widely recognised that ‘the 
public’ comprises individuals with diverse and contextually based values and 
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beliefs, and that certain groups become organisationally significant depending upon 
a number of variables. Such groups are commonly referred to as ‘stakeholders’ and 
their grouping allows organisations – including governments and corporations – to 
decide how they need to react to them. Such reactions include the degree to which 
organisations believe they must provide information in an effort to improve their 
transparency. 
2.2.1. Stakeholders  
The term “stakeholder” was first used in the early 1960s, to challenge the concept 
that only stockholders are worthy of management’s attention (Parmar, Freeman, 
and Harrison, 2010). Freeman (2010, p. 46) defines stakeholders as “any group or 
individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organisation's 
objectives". Although widely used, this definition is not necessarily accepted by 
everyone and there is no global standard as to who a legitimate stakeholder is 
(Collins, Kearins, and Roper, 2005; Donaldson & Preston, 1995). According to 
Parmar et al. (2010), it was not until the late 1970s that scholars such as Freeman 
started working on theories to help management understand issues that involved 
uncertainty. Prior to that, most of the literature assumed the environments around 
organisations were unchanging.  
Freeman argues against the economist view of scholars such as Friedman (1970) 
and emphasises the value of stakeholders through his stakeholder theory (Jensen, 
2001; Evan & Freeman, 1988; Freeman, 1999; Freeman, 1994). Freeman, Harrison, 
and Wicks (2010), write that the main responsibility of management is to make 
value for the stakeholders as much as they can. Baker and Nofsinger (2012, p. 40) 
agree with Freeman’s view and explain further that Freeman is avoiding 
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“responsibility-based” discussions regarding stakeholders and is clarifying the risk 
that executives might be taking by not understanding the expectations of 
stakeholders well. 
CSR activities, for example, from this point of view must add value for 
stakeholders. However, not all CSR activities are satisfying in the view of 
stakeholders. Peloza and Shang (2011) suggest that this could be because of the 
broad range of activities undertaken. Different stakeholders may have different 
views over different activities: while some regard the activities as positive and 
productive, some might consider the same activities as negative and destructive. 
The deeds that are perceived positively by stakeholders can have constructive 
effects on organisational image and therefore increase profit.  
Other scholars take the notion of stakeholder theory further. For example, according 
to Post, Preston, and Sauter-Sachs (2002) "The corporation cannot and should not 
survive if it does not take responsibility for the welfare of all its constituents, and 
for the well-being of the larger society in which it operates" (pp. 16-17). According 
to Dando and Swift (2003), organisations’ commitment to establishing an ethical 
position towards stakeholders motivates them to be more transparent. Further, 
Fombrun and Rindova (2000) argue that open communication with stakeholders is 
the key to achieving transparency, but corporate scandals in recent years have made 
it more difficult for the public to fully trust organisational leaders. Since executives 
are fully responsible for the trust that people put in a company (Bandsuch, Pate, & 
Thies, 2008), stakeholders expect a certain amount of access to information in 
organisations, with Kochan (2003) arguing that increasing the number of 
stakeholders who can access information regarding executive behaviour can help 
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prevent scandals from happening in the future. On the other hand, Hess (2012) 
believes new types of non-financial information must be presented to stakeholders 
to stop companies from misbehaving.  
Morsing and Schultz (2006) argue that stakeholder theory has increasingly focused 
on creating value for stakeholders and engaging them, rather than immediately 
thinking of profit. They explain that their argument does not suggest that making 
profit for companies is not important, but rather it is dependent on engaging with 
different stakeholders. Instead of companies managing stakeholders, the focus is 
now on building a relationship with them (Andriof, Waddock, & Rahman, 2002; 
Morsing & Schultz, 2006).  
Some scholars, however, believe that stakeholder engagement, particularly in the 
context of sustainability, may come with a downside. Collins et al. (2005) argue that 
too much is expected of stakeholder engagement, and in many cases engagement is 
done to create legitimacy for the company. They believe it has yet to bring extensive 
sustainability due to assumptions often made that stakeholders embrace an 
environmentally and socially oriented view of sustainability, have the time and 
resources, and care about such issues enough to get involved with the business at a 
sufficient level to resolve them without being disrupted by their other interests. They 
write:  
conflicting demands by stakeholders provide business yet another potent 
excuse for not engaging in fundamental change toward sustainability. At the 
same time stakeholder engagement holds for business the promise of more 
understanding on the part of stakeholders and enhanced legitimacy while 
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often making mainly only incremental changes to business fundamentals in 
the name of sustainability. (p. 13)  
To demonstrate the power of stakeholders’ expectations, Dando and Swift (2003) 
argue that, in terms of accountability, most stakeholders may not be particularly 
powerful but their views on what they expect from the company can affect the 
company’s ability to accomplish its goals. They explain that stakeholders need 
more than accurate data. They expect to know that the information presented in the 
reports represents how the organisation has been performing, and independent 
experts must be able to provide their opinion on the presented data freely.  
Open communication between a business and the environment around it (including 
stakeholders) creates positive relationships that lead to corporate efficacy. The 
transmission of information is done while considering the satisfaction of the 
expectations of the environment (Salvioni, 2002). Parum (2005) further explains 
the importance of communication between the company and its external 
environment and argues that being transparent and open to stakeholders and 
shareholders are important conditions that allow them to connect to the company, 
evaluate it, and thus contribute to constructive relations with the firm. Therefore, 
organisations often make transparency a fundamental part of an organisation’s 
culture and the way they manage the company (Flyverbom, Christensen, & Hansen, 
2015). 
Christensen (2002) argues that organisations are under pressure to enclose not only 
their annual reports and plans as required by law, but their stakeholders also expect 
them to give access to information and hold them responsible for their strategic 
choices as well. Stakeholders can exercise their power (discussed further in the next 
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section) by possessing more information (Flyverbom et al., 2015). Christensen 
(2002, p. 163) considers transparency in communication as “the proper managerial 
response” and a “basic requirement”. He also argues that the communication 
environment is filled with “competing messages” that corporations send out to 
promote themselves as legitimate.  
In today’s corporate world, customer satisfaction goes beyond just guaranteeing 
good products and services. Consumers expect corporations to give back to the 
communities that they are operating in as well as to look after the environment. 
They have forced organisations to be more transparent than before (Zyglidopoulos 
& Fleming, 2011). Therefore, despite the risks and costs that transparent 
communication might bring, organisations have a certain degree of transparency in 
their corporate policies, although they might not want it at all (Christensen & 
Langer, 2009). Flyverbom et al. (2015) advise managers and organisations to not 
only concentrate on how much information they make public, but also on “how 
transparency reconfigures boundaries, responsibilities, identities, and standards” (p. 
404).  
A common point made by a much of the literature on stakeholder theory is that 
paying attention to all stakeholders and considering their interests will assist the 
company with value creation and as a result improve the company’s performance 
(Bosse, Phillips, & Harrison, 2009; Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1994; 
Freeman, 2010; Freeman, Harrison, & Wicks, 2007; Jones, 1995; Jones & Wicks, 
1999). According to Harrison and Wicks (2013), the empirical literature usually 
backs a positive relationship between a stakeholder oriented style of management 
and company’s performance, which is assessed in economic terms most of the time 
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(Harrison & Wicks, 2013). They argue that the financial performance of the 
company is important to several of the stakeholders of the company, but it is not 
the only part of value creation. Thus, a company’s performance can be defined as 
“the total value created by the firm through its activities, which is the sum of the 
utility created for each of a firm's legitimate stakeholders” (p.102). 
Harrison and Wicks (2013) argue that, instead of concentrating mainly on measures 
that evaluate economic performance, stakeholder-based performance measures 
challenge managers to assess the value their company is creating from the point of 
view of stakeholders who are a part of the value creation process. Therefore, these 
measures provide the information that the managers need to engage with 
stakeholders and boost management’s ability to use such information to create more 
value for the stakeholders: “At its core, this perspective is about creating a higher 
level of well-being for the stakeholders involved in a system of value creation led 
by the firm” (p. 98). 
Morsing and Schultz (2006) explain three CSR communication strategies, based on 
models of public relations designed by Grunig and Hunt (1984): stakeholder 
information, stakeholder response, and stakeholder involvement. 
Stakeholder information strategy describes a one-way communication from the 
company to its stakeholders, where the company makes statements and does not 
take feedback. The main purpose of this strategy is to inform stakeholders about the 
company in a very objective manner. Companies which choose to use this strategy 
are constantly sending press releases to let stakeholders know about company 
activities. 
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The stakeholder response strategy refers to a two-way communication between 
the stakeholders and the company, where the company engages in communication 
with the stakeholders through different ways (e.g. survey and suggestion box). In 
this strategy, the company informs the public regarding their actions, and then asks 
publics’ opinion and feedback to improve its CSR activities.  
The stakeholder involvement strategy is when the company engages in a two-
way communication with the stakeholders, where both parties try to convince the 
other party to change. In this strategy, conducting a survey and just asking for 
stakeholders’ opinions is not enough, and the company invites them to negotiate 
their concerns. By involving the stakeholders, the company endorses positive and 
open communication. In this strategy, ideally, both parties are willing to change. 
Morsing and Schultz (2006) write: 
Because the stakeholder involvement strategy takes the notion of the 
stakeholder relationship to an extreme, companies should not only influence 
but also seek to be influenced by stakeholders, and therefore change when 
necessary. While this could apply to Freeman’s stakeholder 
conceptualisation, it would also challenge his stakeholder concept regarding 
the extent to which a company should change its (CSR) activities when 
stakeholders challenge existing (CSR) activities, and the extent to which a 
company should insist on its own possibly divergent assessment. (p. 328) 
Stakeholder theory can be employed in three correlated but at the same time diverse 
approaches in the communication and management literature: instrumental, 
normative, and descriptive (Donaldson & Preston, 1995). Although part of the 
framework used in this study (the salience model) is considered a descriptive 
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approach, I will provide a summary and analysis of all three to elucidate their 
distinctions.  
An Instrumental approach assesses stakeholder management strategies’ ability to 
accomplish goals set by the companies (Mason & Simmons, 2014). This approach 
(within the management literature) suggests that companies that are approachable 
and respond to stakeholders promptly are more successful than those that do not 
because, in this approach, it is assumed that stakeholders have the power to impact 
the wellbeing of the company (Maltby, 1997). While in an instrumental approach 
there may be ethical results as a consequence of stakeholder benefit, stakeholder 
management is not necessarily established on moral foundations (Miles, 2017). 
Instead, the long term existence and wellbeing of the company is the main focus 
(Collins et al., 2005). This aspect of stakeholder theory is particularly strong within 
the communication literature in areas such as issues management. An extensive 
definition of this aspect of public relations is “the practice of identifying potential 
problems and working to deflect or defuse them in order to minimize their impact 
on an organization or business… it is exercised with a view to ensuring long-term 
business survival by winning public understanding and approval” (Collins et al., 
2005, p. 4).  
A normative approach is based on ethical values rather than perceived standards 
(Miles, 2017) and, unlike the instrumental approach, power is not relevant to the 
normative attribute and companies respond to their stakeholders (for example by 
providing reports) not because it will be in their interest but, for moral reasons, they 
must (Maltby, 1997). The notion of legitimacy is essential to the normative approach 
and is created by aligning the values of the organisation with social norms and what 
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is perceived as appropriate behaviour by the company (Suchman, 1995). Collins et 
al. (2005) explain that from a normative standpoint, the legitimacy of a company 
continuously needs to be refreshed and renewed since the perception of the public 
changes. They argue that inability to oversee these changes can lead to a gap 
between what is expected from the company and what the company is perceived to 
be doing. Sethi (1979) calls this a “legitimacy gap” and warns that the continuous 
spreading of the gap will result in the company losing legitimacy which will 
jeopardise its existence. 
The descriptive approach draws a picture of how companies are managed in terms 
of recognising and responding to stakeholders’ demands (Maltby, 1997). Just like 
the instrumental, the descriptive approach of stakeholder theory provides a 
justification for voluntary acts of transparency by emphasising that companies 
acknowledge that their interest rests in responding to stakeholders’ social demands 
(Maltby, 1997). However, the rationale behind this approach is that since companies 
cannot find the resources to satisfy the demands of all stakeholder groups, it is 
necessary to prioritise them based on their level of power (Madsen & Ulhøi, 2001). 
2.2.2. Transparency 
While stakeholders may be seen as, and may indeed be, demanding transparency, 
there is little agreement on what transparency itself means or entails. If transparency 
is to be interpreted as honesty, it may not be easily achieved. Drucker and Gumpert 
(2007) write that “transparency, the opposite of opacity, is a worthy, but 
unobtainable ideal in the social relationships of people, the workplace, and between 
government and the governed” (p. 493).  
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To achieve an ideal level of transparency, information must be released truthfully 
and at an appropriate time (OECD, 2015). Transparency, through access to 
information, can be attained through different channels such as organisational 
reports and announcements, through Official Information Act requests (Official 
Information Act 1982, 1982), or via an unauthorised information leakage by a 
whistle blower (Bovens, Goodin, & Schillemans, 2014). 
In order to be transparent, organisations provide access to a massive amount of 
information while minimising the control of it (Drucker & Gumpert, 2007). This 
availability of information can be external, for stakeholders outside the organisation 
(Bushman, Piotroski, & Smith, 2004), or internal, which occurs when information 
flows freely within the organisation (Street & Meister, 2004). Availability of 
information externally does not necessarily mean that communication between an 
organisation and all external stakeholders exists, nor that all stakeholders find the 
available information interesting. Organisations provide the same amount of 
information to all stakeholders but as Christensen (2002) argues, different 
individuals have different abilities to process the information given. Therefore, 
what one analyst understands from the information available could be different 
from what others understand. 
While the release of information may not provide value for all stakeholders, the 
company can benefit from it in different ways. Francis, Huang, Khurana, and 
Pereira (2009) argue that corporate transparency contributes to the economic and 
financial development of the country as well. They suggest that a greater level of 
transparency improves a firm’s access to lower the cost of external financing, thus 
improving its ability to use opportunities that will allow the company to grow. It 
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also allows outside investors to monitor the company and facilitates competence in 
investments.  However, this may not be the case for all corporations. Issues such as 
power may affect the ways that a corporation discloses information. For instance, 
Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006) suggest that companies that are politically well 
connected do not need to be transparent in order to attract investors, and are less 
likely to disclose information since they can have access to bank credits through 
their connections (Sari & Anugerah, 2011). 
As for internal transparency, there should be a link of trust between employees, as 
internal stakeholders, and their employer, for the concept to create value. According 
to Erik and Rob (2007), one of the benefits of internal transparency is that it 
motivates employees to be more engaged and improves their performance while 
building trust between the employers and the employees. Jahansoozi (2006) 
explains that the trend of fully engaging employees starts with trusting them at basic 
levels, then takes it slowly further before completely engaging them. Once trusted, 
individuals in an organisation must be able to discuss and communicate issues 
freely, rather than treating them like taboos, to fully benefit from internal 
transparency.  
Kallio (2007) defines taboos as issues whose existence is known to society, but 
people prefer to avoid talking about them – discussing taboos can cause problems 
and could potentially harm one’s position in the organisation or community. He 
explains that taboo is “opposite to rhetoric” and uses corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) (which will be discussed further in the next section of this chapter), as a 
controversial example of taboos in organisational communication. Kallio argues 
that because CSR is treated as a taboo, the potential to critically analyse it is not 
developed well. He writes: “CSR can only be as advanced as its taboos. Because 
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taboos are fixations of social reality, they are also potential windows for social 
change” (p.167).  
Organisational transparency can be affected by many different factors. Technology 
is one such factor. A common communication tool used by public companies to 
enhance transparency is the annual report (Branco & Rodrigues, 2006). While 
annual reports were traditionally used for financial disclosure and communication 
of financial information with shareholders, they now address a wider range of 
stakeholders, contain narratives that tell the story of the company’s future plans, 
and increasingly report on non-financial information (Tricker & Tricker, 2015). 
With advances in technology, many large corporations now choose to publish their 
corporate reports online, via their websites (Alali & Romero, 2012).  
Another clear example of the effects of technology is the increasing power of 
widely-distributed mass media and their impact on public opinion (Christensen, 
2002). For example, mass media are the largest source of non-financial information 
for New Zealanders (Research New Zealand, 2007). The results of a study by Aerts 
and Cormier (2009) suggest that a negative image in the media is a driver for 
companies to issue press releases regarding their social and environmental 
activities, but does not force them to include the same information in their corporate 
reports. On the other hand, more socially responsible companies receive more 
positive attention from the media, leading to a good reputation in the eyes of the 
public, and as a result, an increase in company value (Cahan, Chen, Chen, & 
Nguyen, 2015). Aerts and Cormier (2009) write:  
Firms use corporate communication media (such as annual report disclosures 
and press releases) to manage perceived environmental legitimacy by 
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signalling to relevant publics that their behaviour is appropriate and desirable 
and, at the same time, to react to public pressures by adapting the level, 
content and quality of their environmental information dissemination 
processes. (p. 1)  
A study done by Reinig and Tilt (2009) of four main national banks in Australia 
illustrates the use of media releases, which target mostly customers and the general 
public, to communicate their impacts on the economy, society, and the 
environment, suggesting that public expectations could impact organisational 
behaviour. On the other hand, the news media can do their own investigations on 
the companies, and publish reports, affecting companies’ image (Baron, 2005), and 
consequently influence their behaviour greatly (Siegel & Vitaliano, 2007; 
Zyglidopoulos, Georgiadis, Carroll, & Siegel, 2012). 
Gurun and Butler (2012) suggest that local media tend to use a more pleasant 
language with fewer negative comments when describing their local companies. 
This is due to local media’s interest in maintaining a good relationship with local 
companies, since a considerable portion of their earnings comes from advertising 
by these organisations. In addition, factors such as news production requirements 
and the need to entertain can affect what the media covers (Van Peursem & 
Hauriasi, 1999). 
Big corporations also try to put a positive “spin” on the news and compete with the 
media to influence public opinion by hiring Investor Relations (IR) companies, 
which help their clients produce positive press releases (Solomon, 2012). A good 
example of this is when a company only focuses on broadcasting its philanthropic 
activities and is “doing good in order to do well” (Bartkus & Morris, 2015, p. 9). 
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Ahern and Sosyura (2014) show that companies have a tendency to manipulate 
material used in their media coverage, and the timing of it, to influence their share 
prices and create a good image for themselves. How organisational communication 
can affect a company’s reputation is discussed in the next section. 
2.2.3. Organisational Communication  
Communication and distribution of information are seen as playing important roles 
in reaching stakeholders and achieving transparency (Bushman et al., 2004). The 
history of organisational communication as a field goes back to the early 1920s 
when students in business courses were taught how to communicate professionally 
(Salwen & Stacks, 1996). An organisation’s communication system is directly 
related to how it behaves and how it is perceived by others. In other words, the way 
an organisation communicates within itself and connects externally affects its 
reputation and image (Gray & Balmer, 1998). Gray and Balmer (1998) argue that 
corporate identity is created through corporate communication, which builds 
corporate image and corporate reputation and that can lead to competitive 
advantages.  
The significance of communication in today’s world is acknowledged by the leaders 
of different sectors of societies even though the understanding of the term could be 
different for each segment (Cheng, Green, Conradie, Konishi, & Romi, 2014). 
Tompkins (1984) explains that organisational communication is “the study of 
sending and receiving messages that create and maintain a system of consciously 
coordinating activities or forces of two or more persons” (pp.662-663).  According 
to Redding (1972), it is possible for anything in an organisation to be a form of 
message. He also argues that the listening abilities of the receiver of the message 
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affect an organisation. A practical management team listens to the associates and 
analyses the data available before making a decision. At the same time, the sender 
of the message is just as important. Mumby and Stohl (1996) argue that “voice” in 
organisations could be a central problematic. According to them, the issue of voice 
becomes problematic when its carrier faces different audiences in an organisation. 
An ideal management team should be able to hear the different voices from multiple 
fields and connect them together so as to run an organisation in the best way 
possible and achieve short and long-term objectives. Thus, the relationship between 
the flow of information and transparency and the way they affect decision making 
in organisations becomes important, as explained below.  
2.2.4. Organisational Information Management 
In order to operate successfully, organisations make decisions daily, whether by an 
individual or a group. To answer the important issue of where communication 
belongs in decision-making, it is essential to understand the role of the “flow of 
information” (Cheney, Christensen, Zorn, and Ganesh, 2004). This is addressed by 
drawing on a discussion about how the decision-making power and the flow of 
information has shifted from corporations to stakeholders due to globalisation. 
Organisational communication is a broad topic; organisational information 
management and, more specifically, the flow of information is the focus of 
discussion here because of its strategic effects on transparency.   
2.2.4.1. Information Selection and Usage in Organisations 
Managing information in today’s corporate world is essential. Hinton (2012) 
explains that the influence of information in organisations is so powerful that 
managers dedicate considerable effort and time to managing information, the 
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systems and people that deliver the information, and its users: “The combination of 
skilled people and advanced information technology has revolutionised the concept 
of management” (p.10). 
Daft and Lengel (1986) suggest organisations process information to “reduce 
uncertainty” in doing tasks, and to “reduce equivocality” (p.554) by creating 
solutions rather than learning from the new data (Weick, 1979) so as to achieve an 
adequate performance level.  To reduce uncertainty, the management team needs to 
only use necessary information. Organisations use information systems which 
include “people, data, processes, interfaces, networks and technology” (Guleria & 
Arora, 2012, p. 141) within organisations and the environment around them which 
are designed to “process, keep, and distribute information” (Laudon, Laudon, & 
Brabston, 2012, p. 6), to create solutions for problems and improve operations and 
decision making processes. 
Kelley and Yantis (2009) find the selection of information is a critical factor in an 
organisation’s interaction with its environment. Mastenbroek (1990) also argues 
that the most important aspect of information management is “selection” (p.131). 
He argues that organisations use indicators to select which should be “acceptable, 
simple and visible, and capable of being influenced and motivational” (p.132). In 
other words, the indicators must be easy to understand and accepted by those who 
work with them. Having too many indicators symbolises a weakness in 
organisations (Mastenbroek, 1990).  
Feldman and March (1981) explain that not all the information collected to make 
decisions is useful. The information found could be wrong or, simply because of 
the limitations that organisations or the individuals may have, the data could be 
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useless. Therefore, organisations have to make sure that the majority of data 
gathered can be used. However, gathering only information that can be used 
requires a very sophisticated selection system and, as will be discussed in the next 
part of this literature review, an organisation cannot completely control the flow of 
information and other factors or sources can affect it.  
2.2.4.2. Flow of Information in Organisations  
Uncertainty within an organisation makes it difficult to make the correct decisions 
concerning a particular issue. For instance, according to March (1987), limited 
rationality complicates decision making. This basically means that the person or the 
group making a decision for an organisation cannot know absolutely everything 
about their options and their consequences. Drucker and Gumpert (2007) argue that 
an uninhibited flow of information is impossible as is absolute control over it. In 
other words, organisations may face some difficulties in gathering necessary 
information and there could always be sets of data that the company cannot make 
use of.   
Aside from limited rationality, conflict of interest is another barrier facing decision 
makers as an organisation is a combination of individuals and groups who have 
different goals (March, 1987). Even though an organisation has long-term 
objectives as a whole, it may be run by different departments with own short-term 
goals. These conflicts of interest among individuals or groups could cause difficulty 
in the flow of information.  
 Knowing absolutely everything about the alternatives may be a problem, but there 
can also be too much information when there is more than enough data for one or a 
group of people to make a decision (Cheney et al., 2004). According to Feldman 
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and March (1981), information is considered valuable when it impacts a decision. 
The more the data improves decision making in an organisation, the more valuable 
it is. They also argue that while many organisations gather more information than 
they can use, they should consider the cost they pay to get hold of the information 
as an important factor.                 
So why do organisations try to collect and store more information than they need 
even though it could cost a lot to keep? Christensen, Morsing, and Cheney (2008) 
try to answer this question by discussing the importance of image and reputation 
for organisations. The value of information in this matter goes further than decision 
making. Corporations use the information available to communicate with their 
stakeholders and others who expect transparency from organisations (Christensen 
et al., 2008). That is, the information available could be more than the data that the 
company needs for its operations. The extra information is kept to be exhibited 
when requested by stakeholders. As Werther and Chandler (2010) explain, the 
power regarding control over the flow of information has shifted from corporations 
to their stakeholders. They argue that globalisation (Baylis, Smith, & Owens, 2010; 
Robertson, 1992; Scholte, 2005) has influenced the corporate world by suggesting 
a shift in the balance of power and control over the flow of information from 
corporations to the stakeholders since stakeholders’ access to information about 
companies has increased. They write: “globalisation presents powerful tools that 
stakeholders can use to represent their best interests – that is, if they are willing to 
take advantage of the opportunity and if they really care” (Werther & Chandler, 
2010, p. 63). With the increase of stakeholders’ involvement in controlling the flow, 
companies need to provide as much information as required by their stakeholders 
to avoid issues such as conflict of interest and limited rationality. 
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2.3. Environmental, Social, and Economic Reporting 
The term ‘triple bottom line’ (TBL) was introduced by Elkington (1998). The idea 
of triple bottom line reporting is that aside from standard financial reporting, 
companies should include their social and environmental impacts and plans if they 
are after ultimate success (Norman & MacDonald, 2004). Chapman and Milne 
(2003) state “the three lines represent society, the economy and the environment. 
Society depends on the economy – and the economy depends on the global 
ecosystem, whose health represents the ultimate bottom line” (p. 1).  
Henriques and Richardson (2004) argue that the real bottom line for companies is 
earning profit, which is a part of the economic aspect of triple bottom line but not 
all of it. An important aspect of TBL requires companies to be prepared to not only 
benefit their shareholders but also other stakeholders, including the community that 
the company is operating in (Stoddard, Pollard, & Evans, 2012). The triple bottom 
line framework uses common indicators, which allow easier comparison of the 
performance of organisations and demand transparent disclosure (Stoddard et al., 
2012).  
Seven drivers of TBL and their characteristics that have been developed to support 
its usage are described by Stoddard et al. (2012), adapted from Elkington (2011). 
Elkington considers the market as the first driver, explaining that businesses no 
longer see social and environmental responsibilities as additional costs and that they 
are willing to use triple bottom line thinking to invest in social activities that will 
benefit communities and society. Second, societies’ values are changing and are 
leaning more towards social and environmental awareness. This change in values, 
together with new information technologies, will create an ideal environment for 
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transparency. Lifecycle technology is another driver, which has introduced re-
creating raw materials through recycling. Elkington sees new forms of partnerships 
that are more socially oriented as the fifth driver. Corporations have realised that 
long-term plans are more important than short-term plans; therefore, time is also an 
important factor. Because of pressure from stakeholders, executives will have to 
take a new perspective regarding issues and corporations’ plan to address them. 
Therefore, as Elkington (2011) argues, corporate governance is the last driver.  
Even though it is technically a reporting framework, TBL is sometimes regarded 
and referred to as synonymous with Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). CSR 
is closely related to corporate transparency and is a matter of interest for many 
companies. There is no doubt that CSR has a direct impact on organisations’ policy 
making and strategies, and  understanding the similarities and differences between 
the concepts of CSR and sustainability plays an important role in this study. 
McMillan (2007) argues that modern corporations have already accepted the 
importance of CSR. Perhaps being socially responsible is not every corporation’s 
priority by choice but, as discussed in the previous part of this literature review, 
pressure from different sources may force an organisation to at least maintain a 
socially responsible image. According to Branco and Rodrigues (2006), social 
responsibility transparency refers to the availability of information regarding 
companies’ activities that concern society and may include issues related to 
employees, companies’ involvement in the community and the environment, and 
ethical concerns, among others.  
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2.3.1. Corporate Social Responsibility 
Social responsibility can be traced back to centuries ago when churches and 
community centres cared about societies’ interest (McMillan, 2007). However, the 
introduction of CSR in organisations is much more recent. According to Carroll 
(1999), most of the literature on CSR formally began during the 1950s and referred 
mostly to “social responsibility” (p.271). Only a decade later critiques such as that 
of McGuire (1963) considered social responsibilities just as important as economic 
and legal obligations for corporations. In today’s corporate world, CSR plays a 
much larger role than ever before.  
There are different definitions for CSR. Hughen, Lulseged, and Upton (2014) 
describe the term as companies’ mindfulness of the effects their operations could 
have on the economy, society, and the environment, and what they do to address 
those impacts. They also explain that CSR activities concentrate on adding value to 
the company in the long run by improving the company’s image and decreasing the 
amount of resources that the company uses to run its operations.  
According to Dahlsrud (2008), all the definitions for CSR could be included in five 
dimensions of economic, stakeholder, environmental, social, and voluntariness. 
Carroll’s CSR model also breaks CSR activities into four types:  first, the 
responsibility that companies have to make profit; second, their legal obligation to 
obey the law; third, their ethical responsibility to do the right thing; and fourth, their 
responsibility to do philanthropic activities (Carroll, 1979). McWilliams, Siegel, 
and Wright (2006) define CSR as “situations where the firm goes beyond 
compliance and engages in actions that appear to further some social good, beyond 
the interests of the firm and that which is required by law” (p.4). This definition 
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falls under the social and voluntariness dimension. In a very broad definition that 
includes all dimensions, van Marrewijk (2003) describes CSR and sustainability as 
actions taken by companies indicating the addition of social and environmental 
anxieties in business operations and in dealing with stakeholders. These different 
dimensions of CSR have been created because of the different views that analysts, 
scholars, and stakeholders have on the matter, such as the economist arguments of 
Friedman (1970) and more stakeholder centred discussions of Freeman (1994) 
which were discussed earlier.  
CSR activities are sometimes costly. So why would companies go through the 
trouble? Why is there CSR? McMillan (2007) answers this question by saying that 
a large number of individuals have simply stopped caring for one another or are not 
sincere about it and it is the organisations that have to resume the task of looking 
after society. She also adds that the reason why CSR is becoming even more popular 
is “because we have recently become painfully aware of how ill-suited the modern 
corporation is for the task [of being socially responsible], lacking both credibility 
and the voice of moral authority” (p.26). Different groups or individuals can 
pressure companies to behave in a socially responsible manner. These sources 
include internal pressure from stakeholders within the company, and pressure of 
expectation from competitors, customers, shareholders, government and its 
regulatory bodies, and non-government organisations (NGOs) (Ballou, Heitger, 
Landes, & Adams, 2006; Gualandris, Klassen, Vachon, & Kalchschmidt, 2015; 
Haigh & Jones, 2006; Weber & Marley, 2010). 
Similarly, Campbell (2007) offers some explanations for firms’ not engaging in 
CSR activities, and some for why a company might choose to act in a socially 
 41 
responsible manner. He explains that companies are less likely to take on CSR if 
they are not financially doing well, there is too much competition, or there is not 
much competition. He also suggests that companies tend to get more engaged in 
CSR activities if there are government regulations and industrial regulations 
involved, if there is external pressure from different stakeholders such as media and 
NGOs, if they are a member of an association where they are encouraged to act 
responsibly, and if they are engaged in institutionalised dialogue with their 
stakeholders.  
For whatever reason, either to keep a legitimate reputation or to increase sales and 
use it as a marketing strategy (which will be discussed further in the next part of 
this section), CSR is growing among corporations. Companies take steps towards 
serving communities as well as their shareholders. The demand for transparency 
has forced companies to include CSR in their plans, which has created the challenge 
of applying CSR strategies and communicating their outcome with their 
stakeholders. The major problem for companies is how the CSR activities of the 
company should be communicated to please stakeholders and, as a result, create a 
legitimate image (Arvidsson, 2010).  
2.3.1.1. Strategic Uses of CSR 
Among the most important objectives of corporations is one of keeping 
stakeholders satisfied. As described above, company stakeholders are considered to 
be people who can affect or be affected by an organisation’s wellbeing, including 
customers, communities, the government, and employees (Freeman, Harrison, & 
Wicks, 2010; Jensen, 2001; Phillips, Freeman, & Wicks, 2003; Roberts, 1992). 
Managers need to make decisions that are in the interests of all the company’s 
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stakeholders (Jensen, 2001). Companies are pressured by these individuals or 
groups to be transparent (Christensen, 2002), and since large companies are more 
exposed to the eyes of the public, they feel this pressure even more and, 
consequently, they are more likely to publish non-financial information (Branco & 
Rodrigues, 2006; Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang, & Yang, 2014).  
This pressure could create an opportunity for organisations and lead them to be 
sustainable and socially responsible. Companies consider CSR and transparency as 
good strategies if they can contribute to their profit and sales. However, spending 
large amounts of money, and publishing non-financial information excessively may 
seem pretentious and damage a company’s reputation and credibility (Arvidsson, 
2010; Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Jones & Pittman, 1982; Morsing & Schultz, 2006). 
When CSR and sustainability are misleading and are used solely for marketing but 
have little or no substance, it is known as greenwashing (Bazillier & Vauday, 2009). 
The term Greenwashing was coined by the American environmentalist, Jay 
Westerveld, for companies that undertake activities to create an environment to 
mislead the public and therefore deflect attention from the real environmental issues 
raised because of the firms’ actions (Koh, Butler, Laurance, Sodhi, Mateo-Vega & 
Bradshaw, 2010). Greenwashing includes misinforming customers regarding the 
environmental benefits that a product could have (Werther & Chandler, 2010). 
The main objective of greenwashing is to make the customers feel like the 
organisation is taking the necessary steps in sustaining the environment while in 
fact it is not as responsible as it is claiming to be (Orange, 2010). These corporations 
spend more money pretending to be green than taking any actual actions to be 
environmental friendly. Creating a sustainable image through greenwashing, as 
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Laufer (2003) explains, is possible by corporations trying to “hide deviance, deflect 
attributions of fault, obscure the nature of the problem or allegation, reattribute 
blame, ensure an entity’s reputation and, finally, seek to appear in a leadership 
position” (p. 255). Greenwashing may also occur because of a company’s lack of 
understanding of the purpose of CSR activities, and its inability to link 
sustainability issues to strategies (Baumgartner & Ebner, 2010). 
Although legal restrictions require organisations to be transparent and sustainable 
up to a specific standard, organisations may choose to display more information 
voluntarily, both to show their work plan and to gain more trust from stakeholders 
and keep them satisfied. How organisations select and present information is 
significantly important (Christensen, 2002). Their choice and the way they 
demonstrate the data is among other strategic choices that they must make carefully.  
CSR can benefit both society and the corporation itself. There are ways to be 
socially responsible and at the same time use CSR to build a strong reputation for 
the company. Werther and Chandler (2010) argue that the best way to maximise 
profits for companies is to ensure that they fulfil the expectations of stakeholders 
as much as possible. In today’s corporate world, customer satisfaction goes beyond 
just guaranteeing good products and services. Consumers expect corporations to 
give back to the communities that they are operating in various ways as well as to 
look after the environment.  
As mentioned earlier, globalisation (Baylis et al., 2010; Robertson, 1992; Scholte, 
2005) has influenced the corporate world by creating a shift in the balance of power 
and control over the flow of information from corporations to the stakeholders 
(Werther and Chandler, 2010). This shift of power creates a challenge for 
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corporations as they cannot carry on with their plans as they used to, but it also 
creates an opportunity for them to use CSR strategically.   
A very closely related concept to CSR which according to some scholars such as 
Cheung (2011), looks further than just serving the current stakeholders of 
companies and involves future generations, and improving the conditions that 
people live in, is sustainability. The next section of this literature review discusses 
sustainability and its relationship to CSR. 
2.3.2. Corporate Sustainability  
Scholars have adopted three different approaches involving economics, ecology, 
and social science to study the notion of sustainability (Adams, 2006). Some, such 
as D’Aquila (2012) and Higgins and Coffey (2016), argue that sustainability is 
closely related to (and sometimes referred to as) the concepts of CSR and Triple 
Bottom Line reporting, and involves social, economic, and environmental factors. 
Others such as Hediger (2010) highlight that while sustainability is related to the 
concept of CSR, there are fundamental differences. He writes:  
Corporate sustainability refers to an internal objective of maintaining the 
capital stock and corporate value, rather than fulfilling some arbitrarily 
determined sustainability criteria. It indirectly serves the objective of 
sustainable development by its objective of sustainable asset management. 
In contrast, CSR refers to the way companies manage their internal 
resources (including shareholders’ expectations) and at the same time 
contribute to the welfare of other stakeholders (society) (p.524-525). 
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Cheung (2011) also argues that CSR and sustainability concentrate on different 
things and that while both concepts consider social, economic, and environmental 
factors, they have different ways of combining them. For instance, according to 
Cheung, in CSR economic and social components work independently, while 
corporate sustainability considers them interrelated. Aside from that, some 
sustainability scholars consider environmental issues as being concerned with the 
preservation of the planet, regardless of how it benefits people (Montiel, 2008), 
while some CSR scholars consider these issues to be based on how they can be 
beneficial to humans. Cheung (2011), for example, explains that CSR is related to 
communication of the relationship between the environment and people, while 
sustainability, especially in the form of ‘sustainable development’ is more about 
what role the corporation plays as “human-oriented agents” to maintain a 
sustainable operation. From another point of view, corporate sustainability is seen 
as concerned with future generations, while CSR is more concerned with balancing 
social, economic, and environmental dimensions (Cheung, 2011). 
While Hediger (2010) argues that corporate sustainability obliges corporate value 
to be maximised and not dropped over time, Vucetich and Nelson (2010) describe 
sustainability from a social and environmental point of view as providing human 
needs in a manner that does not jeopardise the environment or society. Based on 
this definition, they draw a framework with five dimensions (Figure 3): a. 
Developed technologies that affect environments and societies; b. Understanding 
environment; c. Understanding the effects of taking advantage from the 
environment; d. Understanding the effects of exploitation on societies and cultures; 
and e. Understanding ethical attitudes about human beings and nature. In this 
framework, sustainability is seen as the relationship between the environment and 
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society, which encompasses tensions between exploitation and ethical attitudes and 
is affected by the factors mentioned above. Figure 3 illustrates the mechanism of 
this relationship.  
 
Figure 3. The dimensions that affect sustainability. Source Vucetich and Nelson (2010, p. 540) 
 
Sustainability is a very broad topic that can be both simple and complex 
(Bosselmann, 2008). During the past few years, the concept of sustainability has 
become more important to businesses, which has led them to choose their approach 
towards dealing with social and environmental issues more strategically (Higgins 
& Coffey, 2016). The reliance of stakeholders, including shareholders, on non-
financial information to make the right decisions, has dramatically increased over 
the years (Hughen et al., 2014). Commitment to being sustainable is seen more as 
a valuable advantage when competing with other companies, and as a guide which 
can help improve the company’s performance in the future (Lourenço, Callen, 
Branco, & Curto, 2014).  
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The results of studies conducted by Eccles, Ioannou, and Serafeim (2014), Khaled 
and Aly (2010), Lourenço et al. (2014), among others, suggest that companies’ 
good reputation in social and environmental performance enables investors to 
anticipate the companies’ future earnings better. This is because investors are able 
to understand companies’ long-term plans in greater depth, thus improving their 
share prices and total income in the long run. While the main goal for many 
companies that take sustainability seriously is to improve their reputation and build 
a good image, improving environmental performance and managing a company’s 
impacts and wastes results in reducing costs of operation, saving money, and 
creating an opportunity for new business ventures (Nidumolu, Prahalad, & 
Rangaswami, 2009).  
Many other scholars believe that companies can benefit from meeting the demands 
and expectations of stakeholders who do not own shares in the company because if 
a corporation fails to do so it will face financial consequences (Freeman et al., 2010;  
Porter & Kramer, 2011) such as consumers refusing to buy their products or 
services (Sen & Bhattacharya, 2001). Numerous studies illustrate that when 
companies demonstrate strong socially responsible action, they can get positive 
feedback from customers (Brown & Dacin, 1997; Creyer, 1997; Ellen, Mohr, & 
Webb, 2000; Sen & Bhattacharya, 2001). A study done by SBC & Fairfax Media 
(2013) in New Zealand found that 63% of their participants (more than 2000 New 
Zealanders participated) said they will stop using a company’s product if they find 
out that the company’s actions are not socially and environmentally responsible. 
Aside from being boycotted by their customers, companies can face other 
consequences for not meeting stakeholders’ expectations, such as being penalised 
by the government (Eccles et al., 2014), or failing to recruit skilful and quality 
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employees, who care about companies’ social and environmental performance 
(Greening & Turban, 2000). 
A study by Hayward et al. (2013) on 1000 CEOs, in 103 countries from different 
industries, found that 93% of the participants considered sustainability as an 
important factor for a company’s success. However, the same study suggests that 
the participants had trouble understanding the business benefits of sustainability. 
While many companies see sustainability as a valuable concept for their business, 
some see it as a cost. According to Nidumolu et al. (2009), many CEOs in the 
United States and Europe believe that shifting to a more sustainable approach is 
costly and puts them at a disadvantage, since many of their competitors in other 
countries are not under pressure from their stakeholders to do the same. Despite 
their doubts about values of sustainability, many CEOs are still convinced that the 
notion of sustainability is changing their industries for the better, and request 
governments’ involvement to align their regulations with sustainability (Hayward 
et al., 2013). 
Branco and Rodrigues (2006) believe that some scholars exclude certain industries 
such as financial services and banks from sustainability related studies because they 
believe such sectors do not have much impact on the environment. This view 
disregards social sustainability. On the other hand, others argue that banks and other 
financial services can affect the environment by investing in businesses that are not 
environmentally friendly (Branco & Rodrigues, 2006; Thompson & Cowton, 
2004). Aside from that, these institutions use a considerable amount of energy and 
other resources (e.g. paper) and should have sustainability policies that include 
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managing their resources (Branco & Rodrigues, 2006), and demonstrate and 
communicate their impacts with their stakeholders.  
There are many tools used by companies to communicate their social and 
environmental performance with the stakeholders, such as sustainability reports 
(Higgins & Coffey, 2016). The next section of this literature review, concentrates 
on some of the tools that are used for non-financial reporting. 
2.3.2.1. Non-financial reporting 
Annual and other corporate reports have played important roles in communicating 
public companies’ performance with their stakeholders, ever since ownership 
separated from control (Mir, Chatterjee, & Rahaman, 2009), as discussed earlier. In 
recent years, there has been a growth in expectation for companies to be more 
transparent regarding their activities which have an impact on society, environment, 
and the economy (Benn, Dunphy, & Griffiths, 2014). Voluntary non-financial 
reporting dates back to the 1970s (Livesey & Kearins, 2002). Martínez-Ferrero, 
Garcia-Sanchez, and Cuadrado-Ballesteros (2015) argue that the interest for non-
financial information to be added to corporate reports has increased, and their 
results suggest a positive relationship between companies’ quality of financial data, 
and how they disclose sustainability information. Arvidsson (2010) argues that this 
increase in expectation for non-financial reporting is due to pressure from societies, 
caused by numerous corporate scandals.  Restrictions such as disclosure regulations 
have been deployed to stop companies getting involved in wrong doings, in order 
to re-establish trust between corporations and the society (Sutantoputra, 2009).  
While corporate disclosure is meant to create an informational link between 
external sources, especially potential investors, and the company, social disclosure 
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is considered as an approach that impacts the way stakeholders perceive an 
organisation (Brammer & Pavelin, 2004). In other words, corporations practice 
CSR disclosure to develop legitimacy for themselves. Publishing corporate 
sustainability reports, and other forms of corporate social reporting, is one way to 
achieve that goal. While there are different ways to disclose non-financial 
information, sustainability reports are used by companies the most (Fernandez-
Feijoo, Romero, & Ruiz, 2014a). Carroll and Shabana (2010) define corporate 
social reporting as “issue of stand-alone reports that provide information regarding 
a company’s economic, environmental and social performance” (p. 99). They 
further explain that by releasing these reports firms can show that they are doing 
what is expected from them; hence they are “legitimate” (p.100). The reports are 
also seen to reduce the risk of being accused of lack of transparency, thereby 
creating competitive advantage.  
 Gray, Kouhy, and Lavers (1995) suggest that the survival of a company calls for 
the support of its stakeholders who must approve of actions that the firm takes. 
Therefore, these actions need to be aligned with what stakeholders appreciate. The 
more power stakeholders have, the more the company has to adjust. Hence non-
financial disclosure acts as a kind of interaction between the stakeholders and the 
corporations. Font, Walmsley, Cogotti, McCombes, and Häusler (2012) also argue 
that regardless of what view Friedman (1970) had on the matter of the 
responsibilities of businesses, currently those responsibilities include more than just 
satisfying shareholders and investors, and the importance of corporate social 
responsibility activities and non-financial disclosure are commonly accepted. 
Epstein, Buhovac, and Yuthas (2010) explain that sustainability disclosure starts 
with leadership and that once employees see the benefits of communicating 
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sustainability performance, they will follow management and will integrate the 
concept with their own tasks, and will do it without hesitation, because they know 
that management will be supportive of their actions.   
Sustainability reports have become useful tools in finding the real sustainability 
issues that need to be addressed, which can help improve operations (Higgins & 
Coffey, 2016). KPMG’s survey of corporate transparency, which is conducted 
every three years, shows substantial growth in production of sustainability reports 
by the 250 largest companies in the world (G250). According to the survey, only 
50% of these companies produced such a report in 2005, while by 2013, this number 
had grown to 95% (KPMG, 2005, 2013). 
The drivers for producing non-financial reports have changed over the years. 
Higgins and Coffey (2016) explain that these reports were initially published 
because of the social pressure on the companies, and the need for the companies to 
gain legitimacy. However, today the reports are published for other strategic 
benefits such as improving a company’s position compared to competitors, 
managing stakeholder expectations, decreasing pressure from the government, and 
ensuring that a company is doing its part as a sustainable entity.  
The level of transparency of what is reported by companies may be affected by 
different factors. In their study, Fernandez-Feijoo et al. (2014a) find that the 
ownership structure of the company influences how transparent their non-financial 
report is. Their findings suggest that, even though publicly listed companies 
disclose more sustainability and CSR related information than private 
organisations, their reports are not as reliable as the private ones. Other scholars 
have looked at non-financial reporting based on the geographic region where the 
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companies were located (Fernandez-Feijoo, Romero, & Ruiz, 2014b; Sumiani, 
Haslinda, & Lehman, 2007; Tilt, 2016). 
 Pervious literature has also examined the relationship between the size of the 
company and the content included in corporate responsibility reports (Baumann-
Pauly, Wickert, Spence, & Scherer, 2013; Frias-Aceituno, Rodríguez-Ariza, & 
Garcia-Sánchez, 2014; Gallo & Christensen, 2011; Morhardt, 2010). Several 
studies have found that size of the company affects the quality of their non-financial 
reports. Studies by Brammer and Millington (2006), Fernandez-Feijoo et al. 
(2014a), Simnett, Vanstraelen, and Chua (2009), indicate that larger companies 
disclose more information. The literature also suggests that aside from company 
size, the industry that the companies are active in can also be considered a factor 
(Alali & Romero, 2012; Kolk & Perego, 2010), though it is not as important as size 
(Hackston & Milne, 1996). 
Prado-Lorenzo, Gallego-Alvarez, and Garcia-Sanchez (2009) also consider size as 
an important factor and argue that larger companies that normally have more social 
and economic impacts, grab government’s attention more easily, and therefore are 
more transparent to minimise the political cost. They also explain that, aside from 
the government, shareholders can heavily influence the content of non-financial 
reports. However, since shareholders are not generally interested in the accuracy of 
the information included in the report, but rather in the benefits that publishing the 
report will have for the company (Mason & Simmons, 2014), Prado-Lorenzo et al. 
(2009) suggest that the government as an important stakeholder should have strict 
laws around sustainability reporting. In addition, Fernandez-Feijoo et al. (2014b) 
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found that pressure from certain stakeholders such as employees and customers can 
positively impact the quality of sustainability reports.  
Another factor, which internally affects the quality of transparency in corporations, 
is the board of directors. Rao and Tilt (2016) find that “multiple directorship” in 
different companies can affect the quality of non-financial reporting in companies. 
In addition, while the board usually has the final review before the reports are 
published, there is a possibility that the members of the board of directors could act 
in their own interest, rather than the interest of other stakeholders (Kasum & 
Etudaiye-Muthar, 2014). In their study of 23 publicly listed companies in Australia, 
Stubbs, Higgins, and Milne (2013) identify some factors that have been barriers to 
non-financial reporting, including absence of pressure from external stakeholders, 
companies’ negative perception of the benefits of such reports, and lack of 
encouragement within the organisational structure and culture. 
Even though there has been consistent growth in the publication of sustainability 
reports, many companies are unable to link the concept of sustainability to their 
strategies (Baumgartner & Ebner, 2010; Galpin & Whittington, 2012;Porter & 
Kramer, 2006). Galpin and Whittington (2012) argue that for sustainability efforts 
to work and provide value for both the company and society in the long run, 
sustainability activities must be integrated with a company’s strategies, and must 
be aligned with the company’s values. In addition, Baumgartner and Ebner (2010) 
explain that, to have complete sustainability strategies, all three dimensions 
(environmental, social, and economic), their impact, and how they interrelate, must 
be considered.  
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The following describes some of the different types of sustainability strategies 
(Baumgartner, 2009): 
Introverted strategy concentrates on making sure that the actions taken are 
essential and beneficial for the wellbeing of the company. Most of the activities 
which are based on this type of strategy are compliance driven, to protect the 
company against regulations and standards that involve social and environmental 
concerns. An example of this strategy is when companies improve the work 
environment to avoid the risk of gaining a bad reputation. In this context, 
compliance can be viewed as an opportunity. As Nidumolu et al. (2009) put it: 
 It is tempting to adhere to the lowest environmental standards for as long as 
possible. However, it is smarter to comply with the most stringent rules, and 
to do so before they are enforced. This yields substantial first-mover 
advantages in terms of fostering innovation.  (p.2) 
Nidumolu et al. (2009) explain that businesses that concentrate on meeting the 
upcoming standards have more time to prepare themselves in regard to the changes 
that need to be made, and are normally the ones that find business opportunities 
before others. Aside from that, companies can become the leading force for change, 
by assisting in the creation of social and environmental regulations, and as a result 
create a partnership with the regulators.  
Extroverted strategy concentrates on companies’ external relationships, and how 
a company is viewed by the public. Companies may invest in many social and 
environmental activities to gain the public’s trust and a Social License to Operate 
(SLO). A SLO is described as the continuous approval of a company’s operation 
by the community in which it is active, and by other stakeholders (Boutilier & 
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Thomson, 2011; Moffat & Zhang, 2014; Prno & Slocombe, 2012). In other words, 
it is seen as an investment for company legitimacy. According to the Sustainable 
Business Council (SBC) and Business NZ's Major Companies Group (MCG), a 
SLO is a company’s ability to continue to operate because society trusts that the 
firm will act legitimately, and be socially and environmentally responsible. They 
believe that, aside from compliance, the wellbeing of a much larger group of 
stakeholders is considered by the companies that want a social licence to operate 
(SBC, 2013). 
Conservative strategy concentrates on efficiency in production and creating goods 
and services that are made using a minimum amount of energy and material. While 
this strategy lessens effects on the environment, it also gives the company a 
competitive advantage in terms of cost reduction, due to efficient production, and a 
good reputation in environmental performance (Baumgartner & Ebner, 2010). 
Visionary strategy concentrates on all possible sustainability related matters in 
every aspect of the business. A visionary strategy is designed to be uniquely 
advantageous for both customers and stakeholders. Sustainability in this strategy is 
focused on innovation and diversity, based on the opportunities that arise in the 
market (Baumgartner, 2009; Baumgartner & Ebner, 2010). 
2.3.2.2. Sustainability and Non-financial reporting in New Zealand 
While the concept of non-financial reporting has been around for decades, the 
process of adopting it in New Zealand has been rather slow. An overwhelming 
majority of businesses in the country do not produce any form of social and 
environmental reporting (Lawrence, 2007). Accounts of the lack of trustworthy 
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indicators to measure sustainability growth in the country date back to the late 
1990s (Bicknell, Ball, Cullen, & Bigsby, 1998).  
Many attribute this slow progress to New Zealand’s history of the introduction of 
strong neoliberalism during the 1980s, with the belief that creating a free market 
and competition would help overcome the lack of economic progress (Connell & 
Dados, 2014) and result in greater productivity (Lovell, Kearns, & Prince, 2014). It 
began with the social democratic Labour Government, first by privatising and 
restructuring the activities of many government sectors and creating at least nine 
state owned enterprises (SOEs), and second, by creating an investment friendly 
environment for entrepreneurs to bring their business and capital to New Zealand 
(Kingfisher, 2013).  
Even though in the early 1990s the government included social and environmental 
factors in legislation by introducing The Resource Management Act of 1991, the 
number of social disclosure requirements by law in New Zealand at the time were 
minimal (Hackston & Milne, 1996; Milne & Adler, 1999). A study by Lawrence, 
Collins, Pavlovich, and Arunachalam (2006) a few years later illustrates the same 
lack of pressure from the government.  
While the Labour government of 2000-2008 stated that it would put sustainable 
development in the core of all its policies (Collins, Dickie, & Weber, 2009), it 
avoided taking a leading role and setting up any compliance standards (Bebbington, 
Higgins, & Frame, 2009). Their argument was that it must not take the lead and 
play a central role in managing such issues since what the government introduces 
as a standard is normally viewed as the minimum of what all corporations 
(regardless of their size and profitability) must do (Collins, Lawrence, Pavlovich, 
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& Ryan, 2007). When it comes to leading environmental initiatives, government 
organisations often lack robust leadership and tend to lean towards a business as 
usual strategy (Birchall, Ball, Mason, & Milne, 2013), a strategy that is 
fundamentally about carrying on with a company’s current practices, without 
considering any drastic changes to the way the business is run in order to achieve 
sustainability (Collins, Kearins, & Roper, 2005).  
Others also suggest that successive New Zealand Governments have adopted a 
neoliberal approach to sustainability development and thus have not significantly 
inspired sustainability practices (Collins et al. (2007); Frame & Bebbington, 2012). 
Bellringer, Ball, and Craig (2011), reporting a study conducted in 2009 under the 
National Government, say that the sustainability reporting produced by local 
governments in New Zealand did not seem to be inspired “by an idealistic desire to 
ensure a sustainable world, but more by pragmatism and economic rationalism” (p. 
126).  
There is a growing expectation from consumers and individuals in the country who 
demand action on sustainability problems from both the government and businesses 
(Collins, Roper, & Lawrence, 2010). In a survey done by the Moxie Design Group 
(2007), 40 percent of the participants stated that they were concerned with what 
companies are doing to gain profit. In another 2007 study, conducted by Shape NZ 
for the New Zealand for Business Council for Sustainable Development 
(NZBCSD), that included over 3000 New Zealanders, 70% indicated that a 
company’s actions that impact the environment significantly affects their decision 
to purchase that company’s products (Collins et al., 2010). A study done by SBC & 
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Fairfax Media (2013), mentioned earlier, suggests similar expectations from the 
public. 
In order for each organisation to be successful, it is essential to build trust between 
managers, shareholders, employees, society, and the government (Bandsuch, Pate, 
& Thies, 2008). Typically, legal restrictions around the world require organisations 
to release information about their future plans and their annual reports (Christensen, 
2002). This includes New Zealand’s government which, through its three regulatory 
bodies of the Reserved Bank of New Zealand, the Commerce Commission, and the 
Financial Market Authority, ensures a “financially healthy New Zealand” (FMA, 
2016). Any such legislation that is approved by the government will be passed down 
by the FMA to the NZX as the authority figure in charge of overseeing the market. 
Of note is the fact that the NZX, as for other countries operating under a neoliberal 
economic system, is itself featured in its own list.  Thus, the NZX oversees the 
market of which it is also a participant, creating a conflict of interest.  
All publicly listed companies in New Zealand are required to include “material 
information” in their annual reports (NZX, 2016).The listing rules, which are 
enforced by New Zealand Stock Exchange (NZX), define material information as 
information that “a reasonable person would expect if it were generally available to 
the market, to have a material effect on the price of quoted securities of the issuer” 
(NZX, 2016, p. 13). The FMA does not require corporations to release any 
sustainability information and the recording system for such information remains 
underdeveloped. With the absence of legislation and government policies regarding 
non-financial disclosure, the encouragement to release such information has been 
coming from non-governmental organisations, and the initiative remains voluntary. 
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The argument presented by the supporters of voluntary disclosure is that, in the long 
term, relying on pressure from the industry to implement sustainability practices is 
a lot more effective than making it mandatory through regulations (Brown & Stone, 
2007; Flint & Golicic, 2009). 
It was in 1999 and in the early 2000s that organisations such as the New Zealand 
Business Council for Sustainable Development (NZBCSD, 2018) a branch of the 
World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD), and the 
Sustainable Business Network (SBN, 2016) were established in New Zealand. The 
NZBCSD is now known as the Sustainable Business Council (SBC) (SBC, 2016). 
Aside from helping their members operate a successful business by becoming more 
sustainable, one of the most important aspects of the appearance of organisations 
such as the SBC has been their stance against the “Friedmanite economic ideology” 
associated with neoliberalism (Milne et al., 2005, p. 6). 
Members join organisations such as the SBC voluntarily and producing a 
sustainability report is a membership requirement. The SBC encourages its 
members to present an annual sustainable development report, which contains the 
company’s plans in applying sustainable development (SBC, 2016). This report is 
not required by law but is a requirement of SBCNZ membership and has to be done 
within two years after joining the council (SBC, 2016). Companies that do not 
comply, and do not commit to activity and attend SBC meetings, may be invited to 
resign. Results of a study by Lawrence, Collins, and Roper (2013) suggest that 
members of sustainability organisations such as the SBC and the SBN tend to be 
more engaged in social and environmental practices. 
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Some scholars, however, have criticised how organisations such as the NZBCSD 
(now SBC) have shaped the sustainability reporting activities of their members. 
Milne et al. (2005) studied the language used by NZBCSD and its members for their 
annual reports and concluded that, while the organisation talks about sustainability, 
it is using the wrong rhetoric to promote the concept. Milne et al. were concerned 
that the NZBCSD was introducing sustainability as just eco-proficiency and 
engagement with the stakeholders, concentrating mostly on the business aspects of 
its mission, and warned that this way of promoting sustainability would provide an 
environment for industrial capitalism to persist and fully use up all resources 
quietly. Milne, Walton, and Tregidga (2009) argue that the threat and the power of 
the discourse used by NZBCSD lies in how it silently and continuously emphasises 
economic rationales and the dominance of the business.  
Tregidga and Milne (2006) write: 
Through the triple bottom line…sustainable development is constructed in 
a way that fits with what the organization already largely does – stakeholder 
consultation and engagement, managing environmental impacts, making 
profits and being efficient…not only does the organization convey images 
that it can manage these issues, it now signals that it wants to, and indeed 
that it must do so. This necessity, however, is no longer an externally 
imposed requirement concerned with environmental degradation; it is an 
internally imposed one concerned with economic ends. The environment is 
now less a problem, it is the source of value, and to serve economic interests 
it must be managed carefully. (p. 237).  
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Similarly, Milne, Kearins, and Walton (2006) argue that for companies that speak 
of sustainability as a journey, reporting and other forms of communication create a 
platform where organisations select to exhibit certain aspects of their company and 
how they engage with sustainability. They explain that such companies view 
themselves and their actions as ground-breaking and courageous and want to be 
perceived as honest, seem interested to gain stakeholders’ trust, and believe that 
reporting will make them appear as reliable and honest compared to companies 
which do not produce a report.  
Milne et al. (2006) criticise this type of rhetoric in sustainability, saying that the 
journey metaphor used by some of large corporations in New Zealand interprets 
sustainability into a boundless process, which allows companies to put off tackling 
crucial ethical issues such as “limited resource availability; finite substitution 
possibilities; a lack of connectedness and our collective peril; and no special place 
for the environment at all” (p. 825). They argue that composing sustainability as a 
journey is a strategy for the corporations to escape stating some of their upcoming 
desired affairs. This allows them to use a rhetoric to be perceived as sincerely 
engaging in sustainability discourses and taking advantage of New Zealand’s 
“clean, green” image which is worth billions of dollars annually (Collins et al., 
2010), while at the same time creating a discourse that understates any discussions 
of fundamental change.  
In their study of the annual reports released by 50 of the largest companies in New 
Zealand, Hackston and Milne (1996) look into the factors that impact social and 
environmental reporting and suggest that while the profitability of the company in 
their study was unrelated to the amount of social and environmental information 
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they disclosed, the industry and the size of the corporation mattered. They argue 
that the larger companies released more information compared to the smaller ones, 
and suggest that this size-industry relationship with disclosure may have been 
triggered by the investors’ interest to know more about companies’ risky activities.  
Their study also shows that New Zealand based companies tend to release more on 
human resources, while community and environmental themes also receive 
noteworthy attention. The majority of the information released appears to be good 
news. Hackston and Milne (1996) also make a comparison with the reporting habits 
of other countries such as Canada, the US, and the UK, and believe that non-
financial disclosure could be higher in these countries either because particular 
regulations demand such transparency or for cultural reasons.  
However, in their study of some of the members of the NZBCSD, Bebbington et al. 
(2009) feel that “mimetic pressure” (p. 615) and sensitivity to what other companies 
are doing may play a more significant role than regulations for inspiring 
sustainability reporting. Al-Maskati, Bate, and Bhabra (2015) discuss another issue, 
multiple directorship, and illustrate that in New Zealand many directors are facing 
“director busyness” because they serve in multiple companies at the same time. 
Fox, Walker, and Pekmezovic (2012) argue that the limited number of talented and 
skilled directors and their “busyness” negatively affects their ability to monitor 
companies’ actions and decisions. 
In an attempt to look into why social and environmental reporting has not grown in 
New Zealand, Wright, Milne, and Tregidga (2016) conducted a study, which 
included the SBC, the SBN, and 11 of their members. Six of the 11 participants 
were reporting companies and only three of the 11 were publicly listed. Once again, 
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they criticise the failed role of organisations such as the SBC and the fact that the 
council does not produce a report itself (as discussed earlier, Milne et al. (2005); 
Milne et al. (2006) offer similar criticism). Their findings suggest that the reporting 
foundations endorsed by the SBC and SBN encourage and trigger resistance to 
social and environmental reporting. They argue that due to the lack of “coercive 
pressure” (p. 29) from these organisations and other external powers, reporting 
practice is bound to stay minimal and “a fizzer” in New Zealand, unless members 
see a form of financial gain from reporting. As Wright et al. (2016) point out, “In 
the absence of any strident stakeholder demand, compelling win-win logics for 
reporting remain far from clear” (p. 29).  
Collins et al. (2010) similarly find that the companies that are most engaged with 
sustainability practices show good financial returns or eco efficiency. The study is 
an analysis of two sets of surveys done in 2003 and 2006 that included SBN 
members and non-SBN member establishments with different sizes. It is not clear 
how many of these companies were publicly listed. They also found cost, 
management time, and the lack of knowledge and skills as the main obstacles for 
embracing sustainability practices, and brand and reputation as the main drivers 
(10% increase in 2006 compared to 2003 in this category). Collins et al. (2010) 
conclude that the personal values of management are extremely important when it 
comes to engaging sustainability practices. 
New Zealand’s approach to sustainability reporting has remained less inspired by 
empathy for social and environmental issues and more encouraged by strategic 
needs of corporations, matching the country’s neoliberal economy. And as is the 
norm for a neoliberal system, 
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the business sector has predominantly embraced ideologies of economic 
growth, individual rather than collective responsibilities, minimal 
government intervention in business matters and voluntary action for issues 
such as environmental damage mitigation” ( Lawrence et al., 2013, p. 51).  
Regardless of the drivers behind reporting, those companies which choose to 
embrace non-financial reporting have many different framework options to choose 
and adopt from. Below I discuss two of the most well-known (and in the case of 
Integrated Reporting <IR>, arguably the most controversial) frameworks available.  
2.3.2.3. Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) 
There are several ways to produce non-financial reports. One of the issues that 
companies face while creating such reports is measuring all three components of 
sustainability: social, economic, and environmental. D’Aquila (2012) explains that 
while economic factors are relatively easy to measure by accountants, the other two 
components can be more difficult to measure due to the lack of a clear unit of 
measurement, compared to the economic dimension (e.g. dollars can be used as a 
unit of measurement).  
A common way of making corporate social reports is by following the Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI) that offers a well-known set of guidelines that has 
assisted corporations in creating voluntary sustainability reports since 1997 (Hale, 
Hale, & Held, 2011). The GRI guidelines are the most used sustainability reporting 
guidelines in the world (Levy, Szejnwald Brown, & de Jong, 2010) and are regarded 
as providing the most suitable standards by which companies can measure their 
impacts on the environment, society, and the economy (GRI, 2016b; Manetti, 
2011). The GRI’s vision is “to improve corporate accountability by ensuring that 
 65 
all stakeholders – communities, environmentalists, labour, religious groups, 
shareholders, investment managers – have access to standardised, comparable, and 
consistent environmental information akin to corporate financial reporting” 
(Brown, De Jong, & Lessidrenska, 2009, p. 189). It is important to clarify that 
according to G4 (the last guideline released by the GRI), the economic 
measurement of sustainability is concerned with the companies’ effects on the 
economic environments of its stakeholders and is not concerned with the financial 
situation of the firm (GRI, 2013b).  
Hahn and Lülfs (2014) argue, however, that while the GRI guidelines direct 
companies on what to report, they do not necessarily tell them how to report it.  
They explain that the GRI guidelines are designed for companies to report on both 
positive and negative impacts, and the negative impacts may affect a company’s 
reputation. For that reason, many companies tend to concentrate more on narrative 
and positive news (Hackston & Milne, 1996). To minimise the risk of jeopardising 
reputation, Hahn and Lülfs (2014) suggest a different version of how to report the 
negative impacts (Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4. Scheme for disclosing negative incidents. Source: Hahn and Lülfs (2014, p. 415) 
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Hahn and Lülfs (2014) suggest that the process of reporting on negative impacts 
can be broken down into the steps shown in the scheme above and explain that, 
first, the negative issue has to be accurately described. Next, the circumstances of 
what happened need to be explained. After the second step, Hahn and Lülfs (2014) 
clarify that, for the sake of protecting the legitimacy of the company, and to avoid 
risking its reputation, the company may need to add the two voluntary steps, which 
are designed to first evaluate the situation and identify the solutions to address the 
issue and, finally, describe the actions that they took to resolve the problem. 
The GRI has taken action to improve how it assesses sustainability by transitioning 
from guidelines (G4 was the last guideline) to GRI Standards. While the GRI 
Standards are based on the content of G4, some major improvements have been 
made (GRI, 2018) including: 
• A New Structure: The G4 guidelines previously had a separate G4 
Implementation Manual which has been brought together in the GRI 
Standards. Some parts have also been integrated with others to avoid 
repetition, and a simpler language is used throughout the report for better 
understanding.   
• A New format with clearer requirements: For a company to be able to 
use the GRI Standards they must now comply with its requirements, 
indicated by the term “shall” in the standards. An example of one these 
requirements is conducting a thorough stakeholder engagement process. 
The Standards also have recommendations which are indicated using the 
term “should”. 
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According to the GRI (2018), while this transition is taking place, the G4 remains 
valid.  
Not all companies use GRI as a standard. In fact, there are more than 400 
sustainability reporting instruments around the world, 65% of which are mandatory 
for publicly listed companies (UNEP et al., 2016). Lydenberg, Rogers, and Wood 
(2010) note that while voluntary reporting on sustainability issues is becoming 
gradually accepted as a system that creates value, it also has problems. They explain 
that companies in a voluntary system can choose the time of the year, and how often 
they want to report. They can also choose indicators and formats that suit their 
image, which helps them create a false reputation of responsibility (Hahn & Lülfs, 
2014). They believe a mandatory system, in contrast, creates a fair platform, which 
has the same conditions for all companies to release information regarding their 
sustainability performance, allowing stakeholders to discuss companies’ operations 
and their impacts, and enabling investors to compare companies’ performance in 
the same industry.  
On the other hand, companies’ activities might have costs for society known as 
“externalities” (Mosteanu and Iacob, 2009). Externalities arise from activities that 
harm the environment, society, and the economy in direct and indirect ways, 
damaging public goods and imposing costs on people living in affected 
communities. Mandatory reporting helps regulators identify the offenders. 
Mosteanu and Iacob believe that these offending companies should be penalised 
and made to pay for the damage they have caused. Punishing offenders, however, 
is not possible in a voluntary system (Nadesan, 2011).  
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While scholars such as Alesina, Ardagna, Nicoletti, and Schiantarelli (2005) 
suggest that having fewer regulations attracts more investment, and adding 
regulations may prevent new businesses from entering the market (Koźluk, 2014), 
others such Testa, Iraldo, and Frey (2011) argue that laws that involve sustainability 
majorly impact companies’ competitiveness and challenges them to be more 
innovative in their operations, resulting in improvement in their environmental 
performance. 
2.3.2.4. Integrated Reporting 
A tool designed to improve traditional financial reports, and to integrate 
sustainability issues with companies’ core values and strategies, is Integrated 
Reporting (IR) (Higgins & Coffey, 2016; Higgins, Stubbs, & Love, 2014; 
Rowbottom & Locke, 2013). The International Integrated Reporting Committee 
(IIRC), defines IR as a tool that “brings together material information about an 
organisation’s strategy, governance, performance and prospects in a way that 
reflects the commercial, social and environmental context within which it operates” 
(IIRC, 2011, p. 2).  
IIRC is a global partnership of regulatory bodies, shareholders, corporations, 
accounting professionals, and non-profit organisations, which encourages 
communication regarding creating better value in corporate reports. The IIRC has 
been developing and testing a framework since 2014 (IIRC, 2016). They believe 
that Integrated Reporting must be the main reporting tool that companies use, since 
it draws a clearer picture of what the company does to create value for itself, and 
other stakeholders, by combining all financial and non-financial corporate reports, 
and other statements together (Figure 5). Adams (2015), however, argues that using 
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an integrated report does not make sustainability reporting redundant: “you cannot 
tell a comprehensive value creation story unless you have been identifying material 
sustainability risk and thinking about the benefits of your social, community and 
environmental investments” (p. 23). 
 
 
Figure 5. The evolution and prediction of Integrated Reporting from 1960-2020. Source: IIRC (2011, p. 7) 
Adams and Simnett (2011) explain that Integrated Reporting presents a framework 
that communicates the relationship between all forms of assets, or capital (not just 
financial), which are important to the company and essential for creation of long 
lasting values. These forms of capital are shown in Table 1 in the next page.  
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Form of Capital Description 
Financial capital  
The pool of funds that is available to the organisation for use in the 




Manufactured physical objects (as distinct from natural physical 
objects) that are available to the organisation for use in the production 
of goods or the provision of services. 
Human capital People’s skills and experience, and their motivations to innovate. 
Social capital The institutions and relationships established within and between 
each community, group of stakeholders, and other networks to 
enhance individual and collective well-being, which together support 
the business model. 
Intellectual 
capital 
Intangibles that provide competitive advantage. 
Natural capital Natural capital and the natural processes that generate them, including 
air, water, land, biodiversity, eco-system health, and natural sources 
of energy. 
 
Table 1. Important forms of capital for companies to create long lasting value. Source: Adams and Simnett 
(2011, p. 296) 
 
The IIRC (2013) explains the value creation process using Figure 6 below.  The 
external environment, which includes economic settings, technological change, and 
societal and environmental issues, sets the framework in which the company 
operates. The mission and vision incorporate the whole company, identifying its 
purpose and objective in clear terms. The people who are in charge of governance 
are accountable for forming a proper structure to oversee and support the ability of 
the company to create value. 
The business model, which is at the centre of the business, attracts different capitals 
as inputs and, through activities, transforms them to outputs including products, 
services and waste, which lead to outcomes (positive and negative results of 
company’s activities and business). The ability of the business model to familiarise 
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itself with the environment and to adapt to changes in the obtainability, quality and 
cost effectiveness of inputs can affect the company’s long-term sustainability. Risks 
and opportunities related to the way the company operates are recognised through 
observing and analysing the external environment. The company’s strategies are 
then designed to control and risks and magnify opportunities (IIRC, 2013). 
 
Figure 6. Value creation process. Source: (IIRC, 2013, p. 13) 
 
While non-financial reports are creating value for organisations all around the 
world, because of the amount of information involved they could be hundreds of 
pages long (Cheng et al., 2014). On the other hand, separation of financial and non-
financial information does not enhance stakeholder understanding. These issues can 
be resolved by using integrated reports that combine the financial and non-financial 
information and are designed to showcase companies’ short term and long term 
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plans to create value (Cheng et al., 2014).  An integrated report, therefore, is 
expected to have a number of benefits. First, it provides a clear and well-adjusted 
picture of company’s performance. Second, it can cause positive organisational 
changes in the company by promoting “integrated thinking”. And above all, it can 
help in understanding what creates value for the company and, as a result, improve 
decision making processes (Adams & Simnett, 2011, p. 293).  
The concept of integrated reporting is rather new and is still facing challenges. 
Many companies have chosen to wait and observe other organisations’ experience 
with IR before committing themselves (Rensburg & Botha, 2014; Watson, 2012). 
Views over the usefulness of IR are divided and scholars such as Dumay (2016) 
believe that IR has a long way to go to accomplish its objective of becoming the 
standard for corporate reporting and, as a result, regulated annual reports and other 
voluntary forms of social and environmental reporting are still favoured (Dumay, 
Bernardi, Guthrie, & Demartini, 2016). The findings of a study by Perego, 
Kennedy, and Whiteman (2016) suggest that, from a managerial point of view, 
many experts believe that IR is a disjointed and confusing field, and presently the 
majority of companies do not have a strong understanding of its business value. 
Dumay, Bernardi, Guthrie, and La Torre (2017) also believe that terms such as 
“integrated thinking” and “value creation” have been unclearly defined in IR’s 
framework which serves as a barrier to effectively applying it. Adams (2015) and 
Robertson and Samy (2015) raised the same concerns.  
Flower (2015) takes it a step further by claiming that the IIRC has failed to fully 
achieve its original goals. In his analysis of IIRC’s Framework (IIRC, 2013) and 
Discussion Paper (IIRC, 2011), Flower argues that the organisation has deserted 
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sustainability accounting, by favouring value for shareholders over society, and by 
not requiring the companies to disclose destruction brought to external stakeholders 
and the environment where the company is not affected. He also concludes that due 
to its lack of power, the IIRC will have marginal influence on how corporations 
report. As a result of these concerns raised, the IIRC clarified later that integrated 
reporting produced using the IR framework is beneficial to all stakeholders (Cheng 
et al., 2014), but despite the improvements made, many still believe that the 
framework still heavily favours providers of capital (Dumay et al., 2017). 
IR’s framework is often compared to the GRI guidelines. Beck, Dumay, and Frost 
(2017) argue that while the GRI guidelines offer an initial structure, IR illustrates 
noteworthy distinctions. They explain that the GRI requests material information 
disclosure and proof of engagement with multiple stakeholder groups, whereas IR 
pays attention mostly to investors and shareholders. Further, IR information needs 
to be released in order to clearly connect social and environmental practices to 
strategic goals identified by the company. It is important to note here that evidence 
from multiple studies suggests that the usage of the GRI guidelines in a voluntary 
reporting system is not very different and has often offered partial (and strategic) 
disclosure of non-financial performance of the companies involved (Joseph, 2012).  
For instance, Boiral (2013) shows that 90 percent of incidents with potential major 
negative impacts had been left out of the reports prepared using the GRI guidelines. 
This suggests that how non-financial reporting is inspired in a country (whether by 
regulations or a voluntary system), and the ethical qualities that are implanted into 
companies’ values (Abeysekera, 2013), impact the content of the report more than 
the type of the framework used. Beck et al. (2017) write:  
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The institutional environment in which organisations operate provides not 
only the framework within which to act, but also a considerable breath of 
narratives by which to observe, evaluate and understand non-financial 
performance. Institutional legitimacy may thus be achieved by managers 
passively adopting and complying with the rules of the society in which they 
operate. (p. 194) 
Beck et al. (2017) see a number of challenges for the IIRC. First, companies are at 
different levels of adopting non-financial reporting and expect different results from 
reporting. Second, the fact that the companies use the IR framework as suits them 
means that the vision for standardising the way shareholders and other stakeholders 
are informed may never be achieved. Lastly, pursuing reporters to believe that using 
IR will have positive impact on the business, may be a lengthy process. As long as 
shareholders and managers are fixated on improving short -term financial 
performance, a company’s capability to apply necessary changes to their business 
model to make IR work may be hampered (Cheng et al., 2014).  
2.4. Summary of literature review 
In the previous three sections of this chapter, I considered the current literature on 
transparency, paying special attention to non-financial disclosure in New Zealand. 
In the first section I reviewed the concept of surveillance and Panopticism, which 
led to a discussion of what transparency could mean to organisations in a neoliberal 
system. In this section I explained how the power of the state has been transferred 
to individuals, and that in a neoliberal system individuals who choose wealth are 
prioritised. Hence, business comes before society and the environment.   
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I then looked at the concept of transparency, and the importance of the flow of 
information within and outside of companies. As critical factors in an organisation’s 
interaction with its environment, I also discussed how information is selected and 
used by companies.  
The third section of this chapter paid special attention to non-financial transparency, 
particularly in New Zealand. As discussed earlier, there is a significant amount of 
work done on non-financial disclosure literature, much of it concentrated on cases 
outside New Zealand. Scholars have studied factors that could affect non-financial 
transparency such as ownership structure and geographic location of companies 
(Fernandez-Feijoo et al., 2014a, 2014b; Sumiani et al., 2007; Tilt, 2016), size of the 
company (Baumann-Pauly et al., 2013; Brammer & Millington, 2006; Frias-
Aceituno et al., 2014; Gallo & Christensen, 2011; Morhardt, 2010; Prado-Lorenzo 
et al., 2009; Simnett et al., 2009), the industry the company is active in (Alali & 
Romero, 2012; Kolk & Perego, 2010), and the board of directors’ level of 
participation (Kasum & Etudaiye-Muthar, 2014; Rao & Tilt, 2016). 
Substantial research has also been completed in New Zealand on different aspects 
of non-financial transparency. The table 2 gives an overview of some of the key 



















report of 47 
largest 
companies 
listed on the 
NZX. 
Similar to companies from the USA, UK and 
Australia, the majority of the social 
disclosure done by NZ companies is on 
human resources, while environment and 
community matters are also getting attention. 
Most of the disclosures made by NZ 
companies tend to be narrative and good 
news. Both size and industry are notably 
connected with amount of information 
released, while profitability is not. The 
findings also suggest that “the size-disclosure 
relationship is much stronger for the high-
profile industry companies than for the low-


















While the reports produced by the members 
of NZBCSD clearly address “sustainability” 
and “sustainable development”, The authors 
only find a small amount of reporting done 


























The paper investigates the progress of one 
organisation’s reports by analysing language 
and images that have been used to create 
meanings, and the circumstances in which the 
reports were developed. The paper 
demonstrates how the organization has 
remodelled itself by shifting from one that 
manages resources sustainably and produces 
environmental reports to one that creates 
sustainable development reports and 



























assist them to 
initiate SDR.  
Observation at 
the workshop.  
For the companies involved in the study, 
deciding to participate in reporting seems not 
to be a logical choice. Rather they began 
reporting because it has come to be a 
recognised aspect of chasing a differentiation 
strategy. It helps with some of the challenges 
that the companies are facing and the 













































The reports created by the association and its 
members present a business-like discourse on 
business and the environment. “Through the 
use of rhetorical claims to pragmatism and 
action, this discourse suggests that businesses 
are “doing” sustainability. But critical 
analysis and interpretation within a wider 
framework reveal a narrow, largely economic 
and instrumental approach to the natural 












of one study in 
Australia and 
one in New 
Zealand. 
Both studies done in New Zealand and 
Australia found that while owner-managers 
do several TBL activities, they do not 
explicitly identify them as sustainable 
practice. Both studies also illustrate that 
heavy emphasis on the financial aspect which 
may be an important obstacle to SMEs 




























2003 were to 







The study suggests a strong link with the 
business case for sustainability for NZ 
business. For politicians interested in 
attaining sustainability objectives, the study 
suggests a ‘soft’ approach to business 





















New Zealand  
 
Local governments in NZ were encouraged to 
participate in sustainability reporting for 
leadership, accountability, and financial 
incentive reasons; and by a need to maintain 
key internal stakeholders. The reporting by 
local governments in NZ does not seem to be 
encouraged by an uncompromising wish for 
a sustainable world, but more by business-




















Implementation of sustainability values in 
both Scotland and New Zealand seems 
directed by the current governance practices, 
with rare examples of sustainability-led 
governance. Each country’s strategic 





















The study reveals a progressive shifting 
organisational identity. Three identities 
highlighted include: “environmentally 
responsible and compliant organizations; 
leaders in sustainability; and strategically 
‘good’ organizations.” By analysing these 
developing identities, the study reveals “how 
organizations have maintained a ‘right to 
speak’ within the sustainable development 
debate, despite the fundamental challenges 
and hegemonic threat that a broader reading 



























Reporting grounds acknowledged in the 
literature and endorsed by organisations such 
as the SBC and the SBN both encourage and 
cause defiance to reporting. Reporting does 
not appear to be a predictable result for 
organisations participating with 
sustainability practices in NZ, and since the 
SBIs seem to put insufficient “isomorphic 
pressure, the lack of any coercive pressure 
from either them or other external forces such 
as the Government suggests social and 
environmental reporting seems set to remain 
a practice undertaken by few” (p.2).  
 
        
  Table 2. Overview of literature on sustainability reporting in New Zealand 
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2.5. The Gaps and Research Questions 
Two relevant research gaps emerged from the literature examined, each of which 
has informed my specific research questions. One of these gaps is in relation to the 
non-financial disclosure practices undertaken by public companies in New Zealand, 
and the other relates to transparency.  
2.5.1. Research gap in New Zealand’s non-financial disclosure 
practices undertaken by public companies 
While there is substantial research on why companies should disclose their social 
and environmental activities and why reporting companies do disclose such 
information, current literature has paid less attention to why New Zealand’s 
publicly listed companies do not report. These fields have been studied far better in 
other countries such as Australia (e.g. Higgins, Milne, and van Gramberg, 2015; 
Stubbs et al.,2013). Wright et al. (2016) do pay close attention to sustainable 
business intermediaries (SBIs) in New Zealand such as the SBC and the SBN to 
address the issue of social and environmental reporting. However, only three of the 
participating companies of this unpublished study are publicly listed, and the article 
concentrates on what the authors see as the failed role of SBIs in endorsing 
sustainable business practices. As argued in the literature discussed in this chapter, 
contemporary organisations need to be transparent about their activities, be it 
financial, social, or environmental, to build trust. Yet, public companies in New 
Zealand have not adequately addressed social and environmental disclosure as key 
elements of transparency. I investigate the reasons for this by exploring companies’ 
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views regarding transparency and the impact of those views on decisions to report 
or not. To this end, my first two research questions are:  
RQ 1: What does 'transparency' mean to some of New Zealand's largest 
companies? 
RQ 2: What are the motivations and barriers for participating companies to 
undertake sustainability reporting in New Zealand?   
2.5.2. Research gap in understanding transparency in the 
neoliberal era 
In New Zealand (as in some other countries), regulatory monitoring of the market 
is done by the state. This monitoring, however, only applies to financial disclosure, 
as a neoliberal system favours making profit over any form of social responsibility 
practices (Giroux, 2015). This suggests that the government is not necessarily 
powerless but that it chooses to use its power for certain purposes - in this case, 
only requiring financial transparency and, thereby, creating the perfect environment 
for corporations to disengage from any form of social responsibility practices.  
Because in a neoliberal system non-financial efforts to gain transparency through 
social and environmental reporting are voluntary, stakeholders who are interested 
in social and environmental goals and impacts get only a report that has been 
designed with strategic goals in mind (Tregidga et al., 2014). For some reason, these 
stakeholders do not or cannot exert sufficient pressure on the business sector to 
voluntarily report on, or engage in social responsibility practices. Limited reporting 
leads to partial transparency (only financial and not social nor environmental), 
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which once concluded allows corporations to resume with business as usual 
(Birchall et al., 2013; Collins et al., 2005).  
Although there are models to recognise different levels of stakeholder and 
stakeholder influence, there is very little in the literature about stakeholder 
influence from the perspective of companies. We do not know, for example, why a 
range of stakeholder groups can make demands over issues regarding corporate 
transparency, but few appear to exert real influence in New Zealand. We do not 
know if or what the links are between relative stakeholder influence and the 
neoliberal economic system in which such demands take place. Free market theory 
suggests that companies do respond to stakeholder demands, especially those of 
consumers, so is the failure of the market to influence beyond consumer choices the 
result of a failure on the part of the business sector to recognise and respond to a 
wider range of stakeholder preferences and demands? In order to address such 
questions, I pose the following research question: 
RQ 3: How do some of the largest public companies in New Zealand perceive 
and respond to the influence of different stakeholder groups? 
The particular theoretical lenses through which I seek to find answers to these three 
interrelated research questions is developed and explained in the following chapter.   
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CHAPTER 3: Theoretical Framework 
My research questions posed particular challenges, and called for a combination of 
theoretical lenses through which to analyse and make sense of my research data.  
First, in order to examine issues of transparency and stakeholder influence from the 
companies’ perspective, I needed a theoretical lens that would allow a managerialist 
conception of stakeholder theory. While I acknowledge that a normative approach 
as an ethical branch of stakeholder theory would be appropriate to study 
sustainability from the stakeholders’ perspective, a descriptive approach is deemed 
more suitable for this study (the different approaches to stakeholder theory were 
discussed in section 2.2.1 of the previous chapter).  For this, I chose Mitchell, Agle, 
and Wood's (1997) Salience Model in order to be able to categorise and characterise 
different stakeholder groups from the company/management point of view, based 
on their [perceived] level of power to influence such companies.  
Second, because I wanted to examine issues of relative power within a neoliberal 
economic context, I also needed a critical lens. For this, I chose Zygmaut Bauman’s 
(2000) concept of liquid modernity. Bauman (2000) sees neoliberalism as an era of 
transfer of powers from the state to individuals through the process of 
individualisation. It is this transference of power that he refers to as liquid 
modernity. 
Separately, neither of these perspectives can adequately address the issues raised 
by the literature review in the context of non-financial reporting in New Zealand. 
The positivist approach of Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997) cannot explain why 
apparently salient stakeholders do not exert more influence than they actually do. 
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Bauman’s perspective of liquid modernity goes some way towards addressing this 
gap. However, in a neoliberal system Bauman regards consumers as the principal 
stakeholder group whose power is exerted through consumption choices. This still 
does not explain why consumer choice (for example sustainability-oriented 
investors) does not result in a greater percentage of sustainability reporting and 
transparency. In addition, the relationship between the state and the market is 
missing from Bauman’s discussion of Liquid Modernity.  
However, when combined, these two theoretical lenses – the managerial view of 
stakeholder salience and importance, plus the adaptability (fluidity) of corporate 
responses to issues that liquid modernity describes – offer unique insights into 
understanding the particular pattern of corporate responses to demands for 
transparency, particularly through issuing non-financial reports, that we see in New 
Zealand. While utilising the Salience model allows me to categorise and group 
stakeholders and their perceived level of power to influence the companies, 
Bauman’s liquid modernity facilitates explaining how these variations in power 
levels have shaped corporate transparency in the country.  
3.1. The Salience Model  
While stakeholder theory provides an answer to the question of which societal 
groups companies should pay attention to (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Freeman, 
2010; Matten & Crane, 2005), the Salience Model (Mitchell et al., 1997) identifies 
and categorises stakeholder groups according to their level of importance for 
companies and answers the question “to whom (or what) do managers pay 
attention?”. This question, according to Mitchell et al. (1997, p. 853) “calls for a 
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descriptive theory of stakeholder salience” Some scholars, for example, Emerson 
Wagner, Helena, and Mário (2012), identify the model as an instrumental 
application of stakeholder theory.  
The Salience Model categorises stakeholders according to the three attributes of 
legitimacy, power, and urgency (Figure 7) to assess how the claims of each 
stakeholder group are prioritised by company managers (Dong, Burritt, & Qian, 
2014; Mitchell, Agle, Chrisman, & Spence, 2011; Mitchell et al., 1997; Tantalo & 
Priem, 2016). Because the prioritisation happens in the managers’ mind, they have 
a central role in the theory (Mitchell, Agle, Chrisman, & Spence, 2015). Businesses 
tend to focus on “profits, productivity, and customer service”, and this logic 
influences how companies prioritise attending to their different stakeholders 
(Mitchell et al., 2011, p. 236). While some scholars concentrate on the requests 
made by the individuals and groups that influence the companies, or are affected by 
them (Freeman, 2010), others discuss the process by which management of the 
companies understand stakeholders’ claims, and then prioritise and respond to them 
(Bundy, Shropshire, & Buchholtz, 2013).  
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Figure 7. Stakeholder attributes. Source: (Mitchell et al., 1997, p. 872) 
The Salience Model, designed by Mitchell et al. (1997), is one of the tools 
commonly used to classify stakeholders based on how companies rank and respond 
to their stakeholders and their claims (Cornelissen, 2014). According to Mainardes, 
Alves, and Raposo (2011), the model presents a number advantages: “1. it is 
political (considering the organization as the result of conflicting and unequal 
interests). 2. it is operational (qualifying the stakeholders); and it is dynamic 
(contemplating changes of interests in social space-time)” (p. 236). 
As stated earlier, stakeholder salience is classified according to power to influence 
the organisation, the legitimacy and the urgency of their claim. Each of these is 
described below. 
Power in this context can be described as the ability of a group or individual to 
make another group or individual act in a way the second group would not otherwise 
have done (Dahl, 1957; Mitchell et al., 2011; Mitchell et al., 1997; Pfeffer 1981). 
According to Etzioni (1964, 1975), power can be categorised according to the 
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resources used to implement it. He argues that power can be coercive when physical 
resources are involved to gain control, utilitarian or remunerative when financial or 
material resources are used, and normative when social symbols are allocated as 
rewards to stay in control (Etzioni, 1964, 1975; Krott et al., 2014).  
Legitimacy is often mixed with power to explain relationships in society. Mitchell 
et al. (1997) argue that while many scholars assume that legitimate stakeholders are 
also the ones who hold power, this may not be the case. They use minor 
shareholders in companies as an example of legitimate stakeholders who may not 
necessarily hold much power.  
Urgency in this context is defined as “the degree to which stakeholder claims call 
for immediate attention” (Mitchell et al., 1997, p. 867). For a matter to be 
considered urgent by an organisation, two characteristics are considered. First is 
“time sensitivity”, meaning the degree to which management’s delay in taking 
actions to address claims would be considered intolerable by stakeholders. Second 
is “criticality” and the importance of the claim for the stakeholders.  
According to Mitchell et al. (1997), when only one of the three attributes discussed 
above (power, legitimacy, and urgency) is present, these stakeholders are classified 
as “latent” (areas 1, 2, and 3 in the figure above). The salience or priority level of 
latent stakeholders for organisations is so low that their demands may even be 
ignored by the companies. This is due to a lack of resources to follow all 
stakeholders’ behaviour and to manage the company’s relationship with such 
stakeholders or, as Tashman and Raelin (2013) put it, because of frictions such as 
conflict of interest between different stakeholders, which may cause management 
to be biased when it comes to prioritising their stakeholders.  When two of the three 
 87 
attributes are present, the priority level is moderate and stakeholders receive a fair 
amount of attention from the organisation. Mitchell et al. (1997) call this group 
(areas 4, 5, and 6) “expectant” stakeholders. Companies have a lot more interest in 
managing their relationship with expectant stakeholders compared to latent ones. 
When all three attributes are present (area 7), stakeholders’ salience levels are 
considered high. These stakeholders have the power, the legitimacy and urgency to 
demand immediate action. They are labelled as “definitive” stakeholders. 
 Based on these attributes, the Salience Model categorises stakeholders as follows: 
a) Dormant stakeholders hold the power attribute. They are powerful, but 
because of lack of legitimacy and urgency, their power is not used. They 
can demand more attention by gaining one of the other attributes. 
Examples are those with spending power and those who can get the 
attention of mass media. 
b) Discretionary stakeholders have the legitimacy attribute. They are 
particularly interested in companies’ CSR activities. They have no 
power or urgency of claims to influence companies, therefore there is 
no pressure on companies to engage with these stakeholders. 
c) Demanding stakeholders have the urgency attribute. These 
stakeholders may irritate the management team but are not considered 
dangerous. Mitchell et al. (1997) discuss the characteristics of this group 
of stakeholders and write: “where stakeholders are unable or unwilling 
to acquire either the power or the legitimacy necessary to move their 
claims into a more salient status, the noise of urgency is insufficient to 
project a stakeholder claim beyond latency” (p. 875). They suggest 
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activists who gather outside the company to protest against its products 
as an example of this group of stakeholders. 
d) Dominant stakeholders hold both power and legitimacy attributes. 
Their claims are legitimate and possess power to influence the firm, but 
for some reason may choose not to use their power. They receive a fair 
amount of attention from the management and their expectations 
“matter” to the company. For example, boards of directors, certain 
investors, and employees. Eccles, Ioannou, and Serafeim (2014) explain 
that the board of directors’ role in the company is advising and 
observing the management, to make sure that decisions aligned with 
companies’ objectives are made. However, it is commonly believed by 
many that the companies’ objectives must be designed to serve the 
shareholders, before any other stakeholders. 
e) Dangerous stakeholders have both power and urgency attributes. The 
combination of urgency and power, and lack of legitimacy can lead to 
coercion and violence. These stakeholders can use violence (e.g. 
kidnapping) to influence an organisation.   
f) Dependent stakeholders have urgency and legitimacy attributes. These 
stakeholders have legitimate and urgent claims but since they have no 
power themselves, they are dependent on other guardian stakeholders. 
For example, when an oil spill puts the people and environment in 
danger, the government as a guardian stakeholder steps in to protect the 
public’s interest. 
g) Definitive stakeholders are the only group with all three attributes of 
power, urgency and legitimacy. These stakeholders can influence 
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organisational decisions, and management gives them the highest level 
of priority when addressing stakeholder concerns.   
Organisations make strategic choices in dealing with stakeholders’ claims and 
concerns and prioritise addressing their demands according to the attributes that 
they may hold (Bundy et al., 2013; Tashman & Raelin, 2013). Definitive 
stakeholders receive immediate attention from management, compared with other 
groups, since they have all three attributes. Mitchell et al., (2011) and Mitchell et 
al., (1997), argue that stakeholder groups which possess two of the attributes, such 
as dependent stakeholders (who lack the power attribute), can become definitive by 
gaining the third missing attribute. Other stakeholders who have the power attribute, 
such as dormant and dominant stakeholders, can also influence the companies’ 
behaviour.  
Several studies use the salience model as their framework. Weber and Marley 
(2010) use the model on the Fortune Global 100 companies and find indications 
that not all stakeholders are treated equally and that employees, the community, and 
customers are perceived by management to have high stakeholder salience. The 
findings of another study by Magness (2008) support Mitchell et al. (1997) and 
suggest that a stakeholder position is temporary and is decided by the management. 
James and Gifford (2010) also find shareholders to have the most salience, and the 
values held by the managers of the companies to be the most important factor that 
contributes to how shareholders are perceived.   
In another context, Baskerville-Morley (2004), looking at how professional 
organisations react to crisis conditions, finds that applying the Salience model not 
only enables organisations to identify the salience of stakeholders, but also offers 
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an understanding of the need for public interest supporters to raise their demand 
firmly and with urgency, particularly when the organisation is encouraging actions 
that conflict with the public good. However, Jones, Felps, and Bigley (2007) 
conclude that urgency is in fact only a subordinate attribute that delivers the “extra 
push needed to make already salient issues more so” (p. 153) and unlike legitimacy 
and power, which have their own supporters (“corporate egoist and moralist 
firms”), urgency does not.  
3.2. Liquid Modernity 
Liquid modernity as a concept was first introduced by Bauman (Abrahamson, 2004; 
Bauman, 2000, 2003, 2005, 2013a, 2013b; Gane, 2001; Jacobsen & Poder, 2016) 
to portray a world where the heavy industrial institutions (the solids) of modern 
times collapse and uncertainty is increasingly felt in societies. Bauman (2000) 
explains that the post-modern times consider the solids of the modern era to be 
unreliable and, therefore, they need to be broken down or ‘melted’ into a more 
flexible type of structure that would last forever and would create a predictable, 
trustworthy, and manageable world. In his view, the melting of the institutional 
solids had to be done not to clear them for good and create a fearless new world 
free of the solids, but to prepare the site for new, better, and stronger solids. The 
melting was meant to replace the traditional set of defective and faulty solids with 
a new set, “which was much improved and preferably perfect, and for that reason 
no longer alterable” (Bauman 2000, p. 3). Thus, ‘solid’ became ‘liquid’. 
According to Bauman, people in the world of solid institutions focused on 
production but in the liquid era, there is no place for long term production planning. 
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In such times, individualism holds sway and  power shifts from the state to society 
(Bauman, 2000), marking the beginning of what Bauman calls a liquid modern era 
where structures and any social forms that could possibly threaten individual 
freedom melted with no time given to solidify again, and faster than new solids 
could be built (Bauman, 2005). Bauman explains that because of the rise of 
individuals’ freedom to choose, planned work towards perfection is replaced by 
work geared to individuals gaining satisfaction (although individuals will never 
fully attain it) through consuming products (Vogel & Oschmann, 2013).  
Bauman (2013a) says that “a consumption-oriented economy actively promotes 
disaffection, saps confidence and deepens the sentiment of insecurity, becoming 
itself a source of the ambient fear it promises to cure or disperse – the fear that 
saturates liquid modern life and the principal cause of the liquid modern variety of 
unhappiness” (p. 46). Davis (2011), in turn, argues that nowadays individuals only 
know how to solve their issues as consumers. He believes that in a society where 
citizens are hoping to answer their individual yet common issues by consuming, the 
capacity to manage uncertainty is measured by the freedom they have to choose as 
consumers. They seek more options to choose from to increase their ability to 
negotiate for solutions to solve their daily problems. “Consumer choice has become 
the meta-value of the ‘liquid modern’ world” (Davis, 2011, p. 186). 
Bauman (2013b) explains that in a liquid modern world individualisation processes 
demand the active participation of individuals in their own destiny. They have to 
set goals, work on achieving the targets they have set and, in case they fail, they 
have to find new ways to start over.  He refers to this era of late modernity as:  
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an individualised, privatised version of modernity, with the burden of pattern-
weaving and the responsibility for failure falling primarily on the individual's 
shoulders. It is the patterns of dependency and interaction whose turn to be 
liquefied has now come…like all liquids they do not keep their shape for long. 
Shaping them is easier than keeping them in shape. Keeping fluids in shape 
requires a lot of attention, constant vigilance and perpetual effort –  and even 
then the success of the effort is anything but a foregone conclusion. (Bauman, 
2000, pp. 7-8)  
For Bauman, it is individualisation that jeopardises the very concept of freedom in 
a liquid modern world by allowing private lives to overrun the public sphere. As 
Gane (2012) explains, this incursion of the public by the private sphere not only 
reduces the value of public life but could cause the separation of individual freedom 
from collective freedom.  
This is where Bauman believes that the relationship between time and space is 
reformed. What separates liquid modernity from early modernity is the lack of solid 
and stable institutions. Unlike early modern times when physical space was the 
dominating dimension and was inseparable from time (Abrahamson, 2004), 
Bauman argues that in the liquid modern era it is time that mostly matters and 
explains that modernity is born out of the separation of space and time from one 
another, and from “living practice” (Bauman, 2000, p. 8). After all, it is time, known 
for flexibility and lightness, that is important in a liquid world (Pribán, 2016). 
To explain the importance of the relationship between space and time, and how it 
restructured the concept of surveillance in societies, Bauman draws on Foucault’s 
(1997) discussion about Panopticism, outlined in Chapter Two. In this context, 
 93 
Bauman (2000), who sees the Panopticon as a symbol of modern power and a model 
of joint engagement between both sides of the power relationship, argues that the 
fixedness of the supervised to the place and the watchers’ control over time and free 
movement was their warrant for domination. The supervisors exercised power by 
merging the two strategies of managing their own unpredictability in movement 
while routinising their subordinates’ flow of time. Bauman, however, believes that 
this form of disciplinary power is restricted and sees this combination of two 
strategies as a constraint in itself on the supervisors’ freedom to move and talks of 
a tension between the two tasks. He writes: “The second task put constraints on the 
first. It tied the 'routinisers' to the place within which the objects of time 
routinisation had been confined. The routinisers were not truly and fully free to 
move: the option of absentee landlords was, practically, out of the question” (p.10).  
In addition, he argues that the Panopticon concept of exercising power is an 
expensive one, where the watchers or managers would have to accept responsibility 
for the wellbeing of the place and the subordinates. Bauman (2000) views the 
advancement in technology as a final blow to the reliance on space, making power 
“truly exterritorial”. Unlike the watchers in the Panopticon who had to be present 
in the tower to exercise their power, one can now give a command from anywhere 
due to modern ways of communication. To Bauman (2000), this signals the end of 
the panoptical modern power era, the end of “mutual engagement between the 
supervisors and the supervised, capital, and labour, leaders and their followers” (p. 
11). The moulds of power melt and the responsibilities of the watchers in the tower 
(the state) are passed down to individuals who now are responsible for their own 
wellbeing.  
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Becoming exterritorial and no longer being bound to space, enables power to move 
freely around the globe and separate from politics, while in contrast, politics and 
political agencies remain local due to their purpose of connecting individuals to the 
public interest. Bauman (2000) describes this situation by comparing the people in 
society to airline passengers who suddenly find that there is no pilot in the cabin 
while they are up in the air.    
Bauman believes that the flow of power globally and the growing move towards 
deregulated markets is the root of modern inequality. He argues that the challenges 
of solid modernity have increasingly melted through deregulation, the flexibility of 
the workforce, and the removal of constraints of financial markets (Jacobsen & 
Poder, 2016). “Techniques which allow the system and free agents to remain 
radically disengaged, to by-pass each other instead of meeting” (Bauman, 2000, p. 
5), make it less clear what any agency with power should do to make the world a 
better place.  
Such conditions allow global corporations to move their operations that are 
considered unacceptable and inappropriate in one location, to another where norms 
and values are different from the first place, to avoid being questioned over their 
activities (Dicken, 2003; Zyglidopoulos & Fleming, 2011) and still appear 
legitimate. After all legitimacy is “a generalised perception or assumption that the 
actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p. 
574). 
Bauman (2000) argues that the lack of political control turns power into a source of 
uncontrollable uncertainty. The absence of power makes administrative 
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organisations, and their actions, misaligned with citizens’ problems and, hence, less 
likely to attract citizens’ attention. He explains that with the state losing its power, 
many of the tasks done by state related organisations are increasingly handed over 
to private organisations. He says that abandoning regulations creates a playground 
for notoriously impulsive and fundamentally unpredictable market forces, allowing 
the powerful to now separate themselves from responsibilities (Pribán, 2016). 
This retraction of power from the public to stand against the wrongdoing of 
individuals or free agents diminishes the bonds between people and society, and 
promotes separations rather than unity. According to Bauman (2005), this 
encourages a competitive attitude in society where teamwork is only used as a tactic 
and once it has served its purpose to gain profit, it is abandoned. Thus, “society is 
increasingly viewed and treated as a ‘network’ rather than ‘structure’ (let alone a 
solid ‘totality’): it is perceived and treated as a matrix of random connections and 
disconnections, and of essentially infinite volume of possible permutations” 
(Bauman, 2005, p. 304; Bauman, 2013b, p. 3). 
The advancement of technology, which freed power from the bounds of space, 
however, is like a double-edged sword. Mathiesen (1997) argues that available 
technology, particularly the mass media, has created an environment which is the 
opposite of Panopticism (he calls it Synopticism) where “the many see and 
contemplate the few” (p. 219), the ‘few’ being mainly those with power (Hansen, 
Christensen, & Flyverbom, 2015; Thompson, 2005).  Therefore as Bauman (2000) 
explains, while technology and the changes in the post-panoptical era help the 
wielder of power to escape responsibilities, at the same time their actions could be 
exposed for everyone to see, as “we live in a viewer society” (Mathiesen, 1997, p. 
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219).  
Consequently, in this era of modernity “the surveillance of one individual or 
organisation has, so to speak, become the transparency of another individual or 
organisation. The reciprocal nature of surveillance and transparency means that the 
target of observation is not only the ‘deviant imprisoned’, as implied in the original 
panoptic metaphor, but nearly everyone by default, as suggested by the synoptic 
principle” (Hansen et al., 2015, p. 122). 
Neoliberal political regimes serve to enable and uphold an individualised free 
market, a condition that is normalised across society. As Bauman (1999) explains:  
Instead of joining ranks in the war against uncertainty, virtually all effective 
institutionalised agencies of collective action join the neo-liberal chorus 
singing the praise of the unbound “market forces” and free trade, the prime 
sources of existential uncertainty, as the “natural state” of mankind. (p. 28)  
From a surveillance point of view, the conditions of a liquid modern world also 
provide individuals with a considerable amount of information. The media put the 
actions of corporations transparently on display more than ever before, leading to 
an assumption that such visibility puts some constraint on the actions of the 
corporations active in the market, in order to avoid public criticism. That is, the 
visibility arguably gives them no other choice but to modify their actions and align 
them with the expectations of society (Zyglidopoulos & Fleming, 2011).  
Bauman, however, sees this form of transparency, facilitated by the availability of 
information through channels such as the mass media, as one of the ways for the 
masses to participate in the market. He argues that the publicly-available 
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information is mostly used by consumers to make choices either for business or for 
pleasure (Cotter & Perrin, 2017; Gane, 2012). Thus, in a neoliberal setting 
transparency is partial (Hansen & Flyverbom, 2015), serving only the market as the 
centre of the society.   
3.3. Summary of the Chapter  
In this chapter, I discussed the two theoretical lenses I use to analyse the research 
data. In the first section of the chapter, I explain why Mitchell, Agle, and Wood's 
(1997) Salience Model, a descriptive approach providing a managerialist 
conception of stakeholder theory, was selected to categorise the stakeholder groups 
based on three attributes of legitimacy, power, and urgency. Next, I draw on 
Bauman’s (2000) concept of liquid modernity that elucidates how power takes a 
liquid form in a neoliberal era because of a focus on individualisation, allowing, as 
a result, private lives to take over the public sphere.  
While the Salience Model allows me to distinguish which stakeholder groups have 
the power to influence companies in New Zealand, I use liquid modernity to explore 
how possession of power by some stakeholders and lack of it by others, has framed 
corporate transparency in the country. In the next chapter, I explain the methods 
used to gather the data necessary to address the questions posed in my research.  
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CHAPTER 4: Methodology and Method 
Overview 
Numerous studies have monitored the growth of non-financial reports in both 
developed and developing countries. They suggest a slow development of non-
financial reporting in New Zealand (see KPMG’s International Surveys of 
Corporate Responsibility Reporting available on KPMG.com). This study also 
focuses on non-financial reporting in New Zealand.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, while many other studies have focused on the factors 
that affect non-financial disclosure, the interest of this research is to investigate, 
specifically from the companies’ point of view, the degree to which different 
stakeholder groups influence companies’ decisions to produce such corporate 
reports. In addition, this research assesses a voluntary system’s ability to encourage 
non-financial transparency in a neo-liberal economic context.  
The study was guided by the following research questions: 
RQ 1: What does 'transparency' mean to some of New Zealand's largest companies? 
RQ 2: What are the motivations and barriers for participating companies to 
undertake sustainability reporting in New Zealand?  
RQ 3: How do some of the largest public companies in New Zealand perceive and 
respond to the influence of different stakeholder groups? 
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As this study is concerned with issues of power and justice, I took a critical 
interpretive approach (Kincheloe & Mclaren, 2005). An interpretive way of doing 
research, which is based on the idea that how people behave, and how that is 
interpreted, is socially constructed instead of being an independent entity, places 
key importance on subjective interpretation in the study (Brotherton, 2015) rather 
than making claims of objectivity. As Kincheloe and Mclaren (2005) state, 
interpretation involves 
 in its most elemental articulation, making sense of what has been observed 
in a way that communicates understanding…the quest for understanding is 
a fundamental feature of human existence, as encounter with the unfamiliar 
always demands to attempt to make meaning, to make sense. (p.311) 

















• World is socially constructed and subjective  
• Researcher is part of what is observed  
• Science is driven by human interest and motives  
Research method 
• Focus on meanings  
• Try to understand what is happening  
• Look at the totality of each situation  
•  Develop ideas through induction from data  
Research design • Evolving & flexible  
Researcher 
involvement 
• The Researcher gets involved with what is being 
researched 




• Using multi-methods to establish different 
views  
 
Sampling • Small samples investigated in depth or over time   
Data collection 
methods 
• Observations, documentation, open-ended and 




• Ability to look at change processes over time  
• Greater understanding of people’s meanings  
• Adjustment to new issues and ideas as they 
emerge  
• Contributes to the evolution of new theories  
• Provides a way of gathering data which is 
natural rather than artificial   
Weaknesses 
 
• Data collection takes a lot of time and resources 
• Difficulty of analysis of data 
• Harder for the researcher to control the research 
process  
• Reliability problem with findings  
 
Table 3. Key features of interpretive approach. Adapted from Altinay, Paraskevas, and Jang (2015, p. 89). 
 
Critical theories, largely originating from what is commonly referred to as the 
Frankfurt School, point at “emancipation and enlightenment, at making agents 
aware of hidden coercion, thereby freeing them from that coercion and putting them 
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in a position to determine where their true interests lie” (Geuss, 1981, p. 55). In the 
context of critical enlightenment, Kincheloe and Mclaren (2005) argue that critical 
theory can identify the winners and losers in specific situations by analysing 
competing power interests among specific groups. Aside from paying attention to 
power in a specific situation, Cheney (2000, p. 36) suggests that a critical 
perspective has “an explicit concern for making value-based assessments”, and 
involves “penetrating and ongoing questioning of basic assumptions”.  
For the purpose of this study, I adopted a qualitative content analysis approach to 
interpret the overt and hidden content found in the data gathered (Graneheim & 
Lundman, 2004). In the next section, I describe why I find a qualitative content 
analysis approach to be most appropriate for this research.  
4.1. Qualitative research 
There are different ways of doing qualitative research (Bradley, Curry, & Devers, 
2007). Data can be collected from different sources such as interview transcripts, 
notes, reports, and formal reports (Lewis-Beck, Bryman, & Liao, 2003). Tracy 
(2010) introduces some criteria for good quality qualitative research, including a 
good topic, noteworthy contribution, credibility, and data that can be transferred. 
Some scholars, such as LeCompte (2000) believe that as long as data collected for 
qualitative research is as impartial as possible it is good data for a meaningful 
analysis. 
Qualitative research signifies a comprehensive view on social affairs, and is 
necessary for deep research that involves “subjective qualities that govern 
behaviour” (Holliday, 2007, p. 7). The flexible nature of a qualitative approach 
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allowed me to gather subjective views (Baumard & Ibert, 2001) around the 
theoretical frameworks (The Salience Model and Liquid Modernity) that guide this 
study.  
In a qualitative research setting data are converted into concise statements that 
define, clarify, or forecast something about what is being studied (Schensul, 
Schensul, & LeCompte, 1999), a process that first requires the researcher to 
organise data, to be able to make sense of the data gathered, and then interpret them. 
In line with this, qualitative content analysis, one of the many ways to analyse 
textual data, “focuses on the characteristics of language as communication with 
attention to the content or contextual meaning of the text” (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, 
p. 1278).  
This data could be in forms of text, images, and illustrations, which could be 
gathered from interview transcripts, surveys, and official documents, articles, and 
observations, among other sources. The analysis then involves coding and 
classifying the data in meaningful categories and identifying themes (Kondracki & 
Wellman, 2002; Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). 
4.1.1. Interviews 
Semi-structured interviews were considered suitable for this research as a primary 
source of data because of their flexibility. While semi-structured interviews are not 
necessarily “an open conversation nor a highly structured questionnaire” (Steinar, 
1996, p. 27), an interview guide with some suggested questions is very useful. Fylan 
(2005) explains that because of their adaptability, semi-structured interviews can 
be used “to develop a much deeper understanding of the research question by 
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exploring contradictions” within what the interviewee says (p.67). According to 
Bryman (2012) another advantage of a semi-structured interview is that as the 
interview goes on, questions may come up that were not in the interview guide in 
the first place but can still help the researcher. In this method, usually all the 
questions that the interviewer has prepared will be asked, while there is still room 
for questions that may be added during the interview.  
There are several disadvantages to conducting semi-structured interviews, such as 
additional costs, personal biases from both the interviewee and the interviewer 
(Neuman, 2012), and interviewers’ tendency to affect the answers given by the 
interviewee (interviewee saying what they think the interviewer would want to 
hear). Despite all such limitations, semi-structured interviews are found by 
qualitative researchers to be the most appropriate way of collecting data from busy 
professionals in relation to their perceptions over the subject that is being studied 
(Bryman & Bell, 2011). 
4.1.2. Thematic analysis 
Thematic analysis is a method used to find and analyse themes in sets of data and 
to interpret them (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Themes are specific patterns that the 
researcher finds interesting in the data (Marks & Yardley, 2003).  Boyatzis (1998) 
argues that patterns found in a specific set of information should at least be 
identified as a potential observation, or at best become an interpretation of data 
needed to answer a question. He explains thematic analysis as a way of seeing, as 
what different people understand from a set of data could vary. Furthermore, he 
explains that to use thematic analysis one must go through four stages of sensing 
the themes and recognising the important codes, consistently encoding them, 
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developing the codes, and finally interpreting the themes and information into a 
framework that can contribute towards completing a study.   
I identified themes in reports, formal documents, and interviews by a process of 
thematic analysis (Owen, 1984). I found thematic analysis most appropriate for this 
research as clustering the data into certain themes enabled me to understand where 
non-financial reporting belongs in the context of corporate transparency.  
In this context, I looked for the different ways that the concept of “transparency” 
was used to address financial and non-financial disclosure, in formal organisational 
documents and reporting frameworks of the selected companies, as well as the ways 
in which the key corporate actors position themselves and their companies towards 
sustainability reporting.  
In this study, I followed Owen (1984) and identified themes according to the three 
criteria of recurrence, repetition, and forcefulness. Recurrence was recognised 
when I identified “the same thread of meaning” in more than one part of a report or 
interview. I considered repetition as “explicit use of the same wording” and 
forcefulness of “vocal inflection, volume, or dramatic pauses” (Owen, 1984, p.275) 
when they were used to stress certain points in the reports or during the interviews.  
I followed Braun and Clarke's (2006) step guide for doing thematic analysis:  
1. Familiarising myself with the data: I began the process by repeatedly 
reading through the interview transcripts, notes which I had made during 
the interviews, and the selected corporate reports, searching for patterns and 
meanings. During this stage I highlighted potential codes which I thought 
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could be of significance. This allowed me to create an initial list of 
interesting patterns in the data. 
2. Generating initial codes: Once I familiarised myself with the data, I 
generated codes which I believed were important to this study such as 
sustainability, transparency, disclosure, reporting, GRI, Integrated 
Reporting, reputation, quality, materiality, cost, size, industry, media, 
government, New Zealand Central Securities Depository Limited 
(NZCSD), stakeholders, shareholders, governance, change, challenges, 
benefit, charity, community, lack of knowledge, and some others.  
3. Searching for themes: At this stage I started analysing codes to find out 
which codes could be combined to create an overarching theme. To do so, I 
printed all the codes which were found in the previous phase of the process, 
cut them out, and placed them on the floor. This allowed me to organise the 
codes, create a relationship between them, and make a list of potential 
themes and sub-themes. 
4. Reviewing themes: After creating a list of themes, I checked them against 
the data set and the codes to refine the themes. As a result, some themes 
were combined.  
5. Defining and naming themes:  Once I finished mapping and refining the 
themes, I finalised them as follows: Corporate reporting, materiality and 
report content, drivers and benefits, barriers and challenges, distribution of 
power, role of government and regulations, and conflict of interest. 
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6. Producing the report: With the final themes in place, I started the final 
analysis and write up process. I also extracted the most appropriate parts of 
the data set to be used as evidence in the study. 
4.2. Data collection 
In this section I first introduce the participants (with certain limits due to 
confidentiality concerns), and then describe the data collection methods. In line 
with the aims of this study, the data collected does not represent the views of 
stakeholders but, rather, includes those of representatives from some of  New 
Zealand’s public companies, from the two major Sustainable Business 
Intermediaries (SBIs) in New Zealand (Wright et al., 2016), and some of the most 
active sustainability reporting professionals in the country. I conducted a total of 28 
interviews (772 minutes) which includes interviews with representatives of 21 
publicly NZX listed companies (503 minutes) and seven other participants (269 
minutes). The average length of interviews was 27.5 minutes. 
4.2.1. Corporate Participants 
To make sure that the data gathered for this study were both comprehensive and 
impartial, almost all companies publicly listed in New Zealand (reporting and non-
reporting) were invited to participate. Primary and secondary sources of data were 
identified and gathered as described in the next section.  
Of more than 120 publicly listed companies invited to participate, 21 agreed to take 
part. Many of the interview requests were rejected by organisations that did have 
sustainability reporting processes in place as well as those that did not. Many early 
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rejections were triggered by the term “sustainability reporting”. For example, the 
Communication manager of BBB who had initially agreed to do the interview, 
withdrew her participation offer once she read the questions provided in the 
information sheet. She said in her rejection email:  
I’ve had a look at the questions and unfortunately I don’t think our 
company is going to be a good example for you to use. BBB is a listed 
investment company that invests in growing Australian companies. 
We don’t have a need for sustainability reporting like other larger 
operating companies. 
Although another interview request was sent to discuss the company’s annual 
report, regardless of whether or not they had a sustainability report, she replied:  
I’m really not going to be able to provide any valuable input as the 
majority of your questions are not applicable to us. Apologies, but it 
will not be beneficial if we go ahead with the interview. 
BBB’s communication manager was not the only potential participant to refuse 
involvement in the research. Others who did not take part had reasons such as not 
having anything to say because they had just gone public and had started doing 
annual reports. Some of the reporting organisations rejected interview invitations 
by saying they “have been inundated with requests” and believed they had done 
their part.  Some simply ignored all requests even though they were approached via 
different channels (email, phone calls, and through other people).  
The unwillingness to participate seemed to be caused by the usage of the words 
“transparency” and “sustainability” in the initial request. To broaden the scope of 
the research and, at the same time, to test whether the organisations’ willingness 
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was affected by these terms, part of the wording of the interview request was 
changed from “my research focus is on the motivations and barriers to sustainability 
reporting as experienced by leading companies in New Zealand” to “my research 
focus is on the challenges in reporting as experienced by leading companies in New 
Zealand”. The result was an immediate increase in the number of participants.  This 
did not raise any ethical issues as ‘reporting’ can cover a range of reporting types, 
and participants always had the option, before, during or after the interview, to 
refuse to answer questions or to withdraw, as stated below. 
During the interviews, when the term “transparency” was raised in a follow up 
question, the answers were affected by whether or not the organisation believed in 
corporate disclosure greater than legal requirements (financial reporting). They all 
did at the end answer the question by drawing on either financial or non-financial 
reporting.  
However, when the terms “sustainability”, “sustainability reporting” or “corporate 
responsibility (CR) reporting” were raised in a follow up question (in a semi 
structured interview format), the reactions were a bit different from when 
“transparency” was in question. Some participants, especially from the non-
reporting companies, either refused to answer and simply had “no comment”, or 
just replied with a sharp “no” followed by a long pause and waited for the next 
question to be asked, or found the questions irrelevant to their industry. 
Organisations that had experience of non-financial disclosure (not all from CR 
reporting), treated the sustainability related questions in a more cooperative way. 
Their responses mostly included, “we are looking into it (sustainability 
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disclosure)”, or “we tried it (sustainability reporting) and it just wasn’t creating any 
value”.  
Each key representative of the publicly listed companies in New Zealand who 
agreed to participate in this study held one of the following positions in their 
company: chief executive officer, chief financial officer, group accountant, 
financial controller, general manager-finance, social responsibility and 
sustainability manager, marketing and communications manager, corporate 
communications manager, or investor relations communications manager. The 
corporate participants are cited as CP in the findings and discussion chapters. Table 









CP1 CFO 13 minutes Health care and 
social assistance 
Not reporting 
CP2 Sustainability Manager 33 
minutes 
Transport  reporting 
CP3 Corporate responsibility 
manager 
41 minutes Agriculture  Not reporting 
CP4 CFO 25 minutes Transport Not reporting 
CP5 CFO 25 minutes  Not reporting 





CP7 Sustainability specialist 34 minutes Energy and 
minerals 
Reporting 
CP8 CFO 16 minutes Health care and 
social assistance 
Not reporting 
CP9 Head of investor 
relations 











CP11 Head of 
communications 
14 minutes Financial Not reporting 
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CP12 General manager of 
finance  
19 minutes Real estate 
services  
Not reporting 
CP13 Corporate Affairs 
Manager 
17 minutes Health care and 
social assistance 
Not reporting 
CP14 Environmental and 




CP15 CFO 10 minutes  Horticulture 
 
Not reporting 
CP16 CFO 23 minutes Fishing Not reporting 
CP17 Group Accountant 15 minutes Manufacturing Not reporting 
CP18 marketing and 
communications analyst  
19 minutes Shipping Not reporting 
CP19 Communication 
manager 
26 minutes Manufacturing 
(food) 
Not reporting 
CP20 CEO 25 minutes forestry Not reporting 
CP21 Financial controller 15 minutes Financial Not reporting  
 
Table 4. Corporate participants’ position in their company, the industry they are active in, length of the 
interview and reporting status. 
I am unable to share each participant’s company size individually as the company’s 
name can too easily be guessed, given that the industry sector has been named. This 
would violate my confidentiality agreement with the participants. However, I 
ranked all the participating NZX public companies based on market capitalisation 
and divided them into 5 equal groups, from very large to very small. As shown in 
Table 5, the 21 corporations that participated in this study represent different size 
brackets.  
Size Number of 
participants 




very small 2 
Total 21 
 
Table 5. Distribution of participating public companies across size brackets. 
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4.2.2. Other participants  
I conducted seven other interviews to help understand the current non-financial 
reporting system in New Zealand. These interviewees are cited as OP in the findings 
and discussion chapters and can be described as follows:  
1. Representative of a large international company which does publish a 
sustainability report in New Zealand and globally, but is not directly listed 
on the NZX. This participant shared how non-financial reports are created 
on a global scale.  
2. An adviser with Markets Oversight of the Financial Market Authority 
(FMA). The FMA is one of the three main supervisory bodies in the country 
(FMA, 2016) (the other two are the Reserve Bank of New Zealand and the 
Commerce Commission). Even though the interviewee refused to be 
recorded, she later sent a comprehensive email that summarised our 
conversation on the phone. She mapped out exactly where the listing rules 
and regulations come from, and how they are enforced. 
3. A senior manager in the sustainability team of one of the biggest assurance 
companies in the country. Her inputs provided insights on what content is 
normally included in non-financial reports.  
4. A representative from the Sustainable Business Council 
5. A representative from the Sustainable Business Network 
The representatives from both the SBC and the SBN helped in understanding the 
current non-financial disclosure practices in New Zealand and provided insights on 
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reporting tools such as the GRI and the Integrated Reporting (IR) guidelines. They 
also shared their opinions about the role that government should play in advocating 
sustainability practices in the country. 
6. The Executive Director of a business advisory company, which specialises 
in GRI training. This participant was particularly helpful in understanding 
sustainability tools and the indicators that are used in them.  
7. The Managing Director of one of the most prestigious communication firms 
which has assisted some of New Zealand’s largest companies in creating 
their sustainability reports. This participant shed light on the process of 
creating non-financial reports and their content, as well as public 
corporations’ motivations and the challenges they face in incorporating 
sustainability practices.  












OP1 Head of 
sustainability  
26 minutes information media & 
telecommunications 
Reporting  
OP2 Adviser with 
markets oversight 
15 minutes FMA N/A 
OP3 Senior manager 
climate change and 
sustainability  
50 Minutes 3rd party assurance 
Company 
Not reporting 
OP4 Confidential 45 minutes SBC N/A 
OP5 Confidential 40 minutes SBN N/A 
OP6 Executive director 48 minutes GRI training/business 
advisory 
N/A 
OP7 Managing director 45 minutes Communications N/A 
 
Table 6. Other participants’ position in their company, the industry they are active in, length of the interview 
and reporting status. 
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4.2.3. Primary data: Conducting the Interviews 
As mentioned earlier, there can be challenges in conducting semi-structured 
interviews. To minimise potential problems, certain precautions were taken. All 
interviews were transcribed immediately after the interview and additional notes 
were made about each interview in a journal (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). I also avoided 
expressing my own opinion regarding different matters that came up during 
conversations.  
All participants who were invited to take part in this study did so voluntarily and 
were encouraged to speak freely. I also made an effort to ensure that the participants 
represented companies with different sizes and were from major industry sectors in 
New Zealand. All issues which were relevant to the research questions were 
covered in the interviews with easy to understand questions.  
Respondent validation (Bryman, 2012; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Maxwell, 2012), 
which is thoroughly asking for feedback about the study’s data and conclusions 
from the participants, is the best way to prevent possible misinterpretation of what 
participants say and do, and helps the researcher identify their biases and 
misunderstandings of what they have observed (Maxwell, 2012).  
At the end of each interview, I asked for the interviewee’s feedback in regard to the 
questions and the study. I also adapted a snowball sampling technique (Goodman, 
1961) where I asked each participant whom they believed should be involved in the 
study. For instance, CP14 was referred to me by OP2. This participant also 
suggested asking other participants’ opinion in regard to a reward system such as 
tax incentives, as a follow up question at the end of each interview. The follow up 
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questions were thus continuously refined. The transcripts of the interviews were 
made available to the participants upon request for a final check, and additional 
comments and information were provided by some participants. While no concerns 
were raised in regard to the transcripts, seven participants believed the study will 
be useful for them and asked to have an executive version of the study. Their request 
will be granted once the study is concluded. 
Almost all interviews for this study were conducted on the phone rather than face 
to face, for two reasons. First, the head offices of the public companies are located 
in different regions in the country, and getting to them would have been very costly 
and time consuming. Second, the key representatives, who had the knowledge 
needed to qualify as a participant in this study, were mostly high ranking individuals 
in the companies, and arranging a face to face interview appointment that would fit 
in their busy schedules was extremely difficult. Many of the respondents agreed to 
do the interview in-between other tasks. Nonetheless, the semi-structured format 
gave me the flexibility to guide the conversation when it was necessary, and the 
interviewees felt comfortable to express their opinion regarding matters not initially 
considered as important for this research. For instance, the impact of the media on 
the content of sustainability reports published in the country turned out to be much 
higher than initially expected.  
Potential candidates from more than 120 public companies listed on the New 
Zealand Stock Exchange (NZX) were contacted via direct email and phone calls, 
or through their colleagues. Several requests for interviews were followed up as 
many as five times each. The list of companies was taken from NZX’s official 
website. Of the 21 companies that agreed to participate, only four currently publish 
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non-financial reports. Six others are considering providing non-financial reports or 
used to provide one in the past, and 12 companies do not publish such reports nor 
was there any indication that there could be one in the future. The questions asked 
from the reporting companies or those which used to publish a non-financial report, 
revolved around their corporate responsibility reports. Questions for the non-
reporting companies had a broader scope and included corporate reports in general 
but still included sustainability aspects.  
Two different sets of primary questions (Appendix A and Appendix B) were 
prepared for sustainability reporting and non-reporting public companies. Several 
follow up questions were asked. Appendix C includes examples of the additional 
questions that were asked during the interviews, as appropriate. I had to be flexible 
with the questions and reword or rearrange them when necessary.  The “other 
participants” (OPs) received a different set of questions (Appendix D), since the 
questions I asked them were not necessarily in regard to their own company’s 
transparency and sustainability practices. This is with exception of OP1 who was 
from a large international corporation, which, in spite of being very active and 
profitable in New Zealand, is not publicly listed on the NZX. Nonetheless, they 
produce sustainability reports and were given the same questions as listed in 
Appendix A.  Not all the additional participants answered all the questions listed in 
Appendix D. Since they represented different organisations with different 
backgrounds, some of the questions were left out where necessary. Most of the 
questions were open ended and were designed to control the flow of the 
conversation, at the same time leaving the interviewee free to answer and elaborate 
on the topic in question as they saw fit.  
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The interviews were designed to take up to 30 minutes. They did, however, range 
from 10 to 55 minutes. At the beginning of each interview, I once again confirmed 
with the interviewee that the conversation was being recorded. All conversations 
with the “corporate participants” and five of the seven “other participants” were 
recorded and transcribed. For the two “other participants” who preferred not to be 
recorded, I carefully took notes of what was discussed during the interviews. If a 
point was not clear, I asked the interviewees to repeat themselves. The two 
interviewees also provided additional information after the interview via email.  
Almost all interviewees made additional comments once the recording had stopped. 
Notes were carefully made regarding these comments. At the end of the 
conversation, I confirmed with each interviewee which of the additional comments 
could still be used in the study. The data gathered and the notes taken were cleaned 
up (Romagnano, 1991) and irrelevant and off-topic conversations were removed.  
4.2.4. Ethical Considerations  
This research was conducted in a manner that complies with the ethical standards 
set by the University of Waikato. The research process followed the ‘Guidelines for 
Professional Practice and Community Contact in the Conduct of University 
Research or Related Activities, which have been developed by the University of 
Waikato’s Human Research Ethics Committee to articulate good practice for 
engaging with members of the community in the course of planning and carrying 
out research involving human participants (University of Waikato, 2009). Ethical 
approval was granted by the university before any requests were made for 
interviews. A research outline, information sheet, and consent form were sent to all 
participants of this study via email. All the representatives from the public 
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companies who participated in this study agreed to be recorded but were assured 
anonymity.  
4.2.5. Secondary data 
Many documents were reviewed and secondary data was collected from several 
documents for different purposes, as follows.  
4.2.5.1. Corporate reports of participating companies (2015 and 2017) 
I reviewed the corporate reports (annual and sustainability) of all the participating 
companies to see how they define stakeholders in their reporting and how the 
company has engaged with them. I initially only reviewed the 2015 reports (the 
year interviews were conducted). Later on, the 2017 reports (companies’ latest 
reports) of the same companies were analysed and added to the data set. This choice 
was made for two main reasons. Firstly, a few of the non-reporting participants 
claimed during the interviews that the company will be producing a sustainability 
report in the near future. Reviewing the 2017 reports allowed me to assess the 
validity of these claims. Secondly, as there was talks of new sustainability 
recommendations being introduced by the NZX in 2016, it was important to see 
whether the news of such changes in the market’s code of governance would impact 
the companies reporting practices. Reviewing both 2015 and 2017 reports of the 
participating companies also allowed me to see how these reports evolved in terms 
of transparency and stakeholder engagement, over a period of 3 years.  
A total of 43 reports were studied and analysed. I searched each document looking 
for terms such as stakeholder, communication, engage, engagement, customer, 
employee, community, Iwi, local, people, shareholder, government, environment, 
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investor, NGO, board of directors, media, society, social responsibility. I then put 
a summary of the analysis for each participating company for 2015 and 2017 side 
by side in a table (Appendix E). This allowed me to compare how each company 
had changed their reporting practices over the years.  
4.2.5.2. Corporate reports (40 largest companies) 
Formal organisational documents such as annual reports, sustainability reports, 
shareholders’ reviews, and policies and regulations, were studied to understand how 
corporate reporting is done in the country. Annual reports of 40 of the largest 
companies in New Zealand (all reports are available on NZX’s website: 
www.nzx.com) were also reviewed, as relevant literature suggests that larger 
corporations around the world tend to release more non-financial information 
(Brammer & Pavelin, 2006; Fernandez-Feijoo et al., 2014a; Simnett et al., 2009). 
The validity of this claim was assessed for New Zealand companies. Special 
attention was also paid to the “shareholder information” section of these reports to 
find out who owns majority of shares in these companies, in order to help assess if 
the ownership structure was affecting their non-financial disclosure (Fernandez-
Feijoo et al., 2014b).    
4.2.5.3. GRI frameworks and KPMG reports 
Reporting frameworks of the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI)(GRI, 2013a, 2013d, 
2016a, 2016b) and their latest reporting guidelines (G4)(GRI, 2013b, 2013c, 2015), 
were reviewed to assist in better understanding of how the most used tool in the 
world for sustainability reporting works, and what benefits it has. The GRI 
guidelines also drew a clear picture of what indicators are used to measure 
companies’ impacts on the environment, society, and the economy.  
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Many reports from other organisations such as KPMG (KPMG, 2005, 2011, 2013, 
2015; UNEP et al., 2016), which has been actively monitoring the behaviour of top 
companies towards non-financial reporting in the past years were also studied. 
These corporate surveys and reports, which are done every two years by KPMG 
(available on their website: kpmg.com), helped this research by illustrating the 
changes that have been made in the past decade, in governments and in the largest 
companies around the world, to fit sustainability in everyday organisational 
operations. They also gave a clear impression of how New Zealand is doing in terms 
of non-financial disclosure.  
4.2.5.4. Government and market regulations 
Government regulations and listing rules in New Zealand (FMA, 2016; NZX, 2016; 
NZX, 2017b) were reviewed to understand exactly what is required by law to be in 
corporate reports. I also looked at Australia’s laws (ASX Corporate Governance 
Council, 2014) as they were mentioned by a number of participants and 
comparisons were made.   
4.3. Limitations of this study 
1. The subjects of this study are 21 key representatives of the companies who 
agreed to take part in this research. As reported above, many potential 
participants, from both sustainability reporting and non-reporting 
companies, chose to refuse or ignore the interview requests for different 
reasons. This study would have been richer if more key representatives from 
all or most of the listed companies on the New Zealand Stock Exchange had 
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accepted the invitation to participate in this research, or at least had 
identified their exact reason for not wanting to take part in the study.  
2. More than half of the corporate participants were high ranking officers with 
extremely limited time, who took part in this study in-between other tasks. 
Time pressure may have affected their responses. In addition, only one 
person was interviewed from each company and, depending on their take on 
sustainability transparency, personal values, and their rank in the 
organisation, some follow up questions were either left unanswered or the 
participant gave a short yes or no answer which limits the data gathered. In 
such cases when I asked for more clarification on the topic in question, none 
was provided. This was particularly strong with non-reporting companies, 
when the conversation was about sustainability practices of the company.  
4.4. Summary of the Chapter 
In this chapter I outlined the research approach, the research design, and the 
methods that I adopted to analyse the data. I explained the critical interpretive 
approach taken to explore companies’ view on corporate transparency and the 
expectations, the motivations, and the barriers for non-financial reporting. I also 
explained the semi structured interview method used to gather the primary data, and 
thematic analysis used to identify the most important themes to emerge from 
interviews with representatives of the participating companies and their documents, 
and from documents that are publicly available from organisations which did not 
participate in this research. In addition, I described the responses typically received 
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from potential participants who refused to be interviewed, as this in itself was 
informative in this research context. 
In the next two chapters, I present the findings of the primary and secondary data 
analysis. Those who agreed to participate in this research had different views about 
corporate transparency; more specifically, about corporate reporting. In Chapter 5, 
Compliance, I present companies’ views on corporate reporting, with special 
attention paid to sustainability reporting. I then focus on the legal requirements and 
the government’s role, companies’ perception of stakeholders’ expectations, and 
the need for a common standard. In Chapter 6, I look at motivations, challenges, 
and barriers to sustainability reporting in New Zealand. The focus of each chapter 
aligns with the key themes found. 
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CHAPTER 5: Findings I. Varying 
Interpretations of Transparency 
Introduction  
The current legal requirements in New Zealand, which demand transparency from 
public companies, are all related to financial information with none on the firms’ 
effects on the environment, society and the economy. As a result, corporate 
responsibility (CR) and sustainability reporting are not mandatory in New Zealand.  
In this chapter, I examine what transparency means to the representatives of the 
participating companies, and how the organisations’ perception of stakeholder 
expectations shape their corporate reports.   
Organisation of chapter 
This chapter is divided into four sections:  
1. In the first section of this chapter, I concentrate on how top public 
companies write and organise their corporate reports and what corporate 
transparency means to them. Aside from the interview data, I use corporate 
reports published by these companies as supporting documents. In this 
section, companies are divided into two groups: those that provided 
sustainability reports at the time the interviews were conducted, and those 
that did not.  
2. The second section in this chapter explores factors other than legal 
requirements that affect what is chosen as material information, and 
 123 
provides some insight on how different organisations interpret “material 
information”.  
3. The third section examines companies’ views on pressure from stakeholders 
for sustainability reporting in New Zealand, to which the companies feel a 
need to comply. In addition, I explore the factors that could cause a lack of 
expectation for non-financial disclosure, such as the power and influence of 
certain stakeholders on corporate reports, lack of knowledge regarding 
sustainability indicators, stakeholders’ representation problems, and the fact 
that many large companies are state owned enterprises.  
4. The fourth and final section of this chapter draws from different opinions 
that companies have about mandatory sustainability reporting. I also look at 
reports by KPMG and the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) on the growth 
of sustainability reporting globally, and New Zealand’s position in this 
regard.  
5.1. Corporate Reporting  
Interviewees used the term “compliance” numerous times, mostly to explain the 
way their company’s corporate reports are written. Many explained that their annual 
reports are “compliance based” or are only designed to “comply with the listing 
rules”. In a few cases, compliance was referred to outside the legal context to 
explain the basis for non-financial disclosure. Whether it was out of complying with 
the law or other stakeholders’ expectations, what an organisation reported on seems 
to be directly connected to how they understand and define corporate transparency. 
Some considered complying with “legal obligations” as being transparent; some 
described transparency as “being honest about what you actually do” in all aspects 
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of business. There was even one interpretation which described transparency as 
“taking the risk in informing the public” about a company’s activities.  
Participating organisations, which comply with the regulations and the New 
Zealand Stock Exchange’s (NZX) listing rules, believed that they are only obliged 
to disclose certain types of information that is required by law. For them, complying 
with the rules meant transparency. 
What organisations are legally required to disclose is called “material information”. 
According to the latest version of the NZX listing rules, material information is 
information that “a reasonable person would expect if it were generally available to 
the market, to have a material effect on the price of quoted securities of the issuer” 
(NZX, 2017b, p. 13). This description of “material information” is an unclear and 
open-ended legal statement. It does not require companies to provide information 
on their activities that may affect the environment, society, and the economy. 
However, it identifies material information as information that, when provided, 
would affect the price of the issued securities.  
After years of lagging behind other global stock exchanges, at the end of 2017 (after 
this study was at its final stages) the NZX finally took a step towards creating more 
value in the long term and included non-financial reporting in their 
“recommendations”. The NZX Corporate Governance Code (NZX, 2017a) 
describes recommendations as “comply or explain” which do not force the company 
to include non-financial material in their reports.  
“The Listing Rules act to encourage issuers to adopt the NZX Code but do 
not force them to do so. This allows an issuer flexibility to adopt other 
corporate governance practices considered by the Board to be more suitable. 
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Under the NZX Code, if the Board of an issuer considers that a 
recommendation is not appropriate because it does not fit the issuer’s 
circumstances, it is entitled not to adopt it. If it does not adopt it, it must 
explain why it has not. This is the basis of the ‘comply or explain’ (‘if not, 
why not’) approach”(NZX, 2017a, p. 4) (Figure 8). 
Although a huge improvement compared to what was in place previously (no 
mention of environmental or social material), the legal definition of Material 
Information according to the listing rules remains the same and, as discussed later, 
companies which firmly believe they have no impact on either the environment or 
the society (e.g. investment companies) will hardly be affected by such 
recommendations. OP6, a GRI trainer, said:  
There are still lots of outs. You don’t have to absolutely to do it but 
it’s slow steady build-up of best practice and eventually the laggards 
effectively will have to join in. I think it’s an inclusive model that says 
hey look this is our expectations this is good corporate governance. 
Legislation can be compassing because people can start ticking the 
boxes just to make the legislation (OP6). 
 
 
Figure 1. Hierarch of the "comply or explain" regime. Source:(NZX, 2017a, p. 4) 
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To understand what is legally required and to get the perspective of organisations 
that oversee the compliance process, I interviewed an adviser with Markets 
Oversight of the Financial Market Authority (FMA). The FMA, which is an 
independent crown entity, is a financial conduct regulator and one of the main three 
supervisory bodies (together with the Reserve Bank of New Zealand and the 
Commerce Commission), which are in charge of regulating the economy of the 
country. All “support a financially healthy New Zealand” (FMA, 2016). About 
what type of information is required to be disclosed, the interviewee said:  
 There is currently no specific requirement for NZX listed companies 
to disclose any sustainability/environmental matters (for example, an 
oil spill)…in Section 10 of the NZX Listing Rules, it states that 
companies must disclose any information that is material 
information. (OP2) 
According to this official, the FMA is responsible for enforcing legislation. The 
Financial Markets Conduct Act 2013 deals with the legal requirement for financial 
product markets to be licensed, alongside the initial and ongoing obligations of 
licensed market operators. The FMA representative then explained that for financial 
product markets, it is a requirement to have “contractual market rules” which, in 
New Zealand’s case, are the NZX Listing Rules. Before these rules can take effect, 
both initially and for any subsequent proposed changes, they need to be approved 
by the FMA.  
The representative explained that the FMA is the government agency responsible 
for regulating the capital markets and financial services in New Zealand and the 
laws are passed by the government of the day. Clarifying the role of NZX as a 
“frontline regulator” the representative said:  
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They [NZX] is responsible for regulating the financial product 
markets it operates and the market participants that use those 
markets. NZX is responsible for ensuring its market participants 
comply with the NZX Listing Rules, and will take enforcement action 
against participants who breach the rules. (OP2)  
In summary, this means that even if the interpretation of corporate reporting was 
ever going to change to include non-financial information, this change would need 
to be enacted by the government, approved by the FMA, and enforced by the NZX. 
This indicates that without direct pressure from the government, non-financial 
disclosure is to be controlled by either the companies themselves in a form of 
volunteer transparency, or by the market (NZX) in the form of recommendations. 
These companies and the market as discussed later, may have priorities (e.g. gaining 
profit) different to those of their stakeholders.  
A participant clarified that the current requirement for companies to “comply or 
explain” is still driven by the market rather than the government. He said:  
The government hasn’t stepped in, the share market stepped in, 
because there were already 30 listed companies reporting and I think 
there is a reason that they are doing it and we have seen about 35 
jurisdictions around the world with market and legislative 
requirements to report. So the body of evidence just builds up. That’s 
why the NZX decided there was already time for them to update their 
code anyway. (OP6) 
The second group of organisations, which believed that transparency should be a 
“total integration right across the whole business”, mostly included companies 
which either provide non-financial reporting in different forms (separate 
sustainability reports, online documents, or as a part of their annual reports) or 
support the idea of disclosing non-financial information in the near future.  
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A few of the companies that took part in the research voluntarily produce 
sustainability reports but most of them do not make any form of sustainability 
disclosure. Some of these non-reporting companies are even members of the 
Sustainable Business Council or have a fully functional sustainability department 
within the firm. The sustainability department normally deals with Public Relations 
issues. Their idea of what should be disclosed to the public was affected by factors 
such as size of the organisation, compliance and legal requirements, shareholders’ 
expectations, whether or not they considered sustainability disclosure relevant to 
their organisational activities, and what purpose their corporate reports served.  
5.1.1. Transparency  
The concept of transparency means different things to different companies. As 
indicated earlier, certain organisations consider providing an annual report as being 
transparent. These organisations measure transparency very precisely, using 
indicators to make sure that there isn’t “too much transparency”. They normally 
provide what they believe is enough information, leaving a third party assurance 
company to check the information against indicators and, if needed, tell them to 
provide more information to meet the requirements. A senior manager in the 
sustainability team of one of the biggest assurance companies in the country said:  
If a client decides that they don’t want to report on their director’s 
remuneration, and think that’s too much transparency, and they 
decide to take that out of the report and not report that; If that relates 
to an indicator or a claim that we are looking at as an assurance 
provider, it’s at that point that we would have to say, well look in 
order to get to this accordance level, you will have to provide that 
information. (OP3) 
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The goal for disclosing information for these companies is, first, to keep the 
shareholders informed and happy; second, attract “potential investors”; and third to 
maintain a certain image and “reputation”. Other factors that affected their level of 
transparency included, but was not limited to, “financial disclosure” (CP18) 
(complying with legal requirements in New Zealand), “competitive advantage” 
(CP19), and “operational risk management” (CP3). 
A Corporate Responsibility Manager in the food industry described transparency as 
a “spectrum” where one side needs a “certain reason” to be transparent and the 
concept of transparency is treated on a need to know basis with a “we don’t say 
anything about anything unless you really have to” attitude, and the other side is the 
“high transparent end” (which he claimed his company tends to lean towards even 
though they do not produce any non-financial reports), where no reason is required 
to be transparent (CP3). He believed all organisations are sitting somewhere along 
that spectrum with all their issues (whether financial or non-financial). Many others 
confirmed the “don’t say anything about anything unless you have to” mind-set by 
reporting only on what is required and just  complying with the listing rules.  
Another participant, a Chief Financial Officer (CFO) of a company active in the 
healthcare industry, sees the notion of transparency as a tool to convey information 
and company strategies to the shareholders and a true and fair view of the financial 
statements and nothing else. He said: 
I don’t really think transparency is something you do or don’t. 
Consider it’s sort of an output of the document. I don’t go through 
the document and go: you know gosh are we being too transparent 
there. Not a question that comes into my head. I go: are we conveying 
the information that we need to comply with all the reporting 
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standards, and are we helping shareholders and the recipients of the 
documents to better understand our business and our strategic 
objectives, and if we can broadly answer those questions as yes and 
be comfortable that we are conveying it in an informative and 
concise manner, then I think we have achieved the outcome that we 
need to (CP8). 
A representative of one of the largest companies in the country, a market leader in 
its field, admits that while it has “always had quite good and strong areas of 
performance, we haven’t had the oversight for the framework or the governance to 
look across the business like other places” do (CP3). He later explained that their 
company has “a culture of doing the right thing” and used a cautionary product recall 
as an example, which he described as “going out of our way and taking the risk in 
informing the public which is quite an act of transparency for a potential risk” (CP3). 
The participant appeared to contradict himself by looking at the recall of the possibly 
contaminated product as doing the right thing and, at the same time, considered 
informing the public as sort of a favour done which required the company to go out 
of its way to do. This participant described the company’s level of transparency over 
the past five years as something that “has improved but certainly hasn’t got worse”. 
He later added that there could be an element of “reputation risk” involved when 
deciding on what information should be published and that reputation risk would be 
“balanced against the need to be transparent”, when drawing the line of 
transparency. He argued that factors such as a company’s “competitive advantage”, 
“commercial risk”, and “operational risk” need to be considered and managed when 
one commits to transparency. He also acknowledged that there is a call for their 
organisation “to increase its transparency and its accountability” and, therefore, the 
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time and agenda is set for a commitment to “sustainability and social responsibility 
reporting” and more open communication (CP3).  
5.1.1.1. Reporting Companies 
Only four of the 21 participating organisations publish sustainability reports. In fact, 
by the end of 2013, only 17% of the public companies in New Zealand published 
sustainability reports (KPMG, 2013). This rate has not grown much since then. By 
2015, New Zealand ranked 37th amongst 45 countries in which companies either 
voluntarily or mandatorily provide sustainability reports (among the bottom 30%, 
below the average reporting rate) (KPMG, 2015). 
Organisations, which did produce sustainability reports (whether a separate report 
or as a section of the annual report), felt that sustainability reporting was in the 
“core” of their business and an “ongoing story” for them. To them, transparency is 
more than just a financial report. For these firms, transparency meant being 
“authentic”. Since they valued sustainability reporting so much and thought it was 
essential for their business, they believed that a sustainability report integrated with 
the annual report creates more value than having it as a separate document. One 
participant even tried a separate report but decided to change back to a combined 
annual and sustainability report because they “noticed it wasn’t best practice and 
would like to keep our reports combined” (CP7).  
The reporting companies also considered a wider range of people as the audience 
for their corporate reports. One said:  
It’s all our shareholders and our stakeholders. We have a lot of 
stakeholders… anyone from the local tribal people who are either 
impacted, or employed, or contracted by the company … there is a 
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huge range of people who are interested in different aspects of what 
we do and how we work with people. (CP7) 
Another reporting company emphasised the importance of a certain group of 
stakeholders, its own people, and said: 
What we’ve also been really focused on with our new strategy is 
people. Last year massive changes have been around sustainability 
for the social side of our business and we are now in that mentality 
that without the people, we can’t even operate. So, at the moment 
now there is a bit of a shift to focus more to sustaining our people in 
order to do that. (CP14)  
Reporting companies believed that annual and sustainability reports are just tools, 
which should be used to “enhance” transparency, and transparency and 
sustainability should be consistent in all aspects of the business. It went over and 
beyond the acts of philanthropy for the reporting companies and truly included the 
companies’ positive and negative impacts. A participant whose company and their 
business has everything to do with the marine world said:  
We report on the number of spills that we have, the total of volume 
of those spills. We have to. And I think it’s actually pro us; it works 
in our favour. So we report all these things and then explain how we 
are responding to these issues as well. So if you got an NGO coming 
in and they’ve seen the spill, they can see that we are trying to deal 
with it. You have to be transparent in your operation. Otherwise, if 
you don’t report it and someone notices it then your integrity is gone 
in your organisation. (CP14)  
All reporting companies have been guided by Global Initiative Reporting (GRI) 
guidelines when creating their sustainability reports. As an independent 
organisation, GRI helps organisations communicate their sustainability issues. The 
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GRI guidelines are the most used sustainability guidelines in the world, providing 
standards that allow the companies to measure their impacts on the environment, 
society, and the economy (GRI, 2016b).  
One thing that stood out in the interviews was the emphasis of the companies on 
environmental issues. All the companies that understood the concept of 
sustainability reporting immediately thought of effects on the environment (carbon 
footprint), rarely on society, and never on the economy. This is despite the fact that 
in G4’s latest sustainability reporting guidelines, economic indicators are the first 
category listed in the G4 Specific Standard Disclosures Overview. Such indicators 
include economic performance, market presence, indirect economic impacts, and 
procurement practices (Initiative, 2013). According to G4, the economic 
measurement of sustainability is concerned with the companies’ effects on the 
economic environments of its stakeholders and is not concerned with the financial 
situation of the firm.  
5.1.1.2. Non-Reporting Companies 
Twelve of the 21 public companies that took part in this research do not publish a 
sustainability report. Six others, which are not currently reporting, have plans to do 
so in the future. This includes organisations that used to produce sustainability 
reports, but have stopped publishing them because they believed it did not create 
“value”. The majority of those who claimed that they are looking into producing 
sustainability reports gave no possible timeframe as to when the reports could be 
expected. They explained that they wanted to make sure that they could prepare “a 
quality report with quality information”. However, one of the same interviewees, 
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who made this claim later said: “well if it (sustainability reporting) was important 
[to us] I would have thought we would have one” (CP15). 
Some of these non-reporting companies admitted that “communication has been 
pretty quiet” with the stakeholders in terms of sustainability disclosure and that they 
should report on their activities that affect the environment, society, and the 
economy. One of the participants compared his company to global competitors and 
said:  
No we don’t [publish a sustainability report] but that’s something that 
we are looking at doing. We are aware that’s a gap. So if you are 
benchmarking it against New Zealand companies we do reasonably well 
but if you benchmark it against global peers in our industry like NNN 
then we are behind. (CP3)  
As mentioned earlier, New Zealand is perhaps not the best benchmark for 
sustainability reporting as it sits amongst the bottom 30% of reporting countries.  
A company, which has not been publishing sustainability reports, claimed that it had 
the material for such reports and could even report to other global programs because 
they are active in other countries that may require sustainability disclosure but they 
choose not to report it in New Zealand because there is no requirement for it. A 
representative of this company said: 
We don’t report them [carbon footprint] at the moment. We have 
been doing it for our own purposes for us to know where we are at 
to think about where we want be and we see more large customers 
these days when they tend to their business asking where our 
environmental policy is at, our sustainability policy statements, what 
we do internally. We participate in a carbon disclosure program 
which is a global program; we report on that every year and provide 
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the outcomes of our internal work. At this stage we are not required 
to disclose it to anybody else. (CP4)  
This statement indicates a lack of understanding of what sustainability reporting is 
and what purpose it serves. While disclosure regarding carbon footprints is 
considered by many as a topic for inclusion in a non-financial report, there are many 
others which need to be addressed. A GRI trainer, who has helped many of the large 
companies in the country in understanding GRI guidelines, warns about how topics 
such as carbon emissions can overshadow other topics such as climate change, 
which are very important for some stakeholders. He explains that companies “have 
to be careful not to group them all together” and believes direct communication with 
different stakeholder groups will help understand what is required to be included in 
non-financial reports (OP6). 
Some firms justified the way they disclose information by comparing the size of 
their organisation with others, regardless of their position and profitability. A 
participant whose company is among the top publicly listed firms in the NZX 
explains the correlation between size and level of transparency:  
We are actually a very small corporate holding company while we 
are sitting at number X on the NZX, so we are just outside of NZX 
50. The corporate office of HHH is only about 10 people. You need 
to understand that because it makes us different to other companies 
who might have a corporate team of 100 or 200. (CP5) 
 
Sustainability professionals who participated in this study (OP4, OP5, OP6, and 
OP7) all disagree that size of the company should matter as a factor. According to 
OP7, full transparency (including financial and non-financial) is beneficial to 
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companies regardless of their type and size. She explains that companies need to 
understand what impact they have as an organization on their surroundings and what 
their stakeholders’ opinion are of them to succeed.  
OP6 argues that companies that are listed on the NZX are getting funds from the 
public so size of the company is irrelevant when it comes to being transparent 
towards the public. The representative of SBN also believed that size is definitely 
not a factor. He used their own members’ commitment as an example: 
We have 500 odd members and only 60 of them would be corporate 
big enough to list (not all are listed). You are talking about the 
biggest companies in the country basically and they think they are 
too small to do any reporting. If you are going to play with the big 
boys and join the stock exchange  then you are basically making a 
claim to be big enough and you have to get your house in order and 
I think that’s what this reporting and disclosure is about. It’s taking 
responsibility for the impacts that your business is having. (OP5) 
In the next section, I look into factors other than the legal requirements that affect 
the way material information is put together by public companies. I then explore 
how material information is perceived by organisations and what it means to them.  
5.2. Material Information 
As stated in the introduction of this chapter, all public companies listed on the NZX 
are legally required to present “material information” in their reports. However, the 
legal definition of this term does not mention financial information in particular, 
nor does it exclude certain types of information such as non-financial data. It defines 
material information as information that when provided would affect the share 
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prices as interpreted by a “reasonable person”; it is somehow implied that to comply 
with the legal requirements, only financial information matters.  
The definition for “material information” is very broad since there are more than 
15 industry classifications in New Zealand. According to the New Zealand 
economic and financial overview published by The New Zealand Treasury (2016), 
the primary industries in the country that play an essential role in the wellbeing of 
the country’s economy are agriculture, forestry, horticulture, mining, and fishing. 
At least one company related to each of these primary industries took part in this 
research. During the interviews, direct effects on the environment and society, as 
well as the economy were observed for all the “primary industries”. Many 
companies admitted to having impacts, but believed that their effects were not 
significant enough to be reported.  
Previous research also indicates that the level of transparency and the type of the 
information provided in reports is directly related to the type of industry (Alali & 
Romero, 2012; Kolk & Perego, 2010). For instance, an international study done by 
KPMG (2015), one of the biggest 250 companies in the world (G250), shows that 
the transport sector has the highest quality of carbon reporting while the oil & gas 
sector has the lowest report quality (Figure 9). The study also explains that sectors 
such as Financial Services, which have really low quality reports, look at their own 
operations’ direct carbon release, although they need to consider the impact of the 
companies they invest in as well.   
The findings of this study are aligned with KPMG’s work. The sustainability 
professionals who participated in this study had strong opinions on the impacts a 
type of the industry can have on sustainability reporting. One participant (OP6) 
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argued that some industries, such as investment and financial services, may have a 
little more work to do but they still have to explain the impacts that their investment 
strategies may have. Another participant (OP7) used the New Zealand Super Fund 
as a local example, and Blackrock as a global example, from the Financial Services 
sector that are well advanced in disclosing non-financial information. She also 
believes that “there are some really big issues that are affecting that sector and I 
think more than ever we need that industry to be transparent”. In OP5’s opinion, 
this perception of a company not needing a sustainability report because it is active 
in the financial services sector, is “laughable” and “outrageous”, and is an indication 
of a lack of understanding of the purpose of non-financial disclosure.  
 
Figure 9. G250 companies, adapted from  KPMG Survey of Corporate Responsibility Reporting KPMG 
(2015). 
Other than complying with the regulations, companies provide material information 
for other reasons such as an organisation’s reputation and image, what shareholders 
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or potential investors of the company would want to see in a report, and the changes 
made in the company in the previous year that shareholders should be aware of. 
Not all investors make investment decisions based only on financial information. 
There are particular investors who are interested in non-financial information, as 
pointed out by one participant:  
There are quite a few institutional investors and big financial 
companies that do corporate social responsibility investing and 
those people expect disclosure around sustainability and 
environment, and they obviously invest based on that. (CP9)  
Many of these public companies’ customers are other smaller firms that are after 
keeping a good image and reputation themselves. Therefore, they choose their main 
suppliers (public companies) based on their image and how they are perceived by 
the end customer. A participant, from a very large company in the food industry 
and a supplier of many other large firms, says: 
Our customers are managing risks in their supply chains and they 
want to understand who they are purchasing products from, and 
what their performance is, and what their standards are, and how 
they can work with their supply chains to improve their own indirect 
performance. So they are interested in [our] performance, they are 
interested in ratios, they are interested in risk management 
processes. (CP3) 
These smaller companies, which are clients of public companies, look into the 
material information published by the bigger companies to see whether their 
suppliers have disclosed certain information which may affect their reputation. The 
client firms are also interested to see what actions have been taken to resolve the 
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issues that may have arisen in the past year, which might have negative effects on 
the suppliers and their own image. 
The companies’ perception of material information comes in different forms, as 
described below. 
The first group of companies are those that believe that material information is 
only what the shareholders expect and that shareholders are the only reason reports 
are provided in the first place. These companies made up at least half of the 
interviewees. A few companies did mention other stakeholders such as customers 
but the primary focus was their shareholders. A participant said: 
So obviously yeah the shareholders is our number one but closely in 
number two, we use it as a marketing tool ourselves. So myself and 
my boss the commercial manager, any other people who actually go 
and see customers directly will use the annual report as a selling 
point on the (company) as well and just explain what we can 
offer…We don’t actually do anything internally in the company that 
is of the fine quality, which we take out to customers. So we also use 
the annual report as a tool to promote the company not just to the 
shareholders, but the people who may use the (company) as a 
customer. (CP7) 
In fact, the power of shareholders was considered so great by one of the companies 
in this group that it believed that mandatory reporting would need shareholders’ 
approval. These companies only identified “shareholders and potential investors” 
as their stakeholders. Many of the companies in this group confused the concept of 
philanthropy with sustainability, reporting on their charitable activities rather than 
their negative effects such as their carbon footprint. Most of these companies 
questioned the importance of a sustainability report and its benefits by saying that 
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the “majority of stakeholders are shareholders” and they “are just happy” with what 
is being produced. One asked:  
My first question would be why? What is the evidence? What is the 
purpose of doing something like that? If there is a good enough 
reason then you could sort of take the next step but we need to 
understand exactly why first. (CP19)  
The second group considered materiality preparation to create a report as “part of 
the compliance process”. This group of companies did not question the concept of 
sustainability reporting but emphasised that they only provide what is legally 
required and nothing more, unless the additional information is there to add value 
or to clarify points in the required section. One participant said: 
We ensure that the reports contain everything that we are required 
to disclose under the financial reporting act, and the NZX listing 
rules and beyond that, we really include the additional information 
that helps explain those disclosures fundamentally…We make sure it 
meets all the disclosure requirements that's first and foremost…It’s 
nothing beyond what’s required to be in there. (CP4)  
A few of the companies in this group used to provide sustainability reporting at one 
time but have now stopped doing so. They considered creating sustainability reports 
as a “costly”, “tiresome”, and “time consuming” process that not enough people 
cared enough to read. On top of that, they argued that while such reports are very 
difficult to measure, they do not create any justifiable value. A participant whose 
company has direct effects on the environment and used to be fully owned by the 
government, argued that they stopped producing sustainably reports to avoid giving 
“meaningless numbers” and explained that their company is looking at a different 
way of reporting that does not follow the “cookie cutter approach” and is looking 
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into creating real value (CP9). She explained that the board and the management of 
their company spent a lot of time to review and decide whether or not they should 
continue publishing a sustainability report. A decision was made to stop the report 
because the material information included in the report was not creating any value 
for their stakeholders while a number of employees were spending a lot of time to 
gather, calculate, and analyse the information. She said:  
99.999% of our greenhouse gases come from our PPP and they are 
quite easy to monitor and we actually disclose that quarterly. Now 
the other 0.001% greenhouse gases come from me catching a taxi to 
the other side of town, or the lights in our office and things like that. 
That’s very difficult to measure and it takes a lot of time to measure, 
and it takes a lot of time to calculate, and actually doesn’t provide 
the stakeholders with any information that’s useful for them…so 
having someone spend all day calculating how much greenhouse 
gases it actually takes for me to actually catch a cab from one side 
of the town to the other isn’t actually giving the information they 
need. (CP9)  
The third group were organisations which do provide sustainability reports despite 
the lack of legislation. This group of companies choose to include any impact they 
may have had (positive or negative) in their reports. More importantly, they explain 
what has been done to respond to issues caused by their organisation. These firms 
provide reports that include both financial and non-financial information 
completely voluntarily.  In New Zealand sustainability reports are prepared 
voluntarily, sometimes through organisations such as the Sustainable Business 
Council or Sustainable Business Network, which encourage their members to 
prepare such reports (SBC, 2016b).  
 143 
According to the SBC, all members have joined voluntarily and are required by the 
SBC to submit a sustainability report within two years of their membership. This 
requirement, however, had not been taken very seriously previously. According to 
a participant, “in 2012 only 20% of the members [of SBC] were actually reporting” 
(OP6). The representative of the SBC who participated in this study acknowledged 
that out of their 90 members only a “handful” are publicly listed (OP4). She also 
stated that in 2017 they finally enforced the requirement and for the first time, asked 
a member not to renew their membership as they had not taken the necessary steps 
to produce a sustainability report in the past years that they were a member of the 
SBC.  
The Chief Financial Officer of one of the biggest and most profitable firms in the 
country, which owns 19 other well-known companies in New Zealand, argued that 
sustainability reporting is one of those things that companies have to move 
voluntarily towards to see what acceptance there is of it and whether or not it could 
produce valuable information. He asked:  
Is there going to be useful information to it or is it going to be at 
least measured on the same basis? Otherwise it’s not going to be 
comparable between companies. (CP4) 
He then made a comment which appeared to contradict his earlier remarks about 
voluntary sustainability reporting to some extent as he maintained that there should 
be a clear standard to stop companies which use this kind of reporting to create a 
good image. He said:  
 There is a lot of companies that put a spin on things so I think there 
needs to be a pretty clear framework [to report on] whatever that 
they do. It’s similar to what we are seeing with diversity, I guess 
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gender diversity in particular. It’s not mandatory but certain 
elements of it are starting to be disclosed in annual reports; it’s 
only a matter of time before the listed companies are required 
mandatorily to report a whole lot of information around that. (CP4) 
In a voluntary system, since the government does not require companies to submit 
a sustainability report, shareholders are the only group of stakeholders who have 
the power to influence the publication of sustainability reports. According to 
Nadesan (2011), the problem with voluntary organisations is that they do not have 
the power or the authority to impose the rules and punish those (even their own 
members) who do not provide the right information, creating an ideal environment 
for companies that like to pose as socially responsible but in fact are not (Hahn & 
Lülfs, 2014). There are many SBC members at the moment who do not create 
sustainability reports: “The inevitable end to making something voluntary is that it 
does not happen with anywhere near the consistency or thoroughness that really the 
industry is beginning to demand elsewhere” (OP5). 
The SBC and SBN, however, do provide value by helping their members with 
matters such as supply chain efficiency, social license to operate, freight efficiency, 
and transition to a lower carbon economy. Many participants who are current 
members of the organisation confirmed that it does help with the complex process 
of reporting on sustainability activities (e.g. choosing the right material 
information). Indeed, members include “companies that have been asked to start 
talking about sustainability [by stakeholders] and don’t necessarily know where to 
start. Or they are already doing some stuff but they don’t know whether that’s good 
enough” (OP5).  
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A participant who believes that companies, which do not disclose non-financial 
information in a voluntary system, are in fact punishing themselves, said:  
I think the punishment probably comes through the market, through 
being judged not to be good enough to be a supplier, through 
missing out on contracts. Through making sure you are dealing with 
the risks that your industry and your business has. Getting called 
out on any of those risks is not just a reputational thing it’s a non-
financial disclosure sort of thing. (OP5) 
The participant strongly believed that by not providing non-financial information, 
the company is damaging its reputation and missing out on opportunities that may 
cost the company heavily in the long run.  
5.3. Companies’ perceptions of stakeholders and 
stakeholder expectations  
Some participants suggest that certain stakeholders in NZ do not have any 
expectations for disclosure of non-financial information. In this section, I first 
examine the participating companies’ corporate reports (including annual reports 
and sustainability reports, if any) to get a better understanding of how they define, 
understand, and communicate with their stakeholders. In addition, I identify and 
discuss six major factors  that play an important role in shaping company 
perceptions regarding shareholders’ and other stakeholders’ expectations, that 
cause many to believe that there is little to no expectation in New Zealand for 
sustainability reports.  
As mentioned in the Chapter 4, I reviewed and analysed the participating 
companies’ corporate reports in 2015 (the year the interviews were conducted) and 
 146 
in 2017 (their latest reports). The following section is an overview of the analysis 
and the major findings, which were drawn from the reports. 
5.3.1. Stakeholders in the reports   
The reports referred to stakeholders in diverse ways. All non-financial reporters 
acknowledged other stakeholders as well as shareholders. Two participating 
organisations clearly identified their stakeholders and explained how each group 
has been engaged. In its 2015 report, one organisation identifies industry partners, 
Iwi, customers, shareholders, the government, general community, NGOs and, 
investors (CP7). The company claims to have engaged with stakeholders to identify 
what is important to these stakeholders. Four to eight methods of engagement with 
each group are explained in detail. At least one of the engagement methods is a two-
way communication channel. The report also explains how key areas of concerns 
raised by stakeholders have been addressed. The company acknowledges that at 
times they may have different interests from the stakeholders but constantly work 
towards aligning themselves with their stakeholders.  While the stakeholders are 
engaged with, and their areas of concerns are identified, the company clarifies that 
“no specific external engagement was undertaken to prepare this report”. 
In its 2017 report, this company has been clearer about the stakeholders’ 
expectations. Transparent communication in regards to all the activities of the 
companies is seen as important. The demands of each group have been mapped out 
separately. The report reads: “We know that strong stakeholder relationships are 
key to [company name] success, and affect our ability to create value. We are 
committed to understanding their interests and concerns, responding accordingly, 
and providing honest and transparent communication”. The government (a 51% 
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shareholder) and investors appear to be the main advocates of incorporating 
sustainability and stakeholders’ view into the business. 
Similarly, another company’s 2015 report identifies people (employees), 
shareholders, customers and suppliers, community, government, and industry 
(CP14). This company engaged with stakeholders through surveys and interviews, 
which asked them to rank 19 issues based on their level of importance for them. 
These issues were selected based on ongoing engagement with stakeholders. The 
top issues that stakeholders were concerned about were: [product] safety and 
quality, sustainable [raw material] stock, leadership and values, developing and 
wellbeing of people (employees), customer relationships, community engagement, 
and financial performance.  
In 2017, this company added Iwi, civil society, NGOs, and investors to the list of 
its stakeholders. This time, the stakeholders were asked to rank 30 issues, which the 
company flagged as areas of concern. Due to the high number of issues identified, 
the company grouped them under the following outcomes: sustainable business, 
healthy [source of raw material], employees, community and partnership, healthy 
[product], and protecting the environment. Most issues belong to the sustainable 
business and healthy [source of raw material] categories. The most important issues 
for the stakeholders include product safety and quality, health and wellbeing of 
employees, profitability, and social license to operate. The company selected thirty-
seven stakeholders (22 external and 15 internal) and engaged with them through 
semi-structured interviews. The selection was based on factors such as 
“dependency, responsibility, tension, influence and diversity”. Each issue is 
discussed in the report together with the company’s plans to address them. 
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However, not all groups were identified nor engaged with in some of the 
sustainability reports. For instance, CP2’s 2015 sustainability report, which was 
their first separate non-financial report, mentions communities, employees, and 
customers as their stakeholders. According to the report, however, most of the 
engagement done to prepare this sustainability report appears to be internal and with 
the company's employees but no other stakeholder group.  
CP15, which has recently taken a step towards sustainability reporting, seems to be 
struggling to identify the stakeholders and engage with them. In its 2017 annual 
report, the company claims to have engaged with internal and external stakeholders 
to find out what issues are important to them. However, there is no indication of 
who those stakeholder groups are, or what the method of communication used with 
them was. While in the first part of the sustainability section the report claims that 
the material topics are the result of stakeholder engagement, a later section reads as 
though the topics were based on GRI indicators and not on what is important to 
stakeholder groups. It reads: “We have identified 16 sustainability topics which we 
believe reflect key sustainability concerns for [the company]” (CP15, Annual 
Report). Rather than basing the identified topics on issues raised by the 
stakeholders, the issues seem to reflect on GRI indicators.  
CP12 is another company that has just recently taken initiatives towards non-
financial disclosure. Its 2017 annual report mentions the term “stakeholder” 12 
times. However, in parts, it appears to highlight financial stakeholders more than 
others. For example, the report states, “the company has a wide range of 
stakeholders including small and large shareholders, bondholders and other debt 
holders”. This lack of engagement with stakeholders is also evident in how the GRI 
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indicators have been presented. Nearly half of the indicators are not currently 
provided in the report as the “decisions of stakeholders are still being reviewed”. It 
is also unclear which stakeholders have been engaged with and what method was 
used to communicate with them. Only two of the indicators (out of 16) were 
externally assured, although the company promises to improve the sustainability 
aspect of the report in the future years.  
Most financial reports were even more vague about who their stakeholders are. 
Some did not even mention the term stakeholder, had not identified any of them 
aside from shareholders and employees, or had just made general statements about 
how the company works towards providing adequate information for stakeholders 
and investors. Reports of CP21, CP20, CP16, CP13, CP11, CP4, in both 2015 and 
2017, are primarily financial, with no indication of references to stakeholders other 
than shareholders.  
In many of the financial reports there is a standard statement which identifies the 
board of directors as responsible for providing transparency and protecting the 
interest of shareholders and stakeholders. Again, there is no indication of who these 
“other stakeholders” are or how exactly the board of directors protects them. Some 
financial reports go as far as identifying the stakeholder groups, but they do not 
suggest that they have been engaged with.  
For instance, CP1’s 2015 report claims to have open communication with 
stakeholders including “shareholders, brokers, the investing community and the 
New Zealand Shareholders’ Association, as well as staff, suppliers and customers”. 
Details of two-way communication with stakeholders (primarily by phone) have 
only been provided for shareholders and does not include other stakeholders. Aside 
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from shareholders, employees are the only other group of stakeholders mentioned 
in the report. However, the discussions are mostly in terms of employment benefits 
rather than engagement. CP19 also identifies investors, employees, customers, 
suppliers, creditors, and members of the local community as stakeholders in their 
reports. There are claims of engagement with shareholders and employees but it is 
not clear how the engagement was done and what the outcomes were. 
CP5 seems to define stakeholders as those who gain profit from it. The term 
“stakeholder” has been used only twice in its report and on both occasions in 
financial terms. The report reads: “With a back-to-basics approach and strong focus 
on accountability, the group’s performance improved substantially over the 
following four years. This improvement resulted in higher profits, a recovered share 
price and winning back the confidence of many [company’s name] stakeholders”. 
CP11 appears to have the same view about stakeholders. In its 2015 report, the term 
“stakeholder” comes up five times and mostly refers to “market stakeholders”. No 
other stakeholder groups are identified in the report. The company’s 2017 report 
has not changed much except it identifies stakeholder groups as “regulators or 
government, the Electricity Commission, listed issuers, brokers or institutional and 
retail investors”. 
CP18 singles out one customer and provides details of how this particular 
stakeholder is engaged with. According to the report, the company engages with 
one major customer which contributes 10% of the total revenue, the regulators, and 
permanent employees. The outcome of the engagement is not described in the 
report. CP8 similarly indicates engagement with customers and employees. The 
report also suggests that the company works towards managing the indirect 
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economic impacts on different stakeholder groups. There is no indication that the 
same is being done on social and environmental impacts (except a mention of 
encouraging recycling in the business).  
5.3.2. Changes in stakeholder engagement and non-financial 
reporting  
While several organisations covered in this study (e.g., CP1, CP6, CP8, CP13, 
CP17, and CP21) only added their charity works and gender diversity topics to their 
reports as non-financial disclosure, some others made major changes to the way 
they report since 2015. Out of the 21 companies, which participated in this study, 
six made substantial improvements to their non-financial reporting in  2017 (Table 
7). This sudden increase in the number of active reporters could be due to the new 
code of governance introduced by the NZX (NZX, 2017a). According to a 
representative of SBC who participated in this study, many of the earlier reports 
had a low quality and were only “about the good parts” of companies’ actions. This 
has been improved and replaced by companies looking into “what their role in New 
Zealand is” and taking actions to address the impacts that they have.  
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Company Code 2015 Report(s) 2017 Report(s) 
CP 1   
CP 2   
CP 3   
CP 4   
CP 5   
CP 6   
CP 7   
CP 8   
CP 9   
CP 10   
CP 11   
CP 12   
CP 13   
CP 14   
CP 15   
CP 16   
CP 17   
CP 18   
CP 19   
CP 20   
CP 21   
Table 7. Organisations changing their approach towards non-financial 
reporting. 
 
For example, CP2’s 2017 sustainability report is significantly better than its 2015 
report. The 2015 report, which included economic, social and environmental 
aspects, followed a narrative storyline. The company had set clear goals, priorities 
and targets for each element. The company also identified where they stood 
regarding diversity, carbon footprint, safety, electricity and water use, and recycling 
rates, and defined the goals they planned to achieve for 2016 and 2020. However, 
as mentioned earlier, only employees were engaged to determine the key issues. 
Also, while some of the negative impacts of the company were described (mostly 
The report includes a range of 
non-financial information 
including company’s, 
economic, social, and 
environmental impacts and 
the actions taken to address 
them. It also illustrates details 
of how stakeholders are 
engaged.  
 
The report includes some 
non-financial information but 
there is room for 
improvement. There is little 
to no information about 
stakeholder engagement.  
 
No Non-financial 
information is presented in 
report. There is no sign of 
stakeholder engagement. 
 
Company has been delisted 












in a smaller font and at the bottom of the page), the report did not include all 
indicators identified by guidelines such as the GRI.  
The company clearly learned a lot from their reporting process as its 2017 report is 
much more detailed and addresses issues more directly. The company identifies the 
problems with statistics and explains exactly what is being done to resolve them. 
The report has grown significantly in size (105 pages compared to 22 pages in 
2015). This is because the company has chosen to use the Integrated Reporting 
framework. The report has been written using both IR and GRI principles, and 
includes a complete GRI content index, which was not used in the 2015 
sustainability report. Most importantly, the company has specifically mentioned the 
stakeholders they have engaged with to identify the material issues in the reports, 
the way they engaged them and what is important to each group. The term 
stakeholders was used 37 times in this report compared to only twice in the 2015 
sustainability report. Suppliers, communities, employees, and NGOs are among the 
stakeholder groups identified as having non-financial transparency expectations.  
CP3, CP6, and CP9 too have completely turned their reporting behaviour around. 
Despite CP3’s significant environmental, social and economic impacts, there was 
no indication of non-financial transparency nor stakeholder engagement in the 2015 
annual report. The company even has a sustainability department and there is a 
section for sustainability on the company’s website. It appears to be for marketing 
purposes rather than for communicating the company’s impacts. In the 2017 report, 
however, the organisation has identified “creating sustainable value for all 
stakeholders” as its long-term strategy. The company has also introduced its very 
first sustainability report. The report, which is in accordance with GRI standards, 
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identifies all New Zealanders as stakeholders who “value their natural environment 
highly and they expect [the company] to continue to strive towards the highest 
standards of sustainability”. The company claims to have shaped the topics and 
structure of the report using a materiality process, which considered the 
stakeholders’ view on how important the topics are. The stakeholder groups are 
clearly identified and the method of engagement with each group has been 
described in detail. 
CP6 introduced its second Annual Integrated Report in 2017 (the first one was in 
2016). The report, based on IIRC’s framework, claims to cover the issues that are 
important to the company and its stakeholders, including “customer relationships, 
financial performance, work health and safety, operational efficiency, energy and 
carbon emissions, transport resilience, commercial focus, employee relations, and 
public safety”. This report includes a complete and detailed section on who the 
stakeholders are and how the company engages with each group. There is an 
indication of the expectations of customers and some investors for non-financial 
transparency in the report. 
Despite CP9’s major social and environmental impacts on the country, the company 
disclosed little to no non-financial information in 2015. In fact, instead of 
identifying the issues caused by them and offering solutions, the company saw itself 
as a solution for other organisations’ environmental impacts. The company’s 
corporate report for 2017 is completely the opposite of what was produced 
previously. The company claims to have “ultra-long sustainability in mind” when 
they take any actions. Half of this report features non-financial information. While 
it incorporates aspects of the Integrated Reporting framework, it has been prepared 
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in accordance with the GRI standards. Different stakeholders have been 
acknowledged, including customers, employees, partners, shareholders and 
investors, Iwi, the government, community, suppliers, and industry participants. 
Topics covered in the report include economic performance, natural resources 
availability, fairness, climate change, environmental compliance and mitigation, 
safety, and customer experience. The company also explained what action they are 
taking to resolve issues related to these topics. Stakeholders played a key role in 
what is included in this report. 
CP15 has made considerable changes to the way it reports. The company operates 
in the horticulture industry with nine subsidiaries. While there is a “people, 
community and environment” section in the 2015 report, there is no actual non-
financial disclosure present. This section only claims that the company cares about 
the community, its employees and the environment. There is no explanation of what 
the impact of the organisation’s activities are and how they are being managed. Nor 
is there any sign of any stakeholder groups (aside from shareholders) being engaged 
or communicated with. The term “stakeholder” has only been used once in financial 
terms. However, in their 2017 annual report, the company has taken a big step 
towards sustainability reporting by using GRI indicators and engaging stakeholders. 
The top issues include employment, health and safety, supplier requirements, water 
use, and carbon. There is of course room for improvement as the topics mentioned 
are listed but not discussed in the report.  
While many of these companies have moved towards integrated reporting, CP10 
has only used the GRI framework to disclose their non-financial information. The 
first half reports on financial outcomes and in the second part, a GRI index is 
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introduced. The GRI index by itself is hard to read and understand for an average 
reader compared to other reports where the index is used within an IR framework.  
Stakeholder groups, identified through different methods, include the general 
community, Maori, environmental groups and other non-government organisations, 
shareholders, investors, employees, local government, central government, and 
industry partners and bodies. The most important issues to these stakeholders (both 
internal and external) have been around company’s investment plans for the future 
(making smart decisions that bring good value), and environmental responsiveness 
(climate change and environmental footprint).  
While the report acknowledges the stakeholders’ expectation and the important 
topics for them, it has not addressed them in an easy to understand and clear manner. 
Instead, it uses the GRI index to refer the reader to either a different link or an email 
address to find answers. For example, for one of the indicators which asks for direct 
and indirect greenhouse gas emissions by weight, the response is that “the report 
can be requested by email”. 
In 2016, CP10 changed its direction towards their first separate and comprehensive 
sustainability report. GRI is used to guide the core of the report and the company 
appears to address issues raised by stakeholders directly. The material issues have 
been identified through conversations with the stakeholders and by what the media 
have covered about the company in the past year. While the report is an immensely 
improved version of the earlier report, it is still difficult to understand what specific 
negative impacts the company’s activities have had on the society and the 
environment and how they are addressing them. For example, for major 
environmental issues such as waste and carbon emissions, the report just states that  
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“data is not available at the time of publishing”. So once again, despite engagement 
with the stakeholders and acknowledging their expectations, this SOE has not 
transparently discussed its negative impacts and what they are doing to resolve 
these issues.  
5.3.3. Factors which shape the Companies’ perception of 
stakeholders and their expectations  
Firstly, companies that claim that there is a lack of pressure to disclose non-
financial information only see shareholders as their stakeholders and do not 
consider other stakeholders’ opinion as relevant. When talking about pressure or 
expectation from all stakeholders, this group draws on what shareholders would 
want to see in the reports, ignoring other company stakeholders. The statement 
“There is no pressure from institutional or retail shareholders” (CP12) was used in 
different forms by others to explain that there is no pressure from stakeholders as a 
whole. As mentioned in the previous section, this was also evident in some of the 
corporate reports produced by the organisations. 
To explain why some companies still produce sustainability reports when there is 
no expectation, a general manager in finance of one of the biggest companies active 
in the real estate services sector said:  
I think it is just an expectation of best practice. Most or a lot of 
companies have a sustainability section in their reports now and it’s 
just a bit of a process. I think 10 years ago people got excited about 
sustainability and it has calmed down a bit and mostly they are after 
financials. (CP12) 
 158 
This group of companies commonly considered a certain group of people as the 
audience for their reports. This included shareholders, potential investors, share 
brokers, people who advise investors, and banks. This view was not industry 
specific and was not affected by the type of ownership. For instance, CP10 from a 
state-owned enterprise with a substantial impact on the environment, economy, and 
the society, emphasised that what “stakeholders” are interested to see in the reports 
“depends on the type of investor that they are”. He then even categorised 
stakeholders as analysts, institutional shareholders, and mom and dad investors. He 
then explained what each of the categories expect to see in a report and said: 
Analysts are quite data focused. They are more interested in the 
financial statements, the bottom line material, but also the fine print, 
the less interesting financials. So they are definitely focused on that 
aspect of the annual report, whereas you have the institutional 
shareholders which are typically run by the fund managers who are 
also interested in that. When you put your mom and dad type 
investors, they are more interested in the overview sections. So that's 
basically the snapshot of the financial year and trending progress 
looking ahead; and generally prospective investors are in that boat 
as well, but that depends on their investment strategy. (CP10) 
The participants were very clear about why shareholders are not interested in 
sustainability reports. According to a participant, aside from the shareholders who 
do “CSR investing”, only certain customers who are “managing risks in their supply 
chains” and want to understand who they are purchasing products from, what their 
supplier’s performance is like, and what their standards are in terms of corporate 
responsibility ask for non-financial information regarding the impacts of the 
supplying company on the environment, the economy, and the society (CP3). These 
customers want to know how they can work with their supply chains “to improve 
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their own indirect performance” (CP3). This type of clients are the ones who 
directly ask for sustainability indicators. According to another participant, some of 
the companies that do CSR investing are very powerful and if a company does not 
report their negative impacts, the investment company will find out and withdraw 
their investment (OP6). He said:  
There are still ways of finding out [the negative impacts] they have 
got billions in investment so they have got a bit of resource to chase 
people up so they go through these third party company who do the 
research for them…at the end it might be easier for the companies to 
publish that stuff annually anyway. (OP6. 
The second factor for the lack of interest from shareholders for sustainability 
reporting, according to some of the participants, is that some of the shareholders do 
not know of the existence of sustainability indicators. They are generally happy 
with what is written in the report because what is being reported is what is legally 
required by the government and assured by third party trusted assurance companies. 
A sustainability specialist, who works at one of the few firms in New Zealand which 
produces a separate sustainability report, agrees that there is no pressure from the 
shareholders. She said:  
That’s the frustrating thing in the New Zealand environment, there is 
not that pressure. Your customers don’t ask for it. Our shareholders 
of the government they don’t ask for it. (CP7) 
She argued that the reason for this lack of expectation is because such a standard 
has not been introduced to the public properly and they basically do not know that 
they can even expect sustainability indicators: 
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I think part of that is because people don’t know what they don’t 
know. If we actually produce something, until they can see it and 
when they have seen it and go: oh actually I quite like that; [I] quite 
like the reporting on that. Can you keep doing it?...I mean all of the 
research that I have read suggests that there is more and more of an 
expectation that people want to know more than just the financials of 
the company they are going to invest in. Because the health and 
ongoing welfare of that company, and their ability to make returns is 
depending on a lot more. All those things that underlay, all those 
non-financial things. (CP7)  
The third factor, which could explain the lack of pressure from shareholders is how 
they are represented. Many of these companies have hundreds of thousands of 
shareholders. Many of these shareholders are “retail” or “mom and dad” investors 
who do not necessarily have the necessary knowledge to demand sustainability 
reporting. In many situations, they also have no decision-making power, which is 
why they choose a board of directors to make important decisions on their behalf 
(Eccles et al., 2014), or they invest through “fund managers”. How retail 
shareholders choose to invest, affects their level of expectation for non-financial 
transparency:  
Depends if they are active shareholders or they are going through a 
broker who is going through a portfolio and just wants some clients. 
Some people might look at CCC’s annual report and go I don’t like 
gambling. I’m a mum and dad investor now reading that you have 
got problem gamblers leaving their small children in cars in carparks 
while they have gambling episodes. They go I’ve got small kids myself 
I don’t like that. So it depends how transparent they are. Is that one 
of their most material issues, you bet it is. (OP6) 
The challenge here for the so-called mom and dad and other minor shareholders is 
monitoring their “agent’s” performance. There is a possibility that the chosen board 
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would act in its own interest instead of their interest (Kasum & Etudaiye-Muthar, 
2014). It is the board who has the final say in what is put in the report. So, who gets 
to sit on the board becomes an issue since a handful of people get to decide what 
thousands of others see. In most cases even the CEO does not have the final say. 
One participant said:  
[CEO] probably has the final say before it goes to the board but the 
board has that final sign up with the content that goes out there. 
(CP14)  
The fact that in some cases in New Zealand the same director maybe a member of 
different boards in different companies is also a potential problem:  
There has to be better engagement at a director level. You know we 
have got the same people all sitting on a number of companies and 
at a governance level. If we have one director who is looking after 5 
different listed entities and if that person is not a fan of and advocate 
of ESG (Environmental, Social, and Governance) reporting, then 
none of those five companies are going to do it. So there is quite a bit 
of influence at that board level. (OP7) 
The Fourth reason that shareholders have not been demanding information on 
activities that affect the environment, society, and the economy is the fact that the 
majority of the shares in many of the biggest corporations in New Zealand are 
owned by the government itself. Through state owned enterprises (SOEs), which 
behave like privately owned organisations but are at least partially owned by the 
government (Roper & Schoenberger-Orgad, 2011), the state maintains a proxy 
operation in the economic sector. Although SOEs are designed to create profit and 
also be responsible towards the public (Cunningham, 2011), the relationship 
 162 
between the state and the economy is unclear (Roper & Schoenberger-Orgad, 
2011). 
The fact that the government of New Zealand is a major shareholder of some of the 
most profitable public firms in the country ostensibly creates a conflict of interest. 
For example, 51% of very large companies such as Air New Zealand (AirNZ, 
2015), Meridian Energy (Meridian, 2015), and Mighty River Energy (Mightyriver, 
2015) are all owned by the state. As an airline and two of the biggest energy 
producers in the country, all these companies have direct impacts on the 
environment, society, and the economy. In the case of government owned 
companies, “very rarely there are questions about transparency” (CP18) in general. 
A participant who is a marketing analyst says, when one “large shareholder owns 
two-thirds of a company” and this big shareholder is the local government or a 
government enterprise, “it has a lot of influence” over the company’s reporting 
protocols. In other words, if this large shareholder does not ask for sustainability 
reporting, the company does not feel the need to provide it. The influence of this 
large shareholder “with a 66.7 % stake” in some ways tramples upon the interests 
of small shareholders “that own one or two shares” (CP18). 
One of the sustainability professionals who participated in this study stated that she 
is aware of and found it “appalling” that some government owned organisations do 
not currently (some used to) release any non-financial information in regards with 
their activities. She said: 
It is in the public interest and we all should demand a level of 
transparency on their non-financial impacts and I think it should be 
mandatory for all government owned entities and at local 
government level as well. (OP7)  
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The challenge the government is facing is the number of regulations that it places 
in front of national and international investors. A participant who is a Chief 
Financial Officer argues that the government of New Zealand must reduce the 
number of regulations in the stock market instead of increasing them in order to 
create an environment which seems more appealing to investors. He claims adding 
“another set of regulations to follow” scares away potential investors from outside 
the country who have plans to invest in companies in New Zealand and does not 
add any value. He said:   
Investors, especially foreign are scared of regulations. I don’t know 
if anyone is really ready for it [sustainability reporting] because 
ultimately in an environment where the government is trying to 
minimise the amount of compliance work, this just adds another layer 
to it. (CP8)  
In terms of creating such a safe and investment friendly environment, the New 
Zealand government has done a lot. In fact, it is so friendly that many of the listed 
companies in New Zealand are owned by foreign companies. Many of these 
companies own such a big portion of the listed companies that they have the power 
to dictate what should be reported. The communication manager of one of the listed 
companies which is active in the food industry explains that they need to be very 
careful in dealing with some foreign investors: 
The one thing that we need to be more mindful of is we have investors 
who are generally customers of ours but are large organisations 
globally. For example, YYY owns 39% of this company. They are 
listed on the FFF Stock Exchange…There are things that we need to 
be mindful of with the likes of YYY. (CP19)  
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The fifth factor for the lack of expectation is that the majority of the holdings in 
most top NZ companies belong to a dozen international firms with very little non-
financial stake in the country. Companies such as JP Morgan Chase Bank, Citibank 
Nominees, and HSBC are major shareholders in all top 15 companies listed on the 
NZX. These firms are able to invest through “New Zealand Central Securities 
Depository Limited (NZCSD), a custodian, fully owned by the Reserve Bank of 
New Zealand” (RBNZ, 2016). In some cases, up to more than 90% of a company 
is owned by a few of these investment firms, giving them a pool of power while 
“mom and dad” or “retail” shareholders hold a drop. For example, the top 10 largest 
shareholders of Spark New Zealand, one of the major telecommunication 
companies in the country, hold 76% of the company’s shares (Spark, 2015). 
Interestingly, when the Reserve Bank was asked what portion of the holdings in a 
company is held by which member of NZCSD, the response was “unfortunately we 
are not allowed to divulge this information as it is confidential”. This means one 
cannot know exactly which mega foreign corporation owns what portion of a public 
company listed in New Zealand unless the company itself chooses to share that 
information. 
The sixth reason as to why stakeholders may not expect a sustainability report, 
according to some participants, is because the company is too small and their stock 
prices are not high enough for them to be noticed. One participant even explains 
how their small size has helped them get away with providing the least amount of 
information. He said:  
The expectation hasn't changed partly because I think our share 
price is around that sort of 1 or 2 cent mark. So we are classified as 
a penny stock. I think once we start lifting out of that, over the next 
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year or two then the expectations from analysts and the market will 
change and we will need to front with more information. That's my 
gut feel that at the moment we are sliding under the radar. We are 
there but not big enough from a shareholder point of view. (CP16) 
There are other companies that claim the expectation is to do more sustainability 
activities rather than reporting on the company’s effects. There is also clear 
indication that philanthropic activities are what they believe their shareholders 
expect to see in a sustainability report, rather than how the organisation is affecting 
the economy, environment, and society. Evidently, what companies believe is 
expected from them, is to be more active in the community and charitable 
organisations.   
It is not entirely true that there is no pressure from any of the other stakeholders. 
The pressure may not be direct but in some cases companies have sustainability 
disclosure just to be able to sell their product. The chief financial officer of one of 
the companies in the fishing industry said that they will publish sustainability 
reports in the near future because of the fact that they are operating here in New 
Zealand and they do not want customers to question the source of their product and 
whether they have “pillaged” in environmentally unfriendly ways. They are aiming 
to get all their products from sustainable sources so their customers know that they 
are providing the best product available.  
For the sustainability professionals who participated in this study, there is certainly 
expectation from some groups of the stakeholders. One said:  
Certainly there is expectation and pressure from certain sectors. I 
would say that now we have that corporate governance code. To even 
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get that to come to life meant there were interested parties. So I would 
say there is a growing interest and expectation. (OP7) 
5.4. A common Standard, Role of Government, and GRI 
Reporting 
According to a joint report done by KPMG International, the Global Reporting 
Initiative, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and the Centre for 
Corporate Governance in Africa (at the University of Stellenbosch Business 
School), which included 71 countries with sustainability reporting instruments in 
place, there has been a massive growth in the number of reporting instruments, and 
the countries that use them in the past few years. This report shows that in 2013, 
180 instruments were used in 44 countries, while in 2016, this number had increased 
to 400 sustainability reporting instruments in 64 countries. More importantly, this 
report identifies the government of these countries as the source of more than 80% 
of these instruments (UNEP et al., 2016). Other sources included financial 
regulators, stock exchanges, and industry regulators. Sixty-five percent of the 400 
instruments are mandatory. 
In other countries like Australia, where general sustainability reporting is not 
mandatory (although there is legislation surrounding specific aspects of non- 
financial reporting such as carbon and water), it is recommended that a listed 
company “should” release any material information that involves risk to the 
sustainability of the environment, the economy, and the society, and explain what 
actions they have taken or intend to take to deal with the risk. This is a part of the 
recommendations included in the listing rules of the Australian Securities Exchange 
(ASX) (ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2014).  As mentioned earlier, New 
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Zealand has recently taken the same approach in recommending that companies 
comply or explain why they have chosen not to report on a certain matter. This 
recommendation is expected to be implemented in 2018.  
Since sustainability reporting is not a requirement in New Zealand nor is it 
recommended by any of the regulators, I looked into how companies felt about 
mandated sustainability reports. There were mixed opinions on this issue. There 
were many companies that questioned “why” we would need such a report and saw 
no value in adding it, and it was a common belief that it “will be hard for companies 
to measure”. Some even expected “the government to help the people fund it” and 
there were many who believed it does not apply to their industry and it would be 
impossible to define. They also argued that New Zealand is too small and is not 
ready for corporate responsibility reporting.  
There were others who argued that there are just too many different types of 
businesses and, therefore, sustainability reporting cannot be made mandatory: 
No [not a good idea] and the reason for that is in principle it sounds 
like a good thing but how do you define it?... I just don’t know how 
you would do it I mean there are so many businesses...that would be 
another set of regulations to follow, (CP20  
On the other hand, there were a few who believed mandatory sustainability 
reporting would be good for the country and thought it was heading that way. One 
participant even questioned the authenticity of some of the sustainability reports 
being produced in the current voluntary system and thought that the value of most 
of the reports created nowadays is “negligible”. This participant (CP2) argued that 
many of the companies which create sustainability reports end up harming the 
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environment but because the reports are not authentic, the harm done does not get 
reported.  
Whether they agreed with mandatory sustainability reporting or not, almost all 
participants had a main general concern: would all companies from different 
industries have to follow the same standard? Again, companies had two different 
opinions regarding a common standard. One supported the idea of having a 
common standard and argued it provides indicators and makes measuring the 
effects possible. One of the participants who had this view said: 
It would be useful if there was a common standard. I don’t know what 
that should be, but the beauty of an accounting standard from my 
perspective is that it becomes easier to decipher what you do and 
don’t need to report on. And the complexity at the moment is in 
relation to sustainability and climate change and all of that good 
stuff is you know what are you required to do and what should you 
do?…I just am not sure that we have got a common viewpoint on 
what is appropriate in relation to your impact on the environment. 
(CP8)  
The other side argued the applicability of a common standard throughout all 
industries and thought it would be impossible to use it for all sectors. In fact, some 
companies refused to participate in this research by saying “We don’t have a need 
for sustainability reporting like other larger operating companies” and thought 
sustainability does not apply to them just because they were in the financial service 
sector. Another participant from a company active in the forestry industry, which 
uses natural resources to create their product, believed their company did not need 
to provide a sustainability report because what they need as raw material “isn’t 
native” and despite my direct question whether or not the material comes from 
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outside New Zealand, he said: “the business turns over about half a billion and of 
which I think only about 20% is derived from New Zealand” (CP20). He then 
explained that most (not all) of the raw material that they use is environmentally 
certified and sustainably managed. Further investigation on their company’s 
website and reports showed that in fact they do have sources of raw material (more 
than the 20% claimed by the participant) in New Zealand.  
Some were concerned that adopting sustainability reporting requires a big change 
in the way they operate and their business model. One argued against having a 
mandatory system for sustainability reporting by saying: 
All the different companies have very different business models and 
therefore, when you make something mandatory you are making 
everyone report on the same basis and that might not sit within their 
business models…And I think people should refer to sustainability in 
a way that it fits in their business model...It would differ for different 
companies. (CP9)  
Sustainability and Corporate Responsibility reporting has been made mandatory in 
many countries around the globe using the Global Initiative Reporting (GRI) 
standard in different industries and sectors such as automative, transport and leisure, 
retail, industrial and manufacturing metals, healthcare, mining, food and beverages, 
oil and gas, technology and telecommunication, and even financial service (KPMG, 
2015). Figure 10 shows the massive growth in Corporate Responsibility reporting 
because countries like India have made CR reporting mandatory.  
One of the sustainability professionals who participated in this study warns that care 
needs to be taken while considering mandatory reporting for New Zealand, and 
believed that it would be disappointing if non-financial reporting was mandatory 
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and most companies just did the “bare minimum” and the results were not “dynamic 
and interesting”. She said:  
I think all listed companies should do some ESG (Environmental, 
Social, and Governance) reporting, I would support more towards 
mandatory but I would say that you wouldn’t want dictate to what 
level that needed to be… I think they should make it mandatory. But 
I think they should encourage either the use of GRI or the integrated 
reporting framework  (OP7) 
Almost all the companies that are voluntarily providing sustainability reports in 
New Zealand (about 17% of all listed companies) use GRI standards as a guide. 
This standard is also used by third party assurance companies such as KPMG as a 
reliable guide to assess quality of the reports prepared by companies. According to 
a participant whose company currently does provide a sustainability report, GRI is 
a prefered guideline because: 
 It’s a consistent approach. It’s a global approach and the indicators 
are from backed reporting guidelines of founders out there globally. 
So we know that what we are reporting on is consistent with other 
reports, and it’s more tangible for the reader and it gives them more 
confidence as well. (CP14) 
 As the most used standard globally (Levy et al., 2010), the GRI standard gives the 
most suitable indicators considering environmental, economical, and social 
dimensions (Manetti, 2011).  
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Figure 10. Corporate Responsibility reporting growth in 2015 compared to 2013. Source:  KPMG (2015) 
 
However, the analysis of corporate reports of the participating companies in this 
study shows that the majority of the reporting companies are moving towards 
Integrated Reporting or mixture of both IR and GRI. A participant whose 
organisation has helped many public companies to put a sustainability report 
together, explains that using GRI, IR, or both depends on the type of the company. 
She argued that in her experience some stakeholder groups such as “Iwi” find IR 
more useful, and that the value creation model that is used in IR is “a really 
important fundamental piece of work to do, which the GRI standards don’t actually 
get into” and that is why many companies choose to do a mixture of both which 
results in “ultimate” reporting (OP7). She said:  
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The GRI standards works for certain types of companies. We also 
think that in the natural resources sector in agriculture and others 
seeing the value chain is actually quiet useful so integrated reports 
work really well for those type of businesses. the similarity is that 
they both encourage materiality assessment that is stakeholder lead. 
There is also measure of performance indicators and review of 
business strategies. They are very different. One looks at value 
creation the other looks at indicators of performance being the GRI. 
(OP7) 
This participant explained that in her experience the IR framework has become more 
valuable than GRI since it is “more holistic” and can integrate sustainability with 
business strategy. According to this participant, sustainability managers have had to 
“tick boxes” to use the GRI framework and the results were only read by the 
sustainability reporting community because it spoke their language.  
According to a GRI trainer, businesses need to get the “fundamental stuff” right first 
by using the GRI standard, and then adapt the IR framework when they are ready 
(OP6). He believed that the IR framework by itself is too focused on the 
shareholders, and explained that while the two are “complementary”, the indicators 
that are available in the GRI standard and absent from the IR framework are very 
valuable tools. According to him, the GRI is more focused on performance while IR 
concentrates more on value creation:  
IR on purpose did not repeat everything that’s in GRI. They go 
this stuff is already out there, use it. But on top of that help us 
understand your business model value creation, capitals and 
what you create over short, medium, and long term and its link 
to strategy. (OP6) 
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The representative of SBN also believed that while the Integrated Reporting 
framework is “the gold standard” at the moment, the government does not need to 
tell the companies what framework they should use (OP5). Similarly, the 
representative of SBC explained that their organisation does not necessarily 
recommend a tool but rather informs its members of what tools exist (OP4). She 
explained that how companies practice sustainability defines what tool they use. 
This participant shared her personal view regarding the GRI standard and the IR 
framework and described the first to be “so prescriptive” and “quite structured” 
which makes it hard to communicate the qualitative information, while the latter 
“gives the story”, which is why many of their members choose a blend of both. 
However, she believed, shareholders might prefer the GRI standards more.  
5.5. Summary of the Chapter 
How companies understand corporate transparency shapes the way they prepare 
their corporate reports. For some, transparency means complying with the law and, 
therefore, publishing an annual financial report is equal to transparency. For a few, 
transparency is more than just passing the legal requirements and involves honesty 
in every aspect of an organisation’s operations, not just the financial ones. For these 
companies, it is about disclosing material information about their actions which 
have negative effects on the economy, the environment, and the society, and their 
plans to resolve those issues rather than just reporting on their philanthropic 
activities.  
Aside from legal requirements, factors such as a company’s reputation, and 
stakeholders’ expectations can influence what material information is selected to be 
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in a report. Some participants in this study suggest they are influenced by what they 
perceive to be a lack of expectation on the part of stakeholders for sustainability 
reporting. 
The concept of having a regulatory body managing the process of mandatory 
sustainability reporting was challenged by many participants, who argued that such 
requirements do not have any value, and will be hard to define since there are many 
different industries in the country, and that a common standard cannot be applied 
to all industries. 
In the next chapter, I look at the challenges of applying a common standard and 





CHAPTER 6: Findings II. Motivations, Challenges, 
and Barriers 
Introduction 
According to the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI, 2013a), sustainability reporting 
has several benefits which can motivate organisations to publish one. The following 
are some of the notable benefits described by the GRI:  
• Non-financial reporting can establish trust between companies and their 
stakeholders and increase credibility while reducing reputational risks. 
• It reduces cost by improving decision-making processes. 
• It can lead to better and stronger strategies through its process, which 
involves a complete analysis of strengths and weaknesses. 
• Measuring sustainability performance can help organisations gather the 
necessary data more efficiently.  
• Responsible companies can be more appealing to investors and other 
stakeholders. 
In this chapter, I assess different views that the representatives of the participating 
companies have regarding the benefits of sustainability reporting. 
Organisation of chapter 
This chapter is divided into two main sections:  
1. In the first section, I focus on the two main drivers that motivate companies 
in New Zealand, which currently publish sustainability reports, or are 
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considering issuing one in the near future. For my analysis, I look at data 
gathered from the interviews as well as reports and data from the 
Sustainable Business Council (SBC). Since the cost of publishing a 
sustainability report seems to be a major concern for the companies (as also 
noted in the second section of this chapter), I explore if companies see a 
reward system, such as tax incentives, as a potential motive for reporting. 
2. The second section of this chapter looks at the challenges that companies 
are facing in New Zealand, and the barriers that prevent some of the biggest 
companies in the country from disclosing non-financial information. I pay 
special attention to the materiality process by reflecting on the latest 
sustainability reporting guidelines published by GRI (G4), and explain the 
procedures companies must go through to choose the right material 
information to include in their reports.  
6.1. Motivations and Drivers 
By the end of 2013 only 17% of the top 100 companies in New Zealand were 
providing a corporate responsibility report while this number was as high as 71% 
across the Asia Pacific region (KPMG, 2013). The number of reports produced by 
New Zealand based companies had not grown much by 2015. Nevertheless, there 
has been some progress (KPMG, 2015). So what drives organisations to produce 
such a report in an environment where there is a noticeable lack of expectation or 
pressure from certain stakeholders? (Discussed further in the next section). 
Aside from the rare occasion when some CSR investors ask for a sustainability 
report, a few other factors sometimes push companies in New Zealand to make the 
effort to disclose their effects on the environment and society. As sustainability 
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reporting in New Zealand has been voluntary, stakeholders with expectations of 
such information rely on other motivations to kick in. A sustainability professional 
points out that these motivations include the desire of a company to demonstrate 
leadership in its sector and the “peer pressure” of competitors to act (OP 5). 
However, he believes such motives are weak in New Zealand because of the small 
market in New Zealand compared to markets in other countries such as Australia. 
Corporate participants in this research who are involved in currently publishing a 
sustainability report, or are in the process of creating one, highlighted the following 
drivers to do so.  
6.1.1. Change in Leadership  
A change of leadership in an organisation is seen as a major trigger for the 
organisation to start publishing sustainability reports, or to significantly improve its 
existing ones. A new leader has significant influence on a company to change its 
perception of sustainability reporting. Most of the current producers of 
sustainability reports, and those working on one for the near future, believe that a 
new management’s approach encouraged staff to look at sustainability in a 
completely different way. Interestingly, most of the leaders who had experienced 
the benefits of sustainability disclosure globally, started to apply it within the 
organisations they took control of in New Zealand. One of them said: 
I think we're going to bring in some global expertise within that space 
[sustainability disclosure]. Our CEO is ex CEO of UUU in North 
America. He ended up leaving UUU in North America. What I mean 
by that is he will lever a certain knowledge of sort of 
corporate golden standards. So it's kind of interesting now having a 
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CEO who comes from UUU, and understands the core value within 
sustainability. (CP2)  
Some argued that sustainability must go straight to the heart of the business plan 
and thus be fully integrated across all business units within a sustainable 
framework. They believed that this could only be possible when the management 
is committed to sustainability, has the desire to introduce a new business model and 
values, and is willing to create new roles such as a “Chief People Officer”, whose 
job is simply to make sure the employees of the company are well looked after, so 
they can represent and communicate the values of the company. For example, one 
participant (CP14) said that this style of management could be so effective that it 
could encourage everyone in the organisation to be passionate about sustainability. 
She also praised the efforts of the Chief Executive Officer of her organisation and 
said: 
Definitely the CEO. It’s his passion. I don’t mean to say background 
affects position but our previous MD was an accountant. This one is a 
completely different management style, more about the people. Because 
he is quite passionate as well, it really comes through when he delivers 
the message and talks to his staff… So it automatically makes you feel 
quite valued and I think because of the way he approaches, everybody 
wants to see the company succeed. And I think they always have, but they 
have never been openly passionate about it [sustainability] so it’s all 
from the CEO. (CP14) 
She also explained that by “developing the people” in the company, the management 
has, over the years, introduced changes in their strategy, and has promoted a culture 
of “sharing information”. 
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6.1.2. Social License to Operate  
The Sustainable Business Council (SBC) and Business NZ's Major Companies 
Group (MCG) define a Social License to Operate (SLO) as a company’s ability to 
continue to operate because society trusts that the firm will act legitimately, and be 
socially, and environmentally responsible. They believe companies behave in this 
way to not only comply with regulations but also because they consider the 
wellbeing of a much larger group of stakeholders and feel responsible to be more 
transparent (SBC & MCG, 2013). SLO is another motive for organisations to 
provide sustainability disclosure and, according to OP4, “young people” and “the 
new workforce” are big drivers. Companies such as the one represented by CP14 
even attended the workshops about SLO provided by the SBC. She explained the 
importance of having a social licence to operate for her firm by saying: 
The reason why we report quite a lot on sustainability, is because 
people don’t see us as a sustainable operation. This is because we 
are catching fish at the end of the day, so we need to show that we 
are sustainable and, ultimately, we need to maintain our social 
license to operate. To maintain our social license to operate we need 
to show the community and the area that we work, that what we are 
doing is legit. (CP14) 
According to the SBC, 75% of New Zealanders consider economic growth to be 
their main concern for the country. Having said that, they also want to protect the 
environment even if that causes a slower economy, simply because New Zealand’s 
environment is the basis of their quality of life. The SBC’s findings also indicate 
that New Zealanders are gradually growing concerned about businesses’ emphasis 
on profit over their role in society. In fact, 76% of those polled believe that 
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companies should pay more attention to public good as well as making profit for 
their investors (SBC & MCG, 2013).  
The implementation manual of G4 (GRI’s latest sustainability guideline), regards a 
SLO as closely related to reputation. According to the manual, failure to manage 
social, economic, and environmental impacts can result in loss of social license to 
operate, as well as damage to the company’s image and reputation (Initiative, 2015). 
“Brand and reputation matters to the shareholders” (OP4). To have a good 
reputation, companies need to obtain the SLO. Sometimes, paradoxically, to gain 
the SLO, companies need to put their reputation at risk. For example, there are 
public companies in New Zealand that feel pressure to pay more attention to the 
general public’s wellbeing, and even put their reputation at risk by being more 
transparent, just to earn that social licence to operate. A participant (CP3) spoke of 
a recall by his company last year, which, despite the potential reputation risk of 
informing the public, was necessary to show the public that they were being 
transparent. He explained that the “reputation risk would be balanced against the 
need to be transparent” and informing the public was worth the risk.  
6.1.3.  Tax Incentives 
As many of the participants’ major concern regarding producing a sustainability 
report was its cost (this will be discussed further as a barrier in the next section), I 
looked into whether a reward system such as tax incentives would change their 
mind-set about sustainability reporting and its values.  
Most of the companies had a very positive reaction to the idea of receiving tax 
incentives as a motivation to increase their sustainability activities and disclosure. 
While a participant from a state-owned enterprise (CP6) felt that the government 
 181 
would never give tax incentives, the current providers of sustainability reports 
believed that if such incentives were put in place, there should no longer be any 
other reason for not disclosing information regarding a company’s direct and 
indirect social, environmental, and economic impacts. A participant, whose 
company does not provide any information in terms of corporate responsibility, 
believed tax incentives could be a very good start: 
I think it will be very good. If there is a tax advantage of lowering your 
carbon, or your electricity, or water usage that would be great. We are 
looking at doing a development and there is a requirement and the plan 
is, they want to see highly efficient buildings that are good on the 
environment and there is not a really big return on that investment. 
Anything that we got back from the crown or the local body that 
recognises the fact that you are investing in sustainability would be very 
good to be honest because they are very expensive. (CP12) 
Four of the companies that do not publish a sustainability report disagreed that tax 
incentives could help. One believed, “unless it’s a significant tax incentive” it will 
not serve as a major motivation (CP3). Another explained that the major issue is the 
managers’ lack of understanding of the benefits of producing a sustainability report 
(CP14). She argued that unless the management of a company has complete 
understanding of the benefits of the report and sees value in creating one, even tax 
incentives will not motivate them to do it. A good example of this was a participant’s 
(CP1) reaction to the idea of tax incentives. His company does not include any 
material information that is concerned with social, environmental, and economic 
impacts in their corporate reports. He evidently also understands the purpose of 
sustainability reports as a tool that only communicates their philanthropic activities 
with their shareholders. He argued that they “don’t do the donations to get the tax 
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deduction” and that is not the key motivation for why they donate to the community. 
In terms of reporting, he said: “if there is a cost involved even if you get a tax 
deduction the question is what benefit of reporting is there and do our shareholders 
want to know” (CP1).  
A senior manager in the sustainability team of one of the biggest assurance 
companies in the country (OP2), weighed in on the idea of having tax incentives by 
drawing on the concept of “greenwashing”. She believed the incentives could be a 
good motivation if the reporting process is managed properly using an appropriate 
framework, and then the information provided needs to be checked to see whether 
the company is disclosing the right information or is only publishing the report to 
be entitled to receive tax incentives:  
If there was an incentive for a company to report on sustainability or 
non-financial information, you would have to have the right framework 
in place, to ensure that the information that they are providing is correct 
to get the incentive. Because they can just do some sort of greenwashing, 
which you can see in quite a few places. So in that case, you would expect 
that the framework might need to include something like a third party 
assurance, just to give those claims credibility and insure that there is a 
robust data trail behind it. (OP2)  
6.2. Challenges and Barriers  
6.2.1. Lack of Expectation, Understanding, Legislation, and 
Standard 
In the previous chapter, I discussed six reasons for the common belief that there is 
no expectation for non-financial reporting. In this section, I discuss how that 
perceived lack of expectation from certain stakeholders (not all), has become a 
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reason for some organisations in New Zealand to avoid disclosing information 
regarding environmental, social and economic activities. The Chief Financial 
Officer of LLL, a company in the automotive sector, sees the constant growth of 
expectations from different sources (mainly shareholders, potential investors, and 
the government) and adopting “international accounting standards” as the reasons 
why their financial reports have grown from 24 pages to 80 pages over the past few 
years. This pressure, however, is not nearly the same for non-financial or corporate 
responsibility reporting. 
As mentioned before, there are no regulations in New Zealand that require 
companies to provide a sustainability report. In terms of disclosure of information, 
the NZX defines material information as any information that concerns the issuer, 
is expected by a reasonable person, and affects share prices (NZX, 2016). This lack 
of pressure from the government for companies to be transparent regarding their 
activities that have impacts on society eliminates one of the powerful and influential 
stakeholders that could demand sustainability reports. This puts the onus on other 
stakeholders, such as shareholders, banks, investors, brokers, the general public, 
and employees to demand action.  Of these, shareholders seem to be the foremost 
constituency for whom companies prepare reports. Interviewees used terms such as 
“the first obviously”, “majority” and “most importantly” to describe the importance 
of shareholders. 
There are, however, certain other stakeholders who demand sustainability 
transparency, such as the Sustainable Business Council and certain customers who 
use the non-financial information provided in sustainability reports for assessing 
the risks of working with corporations. However, they are usually interested only 
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in certain issues.  One of the participants argued that aside from the low number of 
stakeholders who demand transparency of sustainability related issues, the other 
problem is the fact that many of these stakeholders concentrate on one single 
problem rather than looking at sustainability disclosure as a whole. He said:  
In New Zealand, that’s marginal whether we have that scale 
(expectation). Are there enough NGOs or investors with the capacity 
to consider the sustainability of the business? And many of them are 
quite single issue focused. They are interested in disclosure about 
water or climate, as opposed to risk management and sustainability 
management, so I don’t think there is as much pressure to do 
balanced reporting. (CP3) 
This participant went on to argue that this lack of pressure has had negative effects 
on organisations which used to produce such reports. 
If you look at the sustainability reporting in New Zealand and 
compare it to somewhere in Europe, there are a lot more companies 
here that have done a report, done a couple, and then pulled back on 
that reporting because the stakeholders simply aren’t reading it. 
They are still doing the accurate setting behind the report, 
prioritising and improving, but there isn’t enough of an audience for 
that report to justify putting it together and I think that is an issue in 
New Zealand. (CP3) 
This lack of pressure was raised by at least four other participants as one of the main 
reasons why sustainability reporting has not grown as much in New Zealand 
compared to other countries. 
In addition, not all interviewees agreed that there are benefits in sustainability 
reporting. Participating companies’ views in New Zealand regarding such benefits 
were affected by their perception of what sustainability and corporate responsibility 
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reporting entails. The confusion between what should be reported in a sustainability 
report and philanthropic activities has caused some companies to believe there is 
no benefit in producing such a report. A corporate participant said: 
The question is what benefit of reporting is there, and do our 
shareholders want to know exactly what’s happening, and that’s a 
lot of time and effort which we will do. Or they are just happy with 
what we have done now, to just say we donate. And at this stage I 
don’t think there is benefit of going into any further detail of what we 
are doing, yeah I don’t think there is any benefit of doing that. (CP1)  
While many organisations questioned the benefits of non-financial reporting, others 
such as CP 2 believed that it should be clear that “the reporting system is a tool not 
an end game…you do create value at the back end. But it’s not over a 50 page 
report”. He also argued that the value comes in when an organisation understands 
the purpose of the report itself and for whom they are doing it, and that the business 
should drive the standards, and not the other way around. This participant believed 
that sustainability must be integrated in the business model and finding the right 
tool, which fits well with the organisation, would be the biggest challenge. Another 
participant (CP3) also believed it could be beneficial, but said that it should be 
carefully implemented, as it could send the wrong message that sustainability is 
about ticking the box and a few different matrices, as opposed to thinking more 
realistically about the businesses and their impacts on the society. 
The main argument about the benefits of sustainability reporting was whether or 
not the creation of the report would be worth the cost. One participant (OP2) 
believed there could be benefits but that the organisation would have to weigh up 
the cost versus the benefits to see whether or not reporting was right for the 
business. Some others also argued that whether preparing a report is worthwhile or 
 186 
not depends on the financial impact of the undertaking. It is relevant to note that a 
study done in four countries where sustainability reporting is mandatory (Malaysia, 
China, Denmark, and South Africa) concluded that even though the mandatory 
sustainability reporting may have had some costs for some companies, on average, 
the regulations have boosted value rather than terminating value (Ioannou and 
Serafeim, 2014). Another study by KPMG (2011) showed that almost half of the 
G250 companies (drawn from the Fortune Global 500 List) have shown financial 
gain from their corporate responsibility initiatives.  
Each of the four representatives of the companies that currently publish 
sustainability reports, who participated in this research, and the other six companies 
who are moving towards disclosing non-financial information, believe that 
sustainability reports are a good communication tool and play an important role in 
creating a good image for the company. Some said they use these reports as a 
marketing tool while some others felt they helped advertise their activities in the 
community. 
A participant (CP14), whose company has been publishing sustainability reports 
for the past 15 years, explained that transparency through sustainability reports has 
not only given their company brand a good reputation and increased their credibility 
globally, but is also helping them become “the employer of choice” in their 
industry, which has been one of their long term goals. According to her, it is the 
fact that one owns up to mistakes and offers solutions to correct mistakes, which 
matters the most to their stakeholders. 
OP6, whose company has been helping many major companies in New Zealand 
create sustainability reports, believes there have been a lot of benefits for their 
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clients as a result of producing a sustainability report. These companies have 
experienced enhanced relationships with their investors and employees because of 
more transparency. She said:  
What our clients tell us, those that are actively reporting their non-
financial information, is that it helps them form their business 
strategy. When you conduct a comprehensive materiality assessment 
which is stakeholder led you discover things about your company that 
you may not be privy to on a day to day operational level. It brings 
to light some observations from stakeholders that are quite important 
for the business to be aware of so it can really enhance or sharpen 
the focus of the business as it impacts the key stakeholders. (OP6) 
Similarly, the representative of SBN (OP5) described the benefits of non-financial 
disclosure as “tremendous”. He argued that most of the value does not come from 
the report itself, but the process that the company goes through to identify risks and 
stakeholders and to create the report. He believes that not going through the process 
is allowing unidentified risks to develop in the company’s “blind spot”.  
As noted earlier, some of the participants, such as CP14, also believed that some 
companies simply do not understand the benefits of sustainability reporting. OP7, 
on the other hand, found it “hard to believe” that top managers and directors of listed 
companies could not understand the benefits of sustainability reporting and believed 
that they are simply ignoring it because: 
It is more work. Companies that are highly profitable and very 
successful on the stock exchange - for those companies they don’t 
understand why they need to. Why should we? We are doing great. 
Those same companies when I look at them I do a gap analysis and I do 
a benchmark against I can see that there is exposure, there is absolutely 
exposure, and you also find that they may be doing very well in a 
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particular area but they are actually not listening to stakeholders and 
quite often they are the same companies whilst doing extremely well 
from a profitability perspective, balance sheet perspective, paying 
dividends, investors are happy, they are the same companies that often 
have other stakeholders who they perhaps view less importantly or give 
less priority who view them quite negatively. (OP7) 
It is perhaps more the lack of understanding of the benefits of non-financial 
reporting, (rather than ignoring them) that has become a form of barrier for the 
companies, according to OP5. However, this participant also argued that the benefits 
are not being communicated through either the market (NZX) or the government: 
This puts the companies in “a position of false comfort because they don’t see the 
need and they don’t see the urgency”, and by the time the companies realise the 
need, it might be too late and it could come at a “heavy cost” (OP5). 
6.2.2. Cost 
The high cost of publishing sustainability reports is a major barrier for firms in New 
Zealand. Expenses related to preparing a sustainability report include assurance, 
printing, design, and labour. Aside from these direct costs, gathering the right 
information requires a considerable amount of time. Providing the report can cost 
companies more than NZ$150,000 depending on the size of the firm, with assurance 
being the most expensive part of process. The second most expensive part, printing, 
could be avoided, according to a participant (CP16), as on average only 10 to 15 
percent of stakeholders demand printed copies and the rest prefer to read them 
online. Designing the document is costly too because the material presented needs 
to be visually appealing and easy to understand. Design is particularly important 
for companies that use these reports as marketing and communication tools. Time 
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is another factor as preparing reports eats into the work time of employees. CP6, 
who argues that getting the materiality process right can be very difficult and time 
consuming, said that engaging with people to get the right stories, which could be 
used in the report, and “working out the right level of stakeholder input”, could take 
a long time to process.  
On the other hand, some of the companies that only disclose financial information 
believed that the cost of preparing financial reports is not very significant, although 
the resources required for creating a financial report are very similar to those used 
for a non-financial report. The reason given to justify this belief was that producing 
a financial report is a part of being a public company and there are bigger costs for 
being listed on the NZX than the expenses involved in writing an annual report: 
Cost of being a public company and the requirements around there for 
maintaining computer shares are bigger. We use annual reports as a marketing 
document, something that has to be prepared. I wouldn't say it is the most 
expensive thing that we do. (CP5) 
6.2.3. Materiality  
As noted in the second section of Chapter Five, companies perceive material 
information in New Zealand in three different ways. There are companies that 
understand material information as what shareholders want to see, there are those 
which only provide what is legally required (financial information), and then there 
are some which publish sustainability reports despite the lack of legislation. The 
different ways of perceiving material information, and its significance, are reflected 
in the diverse views on the most challenging aspects of writing a report. 
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Most of the companies that do not disclose information regarding their 
sustainability activities said that the effort required to write the annual report was 
consistent across different sections of the report. However, some believed the first 
half of the report, which includes commentaries, was the difficult part to write. One 
participant, who is the communication manager of one of the biggest companies in 
the food industry said:  
It depends if you had a good year or a bad year. Look it’s not terribly 
challenging or difficult to actually write the elements. It’s in our best 
interest and this is a philosophy that we have always had. We are 
open and honest to communicate what is going on accurately. So it 
is what it is and the most challenging piece, is getting the key 
stakeholders such as the MD [Managing Director] and the chairman 
focused on, and really thinking about the commentary, their letters, 
and ensuring that there is not a lot of crossovers. (CP19) 
These non-reporting companies found the story writing part of the annual report 
much harder than the numbers. CP5, for example, explained that the difficult part 
in the first half of the report, which has more “commentary” and “subjective 
information” than numbers, “is choosing what messages you want to get across and 
how you want to get them across”.  
On the other hand, providers of sustainability reports had a different perception of 
the main challenge of writing a report. For them it was the materiality process 
(selecting the material information that should be included in the report) and 
choosing the right information and aspects that was most challenging. Even though 
there are recognised tools available to assist with this, many of the companies that 
publish sustainability reports use a materiality matrix (shown in Figure 11) to 
determine what aspects should be prioritised and to choose the right material topic. 
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According to GRI (2015), there are a number of factors that need to be considered 
by companies when identifying the material topics. These factors include the main 
topics that stakeholders are interested in, topics that have been explored and 
recognised by experts, the company’s key values, competencies, strategies, and 
goals, and making sure that the topics have been prioritised according to 
importance.   
  
Figure 11. Visual representation of prioritisation of Aspects. The green circles represent the issues that have 
the potential to be included in reports. The issues that end up on the right top corner of the matrix are given 
priority by the companies. Adapted from GRI (2015). 
CP14, who is among the users of the matrix, described the process as long and 
difficult, sometimes taking the whole year. She explained that anything about the 
company that has been published in the media, and somehow is a concern to their 
company, is picked up and added to the materiality matrix. According to her, this 
matrix is built up throughout the year. It helps identify the important material and 
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create the content and design of the report by highlighting the important topics and 
issues that need to be resolved.  
Not everything in the matrix is included in the sustainability report. Because of the 
considerable number of “topics of interest” it is necessary to find the “major topics” 
that stand out and respond to them first. To explain the selection process, CP14 
said:  
We start preparing little stories throughout the year…We look at all 
those topics that we have identified, and we do materiality 
assessment with our own internal staff and all of our management 
staff, and we look at what is the priority or the level of importance to 
our company and how it affects our strategy and the level of 
importance to our stakeholders. As soon as that materiality is set 
…what the quote in the top right quadrant, is what we decide is the 
material topic. (CP14)  
What is interesting is that even though the stories or the topics are prioritised 
according to their level of importance to the stakeholders, some admit that they do 
not engage with the stakeholders regarding the chosen topics directly. She 
explained: 
We don’t really do so much stakeholder engagement on the material 
topic since we feel we have a very good understanding throughout 
the year. So those key people who deal with the stakeholders will 
respond on behalf of the stakeholders on what’s important to them if 
there are some concerns. (CP14) 
The media were the main source of the topics chosen by this participant. No other 
stakeholders were mentioned directly as a source. She said: “What I do throughout 
the year is, anything that I picked up through media that SSS has a concern over, I 
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will put it down into a matrix. It’s just one of those topics”. She highlights the 
important role of the media in choosing what is considered as material: “I am 
listening to what the media are saying, to what my colleagues are telling me about 
stakeholders” (CP14). 
In fact, the majority of the providers of sustainability reports see the media as one 
of the most important sources of material topics. Another participant, whose 
company will publish its first sustainability report soon, explained that in order to 
complete the matrix of materiality, they looked at what is important to the business:  
What I did there was, I looked through our strategic plan, business 
plans, and risk registers, conversations with the key senior managers 
around the business, and looked at media reports and media analysis 
and what has kind of been coming out of the media. (CP6) 
The only thing that this participant did differently was to conduct a survey involving 
“some key stakeholders” just to make sure that what is being chosen as the material 
topic was correctly correlated with some of their concerns.  
Yet another corporate participant admitted that instead of holding meetings with 
stakeholders to know what their concerns are, they also take the easy way of talking 
to their own staff, and picking from what is being covered in the media. She 
explained that they hold internal meetings and invite people responsible for various 
stakeholder relationships throughout the business at different levels. These internal 
groups of people come together to talk to people in charge of writing the reports 
about the stakeholder issues that they either perceived, or had been spoken to about 
by other stakeholders, over the year. Regarding the lack of direct communication 
with stakeholders and the sources of the material topics she said: 
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What we don’t do is hold separate specific stakeholder meetings for 
the purpose of collecting information for the annual report (their 
sustainability report is included in the annual report), and that’s 
something I would like to do in the future. So we basically do it from 
our internal staff who interact with stakeholders and we also look at 
the market, the media… the media is usually about price and service. 
(CP8) 
OP 7 describes looking into what the media covers as a “factor” and as a part of the 
materiality process, which should be done alongside the engagement that the 
company has with other stakeholders. She explained that her company comes up 
sometimes with up to 50 different topic areas “which need to be prioritised against 
the relative weighting of the stakeholder to the organisation”. She said:  
So how it’s typically done is the company weigh the stakeholder in 
terms of stakeholders’ investment in business. You typically find 
employees would be at the top customers will be at the top, investors 
will be at the top, and then you might have analysts and regulators, 
community interest groups etc. So they will get weighed so the 
opinions of the stakeholders when you are doing an assessment are 
not equal and that’s quiet an important part of the process actually 
because otherwise you can wind up with issues on the top right 
quadrant (of materiality matrix) that actually don’t fit the real level 
of influence of the stakeholders on that issue against the business. 
(OP7) 
Another participant (OP6) also explained how his company helps other companies 
prioritise the stakeholders’ level of importance for the company as well as the 
material topics. He explained that he uses a “stakeholder salience” model to teach 
their clients how to create a list of their stakeholder groups “to quickly build a 
picture” of what needs to be reported: 
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If they are legitimate, they are interested in what you are doing and 
they are interested in what’s happening now, it’s urgent. You better 
go and engage with those people those guys who have got a high 
profile because they are powerful or legitimate. (OP6) 
The SBN representative (OP5) also said that while engaging with the media as an 
important stakeholder makes sense, accepting their opinion without considering 
other stakeholders “feels like a bit of a short cut and not good process”. He then 
emphasised the importance of the process of engaging with stakeholders, and 
explained that the true value of sustainability reporting is in having “those 
conversations [with stakeholders] and opening yourself up for criticism and 
feedback”. 
Based on the data collected from the interviews, it is clear that if an incident or issue 
is not covered by the media or raised by the internal staff members who are only in 
touch with certain stakeholders (mostly shareholders), it is unlikely that the issue 
or incident in question would find a place in the sustainability report. This could be 
partially due to how important a company’s reputation and image is to them. There 
seems to be a direct link between what is material and the companies’ reputation 
and image. What is material is chosen to achieve the strategic goals of companies 
and how these companies want to be perceived by others.  That is why the 
prioritised topics are the ones that are covered by the media.  
In addition, CP6 names short term and long term financial wellbeing, brand, and 
reputation as the few factors that influence the process of short listing and 
prioritising the material topics.  
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6.3. Summary of the Chapter 
Not many publicly listed companies in New Zealand choose to publish 
sustainability reports. Since there are no legal requirements for disclosing non-
financial information, companies that do so are motivated for other reasons. One of 
the important drivers for producing sustainability reports (or to work towards 
making one), is a change of leadership. New leaders, who have already experienced 
the benefits of having sustainability reports on a global scale, are now using them 
for the companies they now run in New Zealand.  
Reporting companies also believe that they need to maintain their social licence to 
operate in order to be viewed as a trustworthy business by their stakeholders. By 
being honest in their sustainability reports and openly discussing their impacts on 
society, the environment and the economy, and showing initiative in addressing the 
issues that their operations might have caused, they may initially put their reputation 
at risk. However, this transparency in their activities gives the credibility and social 
licence to operate and improves their image in the long run.  
There are barriers that have discouraged several large companies in the country 
from publishing sustainability reports, and have forced some reporting companies 
to stop disclosing their non-financial information. These barriers include what is 
seen as a lack of expectation from certain stakeholders. While some investors who 
do CSR investing and customers who are interested in their suppliers’ sustainability 
activities require non-financial information, not many shareholders expect to see 
such data in the reports. Other than that, there are neither legal requirements nor 
recommendations that demand a sustainability report. This is despite the fact that 
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the government of New Zealand itself is a major shareholder of many large 
corporations.  
Another challenge for many companies seems to be the cost involved in the process 
of publishing a report. The major expenses, according to the participants, are 
assurance, printing, design, and labour. Besides, the process of choosing the 
material information is very difficult and time consuming as it needs to be done 
throughout the year. In some cases, more than one person was involved in gathering 
the information necessary to put in the report.  
Aside from being a time consuming and expensive process, there were other 
concerns about materiality. Based on the interview data, non-sustainability 
reporting companies find writing the first half of the annual report, which includes 
commentaries, subjective information, and stories, more difficult than the second 
half of report, which concentrates more on numbers. Since storytelling is a key skill 
required to write a good sustainability report, a lack of this ability is also a major 
challenge for companies that only do financial reporting. For the reporting 
companies, however, selecting the right stories and getting access to the 
stakeholders’ topic of interest is the major task. Many reporting companies admit 
that they do not have the necessary communication with their stakeholders to learn 
directly from them about their topics of interest. Instead, they communicate with 
internal staff who are in touch with the stakeholders to learn about what they are 
interested to see in the reports.  
The media heavily influence the material selected to be in the report. All reporting 
companies mentioned media as a major source of their topics. The stories that are 
covered by the media and seem to be a concern for the company are selected and 
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kept throughout the year. The stories are then prioritised and used in the report 
according to importance. 
In the next chapter, I will discuss the findings presented in chapters 5 and 6 in the 




CHAPTER 7: Discussion 
Overview 
In this chapter, I discuss the findings of my research that were presented in Chapters 
5 and 6 in light of the literature on the communication aspects of corporate 
sustainability, corporate transparency and CSR reviewed in Chapter 2. The 
discussion is also guided by the theoretical frameworks of the research, which were 
set out in Chapter 3. 
In the past few decades there has been increasing pressure internationally for 
organisations to be more socially responsible and transparent regarding their 
business activities that have impacts on society (Benn et al., 2014). Font et al. (2012) 
and Christensen (2002) believe that this pressure comes from different stakeholders 
for organisations to act more sustainably and to accept responsibility for their 
choices. Larger corporations are even more likely to be under pressure from the 
public to disclose information regarding their social activities (Dhaliwal et al., 
2014). These expectations, which have affected large firms’ operations globally, 
come from various groups of stakeholders including “investors, consumers, supply 
chain partners, legislators, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs)” 
(Gualandris et al., 2015).  
I argue that New Zealand’s neo-liberal economic system, and the investment 
friendly environment created by its government have greatly affected attitudes 
towards non-financial disclosure in the country. In a neoliberal economy, voluntary 
transparency is favoured over a more controlled transparency system managed by 
the state (Nadesan, 2011).  
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In this chapter, I also challenge the effectiveness of a voluntary system, and present 
evidence that a voluntary reporting structure provides an environment where 
companies may exaggerate their positive impacts (Hahn & Lülfs, 2014) and under 
report their negative ones. As discussed earlier, sustainability reports in New 
Zealand are prepared voluntarily, often through organisations such as the 
Sustainable Business Network (SBN), or the Sustainable Business Council (SBC) 
which requires its members, who have joined voluntarily, to prepare such reports 
within two years of joining the organisation (SBC, 2016b; SBN, 2016).  
While previous studies concentrate on factors such as the relationship between 
industry and social responsibility transparency (Alali & Romero, 2012; Kolk & 
Perego, 2010), the relationship between the level of transparency and stakeholder 
pressure (Fernandez-Feijoo et al., 2014b), and the relationship between pressure 
from certain stakeholders and industries (Adams, Hill, & Roberts, 1998; Hackston 
& Milne, 1996), I concentrate on what the concept of transparency means in legal 
terms, and how it is understood by some of the largest listed corporations in New 
Zealand. I then look into the possible causes of what is commonly seen or 
interpreted by some participants as lack of expectation from stakeholders for non-
financial disclosure in the country. Next, I discuss stakeholder power in terms of a 
neoliberal economic system, by drawing on the Salience Model designed by 
Mitchell et al. (1997) and on Zygmunt Bauman’s discussion of liquid modernity 
(Bauman, 2005; Zygmunt Bauman, 2013; Clegg & Baumeler, 2010; Vogel & 
Oschmann, 2013). Finally, I discuss the importance of having a standard such as 
the GRI (GRI, 2013a, 2013b, 2016a, 2016b) as a guide for sustainability reporting 
throughout all industries in New Zealand.    
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7.1. Corporate Transparency in New Zealand  
As discussed in Chapter 5, there are no regulations in New Zealand which require 
a company to report on its impacts on society, the environment, and the economy. 
Companies are only required to publish “material information” (discussed later in 
this section) which is defined by law as information that when provided would 
affect the share prices as interpreted by a “reasonable person” (NZX, 2017). 
However, a new governance code, which was released by the market (NZX) at the 
end of 2017, now recommends that listed companies either disclose their non-
financial impacts, or explain why they have not done so. How this recommendation 
changes the reporting practices in New Zealand has yet to be determined, as it was 
released after the latest reports were due to be published. 
To look into how some of the public companies perceive stakeholder expectations 
for a sustainability report, I first discuss and critique what corporate transparency 
means in legal terms in New Zealand, and how it is understood by some of the public 
companies listed on the New Zealand Stock Exchange (NZX).  
7.1.1. Transparency in legal terms 
In their study, Prado-Lorenzo et al. (2009) conclude that the ownership structure of 
a company as well as certain groups of stakeholders, such as the government, have 
significant effect on the publication of CSR reports. They highlight the importance 
of the government’s role and conclude that it should improve the regulations by 
defining a standard for such reports, especially since their results show that even 
though shareholders do influence the contents of sustainability reports, they are not 
interested in the accuracy of the information included in the report, but rather the 
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benefits that publishing the report will have for the company (Mason & Simmons, 
2014). 
As discussed earlier, “there is currently no specific requirement for NZX listed 
companies to disclose any sustainability/environmental matters” (OP2). According 
to the FMA representative, the laws regarding material information have been 
passed by the government of the day, are approved by the FMA, and enforced by 
the NZX. Alongside the FMA, there are two other main supervisory bodies, the 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand and the Commerce Commission (Figure 12), which 
all support a “financially healthy New Zealand” (FMA, 2016).  
This is where the problems begin to surface. The entire supervisory body and its 
three main regulators concentrate only on the financial health of the country. The 
first expected outcome, because of the presence of these regulators, is said to be 
“well-informed consumers and investors” (FMA, 2016). The findings of this study 
clearly suggest that there are expectations for non-financial reporting at least from 
“institutional investors and the big financial companies, that do corporate social 
responsibility investing” (CP9) and certain customers who are “managing risks in 
their supply chains” (CP3). Yet, there are no requirements from any of the 
regulatory bodies for non-financial disclosure.  
A review of the reports over two time periods (2015 and 2017) also suggests 
changes in the level of expectation for non-financial reporting among non-investor 
stakeholders. The number of companies that took some form of initiative to create 
a sustainability report has more than doubled among the participants of this study 
over only two years. While there were only 4 reporters in 2015, 9 of the 
participating companies made a clear effort to release non-financial information in 
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2017. In these non-financial reports, all stakeholders have been acknowledged, and 
in the majority of them, there is clear evidence of engagement. The fact that there 
is a now a recommendation introduced by the New Zealand Stock Exchange, which 
monitors the market, suggests that there is pressure (OP7), and that it has been 
increasing from at least certain stakeholders for non-financial disclosure.  
 
 
Figure 12. The main regulators, and the expected outcomes from the regulation Source: FMA (2016). 
 
The FMA’s representative insisted that “material information” is what is required 
of the companies. The NZX (2017b, p. 13) defines material information as 
information that “a reasonable person would expect if it were generally available to 
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the market, to have a material effect on the price of quoted securities of the issuer”. 
Despite NZX’s change of code of governance from no expectation to a 
recommendation (comply or explain), this definition remains the same. There are a 
few factors that need to be considered regarding this description.  
First, this is a very broad definition for material information, since it applies to more 
than 15 different industry groups, including primary ones such as agriculture, 
forestry, horticulture, mining, and fishing (Treasury, 2016). At least one company 
active in each of the primary industries was interviewed, and data show that they 
all have environmental, social, and economic impacts. As mentioned earlier, two of 
the participants (CP3 from the agriculture sector, and CP9 from the energy and 
minerals sector) explained that certain investors in their respective industries do 
CSR investing. This means that there are “reasonable persons” in at least certain 
industries who demand sustainability disclosure. CP6 did not produce any form of 
sustainability report up until 2015, but started publishing one the year after. In their 
2017 integrated report, the company indicates expectations from investors for such 
non-financial transparency. Therefore, the findings of this research suggest that 
some companies are or have been wilfully ignoring “reasonable persons”.  
Aside from that, what a “reasonable person” would perceive as important 
information changes over the years. This definition of “material information” could 
also change and should be updated based on what is perceived as information that 
affects the share price. It is suggested that in today’s consumer society, individuals 
only know how to solve their issues as consumers, and they seek more consumption 
options to choose from to increase their ability to negotiate for solutions to address 
their daily problems (Davis, 2011). For example, the number of households 
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purchasing organic/free range food had increased by more than 40% from 1999 to 
2004 in the UK, because consumers had become more health conscious (Padel & 
Foster, 2005). Therefore, the number of organic food providers has dramatically 
increased due to the high demand for such products, affecting the share price of 
these companies. 
The second issue with this definition is that it does not specifically exclude non-
financial information nor does it include financial information and is described as 
information that, once published, would “have effect on the price of quoted 
securities of the issuer” (NZX, 2017). This leaves the definition of “material 
information” open to interpretation. For instance, on 22 September 2015, 
Volkswagen, one of the biggest car manufacturers in the world admitted to using 
software to cheat the emissions test, allowing them to release cars that produced up 
to 40 times more pollution than the legal limit. As soon as the information was 
released the company lost 15 billion euros in share prices (Kollewe, 2015). It is 
clear, therefore, that non-financial information can and does affect share prices once 
released.   
7.1.2.  Corporate representatives’ views on transparency and 
material information  
As stated in Chapter 5, transparency means different things to different companies. 
The majority of the non-sustainability reporting companies which took part in this 
research only release material information that is legally required of them and that, 
as discussed in the previous section, only includes fiscal data. According to OP3 
(from an assurance company), some of these companies provide what they believe 
is enough information for their third-party assurance provider, and only release more 
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information if it is necessary, just to avoid releasing “too much information”. The 
main goal for these companies is first to pass the legal requirements, and second to 
ensure that the shareholders are happy and informed. These companies have a “we 
don’t say anything about anything unless you really have to” (CP3) mind-set.  
This could be observed easily in some of the reports where organisations only report 
on the positive societal or environmental impacts they have had. Even in some of 
the sustainability reports, the negative effects were down sized by using a smaller 
font.  
It is unlikely that such corporations would provide non-financial information unless 
it is a legal requirement, except when it is demanded by a very important shareholder 
(this will be discussed further, later in this chapter). The data gathered from this 
study and previous studies (KPMG, 2013, 2015) suggest that majority of public 
companies in New Zealand belong to this group, and tend to “need a reason” (CP3) 
to disclose information. Therefore, they do not disclose any information on their 
social, economic and environmental impacts. Figure 13 illustrates New Zealand’s 
position on non-financial transparency compared with the global average (KPMG, 
2015). 
 
 Figure 2. New Zealand's performance on CR reporting compared to global performance. Adapted from KPMG (2015). 
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Early in the process of data collection it became clear that “corporate transparency” 
and “sustainability reporting” were not favourite topics for the companies to talk 
about. Aside from the big percentage of the potential interviewees who simply 
ignored the interview request, many gave other reasons not to participate in this 
research, such as not having anything to say because they just went public, they had 
done interviews for other researchers and believed they had done their part, or 
thought that the topic of sustainability reporting did not apply to their industry. Out 
of more than 120 requests, only 21 companies agreed to do the interview, most of 
which did so after the interview request was changed and no longer included the 
term “sustainability reporting”.  
This unwillingness to talk about sustainability reporting was also observed during 
the interviews, when a question regarding the topic was raised. In particular, the 
non-sustainability reporting companies seemed uncomfortable talking about it. For 
these participants, transparency revolved around their financial reporting and what 
a shareholder of the company would want to know about.  
 Some made it very clear that they did not want to talk about sustainability and CSR 
disclosure. When asked about corporate transparency, they immediately spoke of 
their financial reports. It was as though sustainability reporting was not considered 
as an act of transparency. A clear lack of understanding of what purpose a 
sustainability report serves was observed (this issue will be discussed further later 
in this chapter).  
For more than half of the participants, transparency was heavily affected by what 
was legally required and had little to do with CSR disclosure. It was as though topics 
such as sustainability reporting were taboo. As discussed in Chapter 2, taboos are 
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issues that people know exist but prefer to avoid talking about, because discussing 
taboos could threaten one’s position in the organisation or community, and cause 
problems (Kallio, 2007).  
Why companies reacted negatively towards the topic of sustainability reporting, and 
treated it as a taboo, could be explained by looking at their main goal. The first 
stakeholder, and in some cases the only one, for almost all interviewees (including 
sustainability reporting companies) mentioned as the audience of their corporate 
reports, were shareholders. The findings of this study show that more than half of 
the participants, like Friedman (1970), believed that the shareholders’ satisfaction 
is all that matters. Legal requirements aside, the information chosen to be in the 
reports was in most cases what the shareholders would want to see. Apart from one 
rare case, even the publishers of the sustainability reports mainly had the good of 
the corporation and achieving strategic goals in sight, making their CSR disclosure 
seem slightly insincere. CSR disclosure in New Zealand seems to be used as a 
marketing tool or a luxury thing that some companies “go out of their way” (CP3) 
to do. This superficial take on CSR disclosure found in this research is aligned with 
previous studies done by Eden (1999) and Crane (2000, p. 690) in which, “growth, 
consumption, profitability, and personal success”, are the main components of 
today’s companies’ moral code.  
Almost all participating companies in this study (reporting and non-reporting) agree 
with Friedman (1970) and his notion of amoral business where a company’s 
responsibility is aligned with its shareholders’ interests, and in such a setting 
discussing the other stakeholders’ interest may be considered as crossing the 
boundaries (Kallio, 2007). However, for some participants, it was not entirely how 
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they felt about sustainability that made them avoid it, but rather their incorrect 
understanding of the purpose CSR disclosure and sustainability reporting.  
Participants from non-reporting companies believe that some factors justify the 
absence of non-financial reporting in their company. These factors include the lack 
of “need” (CP17) or “applicability” to them, simply because they are an investment 
company, or a retail company, or their impact is not “significant enough” (CP20 and 
CP21) to be reported. Some question the “value” (CP8, CP9, and CP21) of such 
reports; some refer to their “donations” (CP1 and CP6), confusing philanthropic 
activities with sustainability; and others believe the “size” (CP5, CP16) of their 
company was too small to provide sustainability reporting. All these reasons give a 
clear indication of a misunderstanding of why such reports are prepared in the first 
place.  
The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI, 2016a) describes the purpose of sustainability 
reporting as a tool which has been designed to assist companies “to measure, 
understand and communicate their economic, environmental, social and governance 
performance, and then set goals, and manage change more effectively”, regardless 
of their industry, company type, size, location, and whether their impacts are 
negative or positive.  
Companies that believe that sustainability reporting does not apply to them argue 
that they do not have any effects on society or the environment to report. Investment 
companies, finance providers such as banks, and retail companies, all have impacts 
on the community they are operating in, directly or indirectly, by investing and 
providing loans for projects in certain industries which could cause damage to the 
environment (Thompson & Cowton, 2004) or have negative social impacts. These 
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types of companies (both retail and investment), also use considerable amounts of 
resources such as paper and energy and could also damage the environment by not 
managing their waste properly (Castelo Branco & Lima Rodrigues, 2006). Clearly, 
non-reporting companies, as noted earlier, do not consider any of these impacts 
relevant to their business. For instance, CP21, representing a financial service 
provider, believed their “footprint is pretty small” to matter, compared to “taxi role 
and economy role companies like airlines”.  
There is also evidence of confusion between corporate philanthropy (Bartkus & 
Morris, 2015) and corporate sustainability by some of the participants in this study. 
When speaking of disclosing non-financial information, some participants referred 
to their positive activities in the community and donations (CP1). One even justified 
not having a report by explaining that they have not done the community work to 
report on them because “as we are losing money, it’s not really appropriate for us 
to be giving shareholder money away” (CP21). This mind set also clearly shows in 
the way the corporate reports have been constructed.  CP1, CP6 (2015), CP8, CP13, 
CP17, and CP21 all stated philanthropic work, and gender diversity as the only non-
financial information in their reports. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, philanthropic activities are among four identified 
categories of corporate social responsibilities (Carroll & Shabana, 2010). Although 
corporate sustainability and CSR are closely related concepts, they are often 
thought to concentrate on different matters (Cheung, 2011). For instance, while one 
of the areas that CSR focuses on is environmental issues in relation to the benefit 
that there could be for the public, some scholars believe sustainability pays attention 
to the environmental issues themselves aside from any benefits for people (Montiel, 
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2008), and making sure that while the corporation advances and improves its 
performance, it is still controlling the negative affects it might have on the economy, 
society, and the environment (Cheung, 2011).  
Sustainability reporting is one of the tools designed to assist corporations in 
measuring these harmful impacts, and provides a mechanism by which they can 
plan how to respond and manage these negative effects (GRI, 2016a). While it can 
be used as a marketing tool to highlight companies’ efforts as a responsible part of 
society and improve their image, it has little to do with philanthropic activities such 
as “giving money away”. The reporting companies which took part in this study 
understood this concept to some degree. CP14, for example, explained that they 
report on the number and volume of the spills that they have in the ocean, and their 
plans to resolve the issue. She believed that the report in fact works in their favour 
and adds to the company’s credibility, as it shows the stakeholders that they are 
dealing with the problem rather than hiding it. As presented in Chapter 5, a 
comparison between the 2015 sustainability reports and those of 2017 suggests that 
the corporations are becoming more and more aware of the value of transparently 
communicating their negative effects, as well as what actions they are taking to 
resolve the issues.  
7.2. Lack of Expectation or Lack of Power? 
Currently, the common belief amongst the majority of the participants in this study 
is that there is a lack of expectation from stakeholders for sustainability reports, and 
that this is the primary reason why so many New Zealand companies do not produce 
such reports. In this section, I examine the reasons why they hold such views  and 
discuss why such beliefs hold. As discussed in Chapter 5, there are claims that most 
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stakeholders do not read sustainability reports and, therefore, producing one does 
not make sense to many companies (CP3). I argue that the same claim can be made 
about annual reports: as CP5 explained, most stakeholders such as customers may 
never read annual reports while retail shareholders, and some potential investors, 
mostly read the front and the end of the reports because “there are a lot of standards 
these days which nobody understands” in the annual report.  
For the representatives of the companies to know whether or not stakeholders 
expect to see non-financial information in the reports, they must have in depth 
conversations with their stakeholder groups. Therefore, I looked for evidence of 
such engagement in the reports and interview transcripts. Part of the data suggests 
that the companies or their representatives are aware of certain groups’ expectations 
of non-financial transparency, but why have their voices not been heard yet?  
As explained in Chapter 3, in modern times, as societies have become more 
consumption oriented (Bauman, 2013a), and companies started competing to satisfy 
consumers (Davis, 2011), power was transferred from the state to individuals (the 
liquid modern era) but so did the responsibility for each individual to look after 
their own interest. Instead of pursuing a collective interest and what is good for the 
society as a whole, each person now would work to satisfy their never-ending thirst 
for a better life. While a better life for different people means different things, the 
nature of a neoliberal system is more supportive of those individuals and groups 
that choose wealth. As Crane (2000, p. 690) writes, “the self-sustaining order of the 
modern organisation is one of utilitarian based techno-rationalism, a social 
architecture where the moral code is constructed around growth, consumption, 
profitability, and personal success”. In a sense, a neoliberal system prioritises 
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making profit over creating individuals with a sense of social responsibility 
(Giroux, 2015). Therefore, certain [wealthy] groups possess more power to demand 
change, and companies use their liquid power to provide partial transparency to 
satisfy only these powerful stakeholders. 
I use Bauman’s discussion of liquid modernity and neoliberalism to argue that the 
level of non-financial disclosure in a neoliberal environment has little to do with 
different stakeholder groups’ expectations and demands, but rather the 
stakeholders’ power to influence the company. To do this, I first draw on Mitchell, 
Agle, and Wood’s (1997) Salience Model, to assess and discuss different 
stakeholders’ power to dictate change. I then discuss other major factors which may 
have influenced the current lack of sustainability reporting in the country.  
As discussed in Chapter 3 Mitchell et al. (1997) suggest that stakeholders have one 
or some combination of the three attributes (power, legitimacy, and urgency) (see 
also Dong et al., 2014). They anticipate that if a stakeholder has only one of these 
qualities, their salience for the company is low up to a point that the company might 
even fully ignore them and deny their existence. Mitchell et al. (1997) then argue 
that once two of the attributes are present, stakeholders’ salience is considered 
moderate, and companies’ responsiveness level towards them increases, but they 
do not receive as much attention as the next group. When all three attributes are 
present, stakeholders’ salience levels are considered high. Mitchell et al. (1997) 
then identify different categories of stakeholders, based on the attributes that they 
possess.  
In the next section, I match the characteristics that are listed for each of the 
stakeholder categories in the Salience Model with the stakeholder groups identified 
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by the participants of this study in order to identify the stakeholders’ priority level 
for these companies (Table 8). The main stakeholder groups acknowledged by the 
participants in this study include shareholders, potential investors, the government, 
employees, board of directors, the media, the general public, Iwi, NGOs and the 
SBC, and customers. I argue that based on their characteristics, all these groups can 
be placed in the definitive, dominant, dependent, discretionary, or dormant 
category.  
 
Rating Salience (priority) (Mitchell et al., 1997)* 
Low 
One attribute present, demands are most likely ignored 
due to lack of resources 
Moderate 
Two attributes present, receive reasonable attention from 
companies  
High 
Three attributes present, 
can demand immediate action 
Table 8. Rating system for level of Salience. Adapted from Mitchell et al. (1997). 
7.2.1. Classification of stakeholders  
In this section I categorise stakeholders into five groups. I then discuss how, if at 
all, the participating companies have directly or indirectly indicated that the 
stakeholder group has demanded non-financial disclosure. I also discuss whether or 
not stakeholders have the power to force the companies to publish a sustainability 
report. A figure is included after the analysis of each stakeholder group with the 
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purpose of illustrating the attributes that are present, and the group’s consequent 
salience level.  
7.2.1.1. Dependent Stakeholders (customers and potential investors)   
Customers as stakeholders have been referred to in different ways in the reports and 
by the participating representatives of different companies. In the comprehensive 
reports created by the companies which included non-financial information (these 
reports are shown as green in table 7), customers have been engaged with as one of 
the major stakeholders.  
For CP2’s customers, several things were important, including the company’s 
contribution “to the success of New Zealand” (CP2, 2017 sustainability report). 
According to the report, their customers also took part in the wellbeing of the 
country themselves. For example, the report indicates that thousands of customers 
voluntarily took part in carbon offsetting. For CP3’s customers, climate and energy 
were among the topics that they would have liked the company to work on and 
engage with them about (2017 sustainability report). CP6, CP7, and CP14’s 
customers also directly asked for non-financial transparency according to the 
companies’ corporate reports.  
In other studies, such as an online survey done by SBC & Fairfax Media (2013) in 
New Zealand, out of the 2,152 respondents, 63% said that they would stop using a 
product if there is any sign of human and animal mistreatment, and 67% would 
switch products, if negative environmental and social impacts were observed. The 
report also shows a 3% annual increase in sustainability awareness among New 
Zealanders. The results of this study indicate that the majority of customers do 
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expect companies to be more socially responsible and would like to be informed if 
their favourite brands have impacts on society and the environment.  
Aside from individual customers, some of these public companies serve as suppliers 
for smaller firms which want to keep a good image themselves. CP3 explained that 
these customers choose their main suppliers (the public companies), based on those 
companies’ image and how they are perceived by end-use customers (individual 
buyers). Even though he admits that there is expectation from their customers (other 
smaller businesses), the general public, and Iwi for their company to be “more 
transparent and more accountable”, the organisation did not publish a sustainability 
report until 2017. In addition, CP2, CP4, CP6, CP9, CP14, and CP20 also agreed 
that some customers would like to know that the product or the service is 
“environmentally sustainable” before they use it. 
Based on these findings, these companies experience a moderate level of demand 
for sustainability disclosure from their customers. However, this expectation seems 
to be largely dismissed because it is not coming from a powerful stakeholder. Or in 
some cases, the powerful stakeholders are against non-financial disclosure. As 
CP19 explained, they have to be “mindful” of certain customers who also happen 
to be investors as well. He was referring to their international shareholder who 
currently owns nearly 40% of their company, and is potentially going to invest more 
in the near future. Another non-reporting corporation (CP18) also only engages 
with one major customer which contributes 10% of total revenue. Sustainability 
issues do not appear to be important to this particular customer.  
CP10 defined potential investors as “prospective investors [who] are community 
members who aren’t yet investing in the company but may be interested [to do so]”. 
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Previous literature suggests that potential investors are becoming more aware of the 
importance of non-financial information, and consider that before making 
investments (Hayward et al., 2013; Hughen et al., 2014).  A few of the participants 
in this study directly mentioned certain potential investors who do “CSR investing” 
(CP3, CP9), and look into a company’s non-financial information before they 
invest. As CP20 puts it, “investors don’t like surprises, either positive ones or 
negative ones”. Some are “managing risks” and care about their own “reputation”. 
As a result, they look carefully into the impacts of the companies that they invest 
in. OP6 and OP7 similarly believe that investors are now a lot more interested in 
knowing about companies’ social and environmental impacts, before they decide to 
invest.  
It appears that customers and potential investors possess the characteristics of 
dependent stakeholders. Mitchell et al. (1997) explain that, despite the urgent and 
legitimate claims, these stakeholders have no power and are dependent on 
“guardianship” of stronger stakeholders (such as the government).  The customers’ 
and potential investors’ claims are considered legitimate since their desire is for the 
companies to act in socially acceptable ways, and urgent because if the companies 
fail to do so, customers will switch providers and potential investors could look for 
other opportunities. Nonetheless, neither customers nor potential investors are 
prioritised ahead of current shareholders of the companies by any of the 
participants. The presence of the two attributes suggests that this stakeholder 
group’s (customers and potential investors) priority level for the companies is 
moderate (Figure 14), and they should receive a reasonable amount of attention. 
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Figure 14. Dependent stakeholders do not possess enough power to demand for disclosure of non-financial 
information. 
However, despite the fact that their priority level is fairly moderate, this group does 
not have sufficient power to demand non-financial disclosure. To effect change, 
they are dependent on a guardian stakeholder (Mitchell et al. 1997), the 
government. Due to the neoliberal nature of governance in New Zealand (Collins 
et al. (2007); Frame & Bebbington, 2012), fiscal transparency remains the only 
form of disclosure expected by the government. I argue that with the absence of 
pressure from this authority figure and guardian stakeholder, the pressure of 
expectations from other stakeholders such as customers and potential investors, is 
not enough to force companies to change their ways, as they do not possess any 
power themselves. 
7.2.1.2. Dominant Stakeholders (retail shareholders, employees and 
board of directors, and the government) 
According to Mitchell et al. (1997), dominant stakeholders are both powerful and 
legitimate, and undeniably have impacts on the company. They argue that these 





stakeholders have the power to act on their legitimate claims, and demand both 
annual and sustainability reports but for different reasons (discussed later in this 
section), may choose not to do so. I argue that retail (‘mum and dad’) shareholders 
with minor investments, the board of directors, the employees of the companies, 
and the New Zealand Government belong to this group, and match the 
characteristics of dominant stakeholders.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, being transparent towards employees (internal 
transparency) motivates employees to be more engaged and improves their 
performance while it builds trust between the employers and the employees 
(Drucker & Gumpert, 2007). This benefit of internal transparency was highlighted 
by a participant who explained that her company was currently concentrating on a 
“sustaining people” strategy (CP14). This company believes that employees are one 
of the most important stakeholders and have created a new “Chief People Officer” 
role in their company.  
Employees are one of the influential stakeholder groups, according to the findings, 
who could positively impact the company when empowered. The findings also 
suggest that this empowerment can take place when changes in leadership cause 
cultural changes in the company. For the organisational culture to change, 
management has to take the first step. Once employees witness the change in 
management and understand the benefits of communicating non-financial 
performance, they start integrating the concept in their work, knowing that the 
management will be supportive of their actions (Epstein et al., 2010). 
OP2’s company advises their clients to conduct a biannual survey to engage with 
their employees and get their feedback on what they should do in the future. The 
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participant representing this company explained that employees are well informed 
because they are in touch with other stakeholders, especially shareholders, and 
know the company’s values and impacts. Employees also appeared as important 
stakeholders in the participants’ non-financial reports. The most important topics to 
them included transparent two-way communication, maintaining a social licence to 
operate, and commitment to society and the environment. 
As a majority of the participants consider employees as one of their main 
stakeholder groups, their power to influence the company cannot be denied. 
However, there is a common belief that shareholders’ interest and claims must be 
served ahead of stakeholders such as employees (Eccles et al., 2014). Therefore, 
employees’ power to demand change can be overruled when management decides 
that their claims are not in the best interest of shareholders.  
In addition, data suggests that even directors, as powerful stakeholders with 
influence and legitimate claims, are not immune to shareholders’ interests.  For 
instance, CP19 explained that there are certain directors within their organisation 
who bring a lot of experience and have a really “strong view on sustainability being 
an important aspect”. They believe that they should be communicating their 
sustainability impacts. But their view on sustainability “is not shared across the 
board of directors”. He later explained that an international company owns 39.9% 
of his company and implied that what that major shareholder wants is going to 
highly influence the content of their report, overruling what some members of the 
board would have wanted to include. 
Aside from major shareholders’ influence on the board, there is another major 
reason that can explain the lack of pressure from the boards of directors in New 
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Zealand based companies for publishing a sustainability reports. The board of 
directors’ role is to monitor the decisions that are made by the management of the 
company to make sure that the company’s objectives are being reached (Eccles et 
al., 2014). However, as OP7 explained, many directors in New Zealand serve as 
members of boards in up to 5 companies. A study done by Al-Maskati et al. (2015) 
also finds that the boards in New Zealand based companies are facing what they 
call “director busyness” caused by the fact that some of these directors may be 
serving in multiple companies. This apparent limit in the number of capable 
directors in New Zealand has a negative impact on how well they can monitor 
company activities and have a say when major decisions (such as publishing a 
sustainability report) have to be made (Fox et al., 2012). Another recent study done 
by Rao and Tilt (2016) also suggests that “multiple directorship” can affect non-
financial reporting.  
On the other hand, ‘mum and dad’ or retail shareholders, who also have power and 
legitimate claims, do not demand sustainability reporting for a number of reasons. 
For example, CP7 believes that the benefits of disclosing non-financial information, 
have not been introduced well in New Zealand. She explained that in today’s 
society, “the health and ongoing welfare of a company, and their ability to make 
returns is depending on a lot more”. She said “people don’t know what they don’t 
know” and this can change once the company produces a report and shows the 
stakeholders the benefits and values of non-financial reporting. However, the 
findings suggest that in many cases the management of the company does not 
understand the values of sustainability reporting either. Many companies do not 
necessarily believe that being sustainable can have financial, or any other benefits.  
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Assuming that they do not understand the benefits and purpose of sustainability 
reporting, which in this day and age OP7 thought would be hard to believe, a body 
with authority should take the role of educating the decision makers of the largest 
companies in the country. As OP5 explained, a lack of understanding of what 
benefits a sustainability report at some point becomes conscious ignorance, which 
then becomes wilfully choosing not to understand. 
Similar to the findings of this study, Nidumolu et al. (2009) explain that companies 
see sustainability as an expense since they are worried that customers will not pay 
more for sustainable products and being sustainable means that they have to 
purchase new equipment and find new suppliers. One participant (CP12) argued 
that lowering carbon, electricity and water usage is “highly efficient and good on 
the environment, [but] there is not a really big return on that investment”.  This 
indicates a lack of understanding of what a sustainability report’s benefits are for 
the company. The same lack of understanding is also evident in some of the 
corporate reports.  
Aside from improving companies’ image and reputation, a sustainability report can 
help companies identify all the issues that they may have with control and use of 
their resources, and assist them in creating plans to manage their assets properly, 
which, as discussed in Chapter 2, can lead to reducing costs, creating  opportunities 
for new business ventures, and financial benefits in the long run, and add value to 
the company by improving its performance in the future (Lourenço et al., 2014; 
Nidumolu et al., 2009). The results of other studies such as Hussainey and Salama 
(2010), suggest that investors are enabled to forecast the companies’ future earnings 
 223 
better when the management has a good reputation in environmental performance, 
since the investors are able to understand the companies’ long term plans.  
Aside from the lack of knowledge of sustainability reporting’s benefits, another 
reason for the lack of expectation from the retail shareholders is how they are 
represented. As mentioned in Chapter 5, some of these companies have hundreds 
of thousands of shareholders, many of whom only find out what is happening with 
their investment through communication tools such as annual reports. In many 
situations shareholders and many other stakeholders leave the decision-making 
power to portfolio managers (OP6), the management or the board (Eccles et al., 
2014). This allows the board or management to make decisions on behalf of 
thousands of people. The problem arises when the board or management favours 
their own (Eccles et al., 2014) or one or more major shareholders’ interests instead 
of those of the retail shareholders.  The board, according to almost all participants, 
has the final say, and some participants such as CP18 and CP19 admit that they 
favour the major shareholders’ requests over other stakeholders (discussed further 
in the Definitive Stakeholders section). 
As a powerful stakeholder with legitimate claims, the New Zealand Government 
(and its regulatory bodies), like other dominant stakeholders, has the ability to 
demand sustainability disclosures, but chooses not to, for a number of reasons. 
As CP8 explains, the government of New Zealand is trying to reduce the number 
of regulations and claims that adding “another set of regulations to follow” scares 
away foreign investors who have plans to invest in New Zealand based companies. 
While some consider such regulations as barriers to entry for competition (Koźluk, 
2014), and suggest that deregulations attract more investment (Alesina et al., 2005), 
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other studies such as that by Testa et al. (2011) suggest that sustainability related 
regulations significantly and positively affect companies’ competitiveness in terms 
of innovation, and encourage them to improve their environmental performance to 
compete with each other. Testa et al. (2011) also conclude that the governments and 
their regulatory bodies must keep sustainability regulations in place, since they can 
create competition among companies, which can benefit the environment and 
society as well as the economy. 
 Another reason for the government’s lack of interest in sustainability reports is that 
the majority of the shares (more than 51%) of some of the largest corporations in 
the country are owned by the government. These include but are not limited to Air 
New Zealand, Meridian Energy, Mighty River Energy, and Genesis Energy. While 
state owned enterprises (SOEs) are designed to create profit and be responsible 
towards the public (Cunningham, 2011), as a huge shareholder of some of the most 
profitable companies in the country, the New Zealand government’s interest seems 
to be leaning more toward creating profit, as it is very strict towards financial 
transparency, but imprecise towards sustainability disclosure. The government’s 
lack of interest in sustainability reports can be clearly observed in the vague legal 
definition of material information and the lack of even a recommendation for non-
financial reporting in the NZX listing rules. This has led to the absence of 
sustainability reports from most of the SOEs and in the case of at least two 
companies, abandoning such reports.  
The findings from the corporate reports indicate that the employees, investors, and 
directors of reporting companies are interested in non-financial topics. As dominant 
stakeholders, the employees and the board of directors, retail shareholders, and the 
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government all have the power and the legitimacy to demand sustainability reports, 
but for the reasons discussed above, compared to major shareholders, their claim 
remains non urgent, and while they have a moderate salience level (Figure 15) and 
receive a fair amount of attention from the companies, their high level of power to 
influence companies remains unused in most companies, since the organisations 
perceive no pressure for the disclosure of non-financial information from these 
stakeholders.  
 
Figure 15. Despite having the power attribute, there is not enough perceived expectation from dominant 
stakeholders for sustainability reports. 
 
7.2.1.3. Dormant stakeholder (Media)  
As discussed in Chapter 2, the mass media have increasingly gained the power to 
impact public opinion regarding corporations (Christensen, 2002). The findings of 
this study illustrate that media play an important role as a stakeholder, for both 
reporting and non-reporting companies, effectively influencing how they 
communicate with their stakeholders. This study is also aligned with previous 
the employees and the board of directors, 





studies (Baron, 2005; Siegel & Vitaliano, 2007; Zyglidopoulos et al., 2012), 
providing evidence of the mass media’s influence on corporate behaviour, and 
corporate CSR.  
For the companies that already publish sustainability reports, or are preparing one 
to be published in the near future, media were considered as one of the major 
sources of material information for the reports (the other source was employees who 
are in touch with stakeholders). CP6, CP7, and CP14, who produce sustainability 
reports, explained that they pick up stories in the media that involve their company, 
and bring them up in the reports together with what they are doing to resolve their 
issues. CP19 who is from a non-reporting company also considers “media 
channels” as a major way of communicating with other stakeholders. CP13 also 
explained that they are “very news worthy” and they receive a lot of requests from 
the media for different types of information.  
The findings discussed in chapters 5 and 6 suggest that the media can influence 
sustainability reports that are already being published by the reporting companies. 
However, in New Zealand’s voluntary system, media’s power remains unused to 
demand publication of sustainability reports by non-reporting companies. I argue 
that media can become a tool for companies to gain a good reputation and achieve 
their economic goals, without having to disclose all their major negative impacts. 
Instead, they only have to address the ones that have been covered in the news.  
As mentioned earlier, the reporting companies use the stories that come up through 
media outlets as material information. Aside from the media, they admit that they 
do not directly get in touch with all their stakeholders for feedback, but prefer to 
speak to their staff who are in touch with the stakeholders to find out what they 
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want to see in the reports. This leaves the media as the only major external source 
for the identification of material information.  
The main problem here is, because of the absence of regulations for sustainability 
reporting, companies have no obligation to release information that may have major 
negative impacts on their image, and only cover what was already published by the 
media and therefore expected of them to cover (Zyglidopoulos & Fleming, 2011), 
their own stories about their positive activities, and their good deeds. As a result, 
major issues that are not already known by the public and are not mentioned in the 
media are ignored. This improves the companies’ image and portrays them as 
socially responsible, while they could be hiding a major issue. These companies 
receive more positive news reportage, helping them gain a social license to operate 
(Boutilier & Thomson, 2011; Moffat & Zhang, 2014; Prno & Scott Slocombe, 
2012) and increase their value in the market (Cahan et al., 2015). In this way these 
companies can manipulate both the media coverage and their stock prices (Figure 
16), or as Bauman sees it, to use the media as a publicity platform to get the public 
to join the market and make choices as consumers (Cotter & Perrin, 2017; Gane, 
2012).  
In addition, similar to the findings of Reinig and Tilt (2009), it was observed that 
many of the companies use press releases to communicate their non-financial 
information, which mostly included “community engagement” (CP10), rather than 
having an official report. The problem with this method is that many of these 
companies either have their own Investors Relations (IR) department, or hire an IR 
firm to generate more positive press releases than negative ones (Solomon, 2012). 
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Figure 16. Influence of media in a voluntary system 
 
Another factor that affects the legitimacy of media’s influence, is that they have the 
tendency to lean towards local companies. A study done by Gurun and Butler 
(2012) shows that local media can be biased towards their local companies, since a 
big part of local media’s revenue is from advertising for these companies. 
Therefore, they tend to take a more positive point of view towards the local 
companies, compared to how a non-local media outlet would position itself towards 
that company. Furthermore, Van Peursem and Hauriasi (1999) suggest that media 
coverage in New Zealand is highly affected by news production requirements and 
the need to entertain. Therefore, if a piece of important sustainability news does not 
have the potential to be entertaining, it may not be included in the news. 
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In addition, the findings of this study align with those of Aerts and Cormier (2009) 
in suggesting that negative issues raised by the media that need to be addressed by 
the companies are mostly drivers for press releases rather than sustainability 
reports. Several participants such as CP10, use their websites and “news 
announcements through media” to respond to negative issues that the public already 
knows about.  
Mitchell et al. (1997) argue that while the only attribute that dormant stakeholders 
have is power and they can demand what they want to see, because of the lack of a 
legitimate and urgent connection to the companies, their power is unusable. They 
explain that dormant stakeholders have potential to gain urgency or legitimacy and 
earn a higher level of salience, and demand more attention from management. I 
argue that the mass media, as the largest source of information about sustainability 
in New Zealand (Research New Zealand, 2007) due to its ability to grab public 
attention, has the power to affect companies’ image and reputation and as a result, 
gain the legitimacy or urgency attributes.  
Interestingly, while many of the reporting companies and the other participants 
(OP5, OP6, and OP7) discussed the importance of media in the materiality process, 
this stakeholder was not listed in any of the sustainability reports as a major 
stakeholder. Most companies do not produce sustainability reports and those that 
do look to the media to identify material issues. However, media influence in this 
way is only indirect. Under normal circumstances when there is no incident 
involving the corporations, the media have little to no interaction with the 
companies, so it has the characteristics of a dormant stakeholder and is of low 
priority (Figure 17).  
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Figure 17. With only the power attribute, dormant stakeholders can be ignored by the companies as they have 
no legitimate and urgent claims. 
 
7.2.1.4. Discretionary Stakeholders (NGOs and the SBC)  
Mitchell et al. (1997) describe discretionary stakeholders as stakeholders with no 
power nor urgent claim to influence the company, and explain that because they 
lack these two attributes, managers are under no obligation to have a relationship 
with these stakeholders, although they may choose to do so. I argue that 
organisations such as the Sustainable Business Council (SBC), and the Sustainable 
Business Network (SBN) belong to this category, and even though their claims are 
legitimate and many companies have chosen to be a member of these organisations, 
they hold no power to demand non-financial disclosure on their own in a voluntary 
system (Nadesan, 2011). 
The SBC has 80 members and requires its members to produce a sustainability 
report within two years of membership (SBC, 2016b). Out of these 80 members, 
only 15 are publicly listed on the NZX. Not all of these 15 companies are currently 
The media: Low Salience
Power
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publishing sustainability reports. Five of the members which are publicly listed 
participated in this study (CP2, CP3, CP7, CP9, and CP14). These members 
described their relationship with the SBC as valuable and explained that the council 
helps them with matters such as supply chain efficiency, social license to operate, 
freight efficiency, transition to a lower carbon economy, and the complex process 
of creating a sustainability report. While many of the participants in this study have 
praised the SBC for its sustainability efforts, I suggest, in line with previous 
literature (Milne et al. (2005); Milne et al. (2006); Wright et al. (2016)) , that the 
organisation would have been more  effective combined with governmental 
pressure.   
There were concerns regarding the legitimacy of what is currently prepared 
voluntarily by some participants. CP4 believed that since there is no set framework, 
many companies “put a spin on things” to make themselves look responsible. Even 
though the SBC requires all members to produce a non-financial report within 2 
years of becoming a member, it does not have the power to directly penalise the 
offenders in the same way as an authority figure like a government could (e.g. cash 
penalties). This can create an environment for such companies to take advantage of 
being a member of organisations such as the SBC, to improve their image. In 
addition, the existence of the SBC is dependent on their members. Despite years of 
being active, many of the members managed to avoid producing a sustainability 
report within the two-year window. However, it does appear that the situation is 
changing. According to the representative of the SBC (OP4), in 2018 the 
organisation for the first time asked a member not to renew their membership 
because the company failed to publish a report. The SBC finally took this step 
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towards implementing their own policy after the release of the code of governance 
by the NZX at the end of 2017.  
As discussed before, while many reporting companies use the GRI framework as a 
guideline, some of them only cover issues that have already been raised by the 
media. While there are some genuine reports being published every year in New 
Zealand, there are companies that are not being “authentic” with what they include 
in their reports (CP2). Aside from authenticity, there are other issues that could be 
problematic when it comes to organisations such as the SBC. Lydenberg et al. 
(2010) argue that companies in a voluntary system can choose when and how often 
they want to report. They can also choose indicators and formats that suit their 
image best, allowing them to foster a false responsible reputation (Hahn & Lülfs, 
2014).  
While organisations such as the SBC and the SBN are known for their work for 
disclosure of non-financial information, they have no power to require all public 
companies to publish such information and can only indirectly demand it from their 
own members as a condition of their voluntary membership. As there is no urgency 
to their claim, companies are under no pressure to acknowledge these organisations, 
giving them a low level of priority (Figure 18), and sometimes even completely 
ignoring these stakeholders.  
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Figure 18. Discretionary stakeholders do not possess the power to demand for non-financial disclosure 
 
7.2.1.5. Definitive Stakeholders (major Shareholders) 
The data gathered for this study strongly suggests that there is a sense of urgency 
in keeping the major shareholders “happy”, and that the companies’ first priority is 
to satisfy their major shareholders’ needs (Friedman, 1970; Friedman, 2009) before 
any other stakeholders, including retail shareholders. For example, CP18 explained 
that when one “large shareholder owns two-thirds of a company”, “it has a lot of 
influence” over the company’s reporting protocols. In other words, if this large 
shareholder does not ask for sustainability reporting, the company does not feel the 
need to publish such a report. The influence of this large shareholder “with a 66.7 
% stake” overrules the interests of small shareholders “that own one or two shares”.  
Aside from this participant, many others named shareholders as their main 
stakeholder. It later became clear that they mostly were referring to major 
shareholders who own big portions of the company. CP10, even classified their 




stakeholders into different types of shareholders (indicating that they only consider 
shareholders as their stakeholders) and put “institutional shareholders” on the top 
of his list. For this reason, in the previous section I characterised retail shareholders 
as dominant stakeholders with power and legitimate claims, while I argue that major 
shareholders belong to the definitive stakeholders’ category due to presence of 
urgency as the third attribute, in addition to power and legitimacy. As a stakeholder 
group with all three attributes, they receive the highest level of attention from the 
companies (Mitchell et al., 1997). 
In New Zealand, the major shareholders’ power is enhanced even more, with the 
help of the government. By “minimising the regulations” (CP8), the New Zealand 
government has created an investment friendly environment for these major 
shareholders (Connell & Dados, 2014; Kingfisher, 2013). Aside from not requiring 
any form of non-financial disclosure, the government, through the Reserve Bank, 
has also created New Zealand Central Securities Depository Limited (NZCSD) 
which acts as a custodian and “becomes the legal owner of the securities on the 
relevant register and holds securities on behalf of the member, the beneficial owner” 
(RBNZ, 2016), such as JP Morgan Chase Bank and HSBC.  
“New Zealand Central Securities Depository Limited” is the shareholder name 
listed in the annual reports of the companies. While the NZCSD has more than 100 
members, the information regarding which company owns what portion of the 
public companies listed on the NZX is not publicly available and can remain hidden, 
unless the listed companies choose to include that information in their annual 
reports. When I contacted NZCSD to find out more about these institutional 
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investors, I was told that the information was “confidential” and could not be 
shared.  
As discussed earlier in the third section of Chapter 5, in some cases up to 90% of a 
company is owned by a few of these investment companies, giving them more 
power than “mom and dad” or “retail” shareholders. On the other hand, public 
companies’ ranking on the NZX, which used to be freely available for the public, 
is now only available if one pays for subscription to S&P Dow Jones Indices 
(Adams, 2015).  
Many of these major shareholders own a large number of shares in New Zealand’s 
largest companies, and in the absence of regulations for sustainability reporting, 
they greatly influence the public companies’ disclosure policies. This has led to an 
environment where companies are able to operate without having to worry about 
the impacts that their activities may have on society, the environment and the 
economy. This lack of regulation allows a few investment firms to have the power 
to have control a major part of the market.  
Previously, I suggested reasons why companies may perceive a lack of expectation 
for sustainability reporting from retail shareholders, which included these 
shareholders’ lack of knowledge and the way they are represented. In addition, 
many participants including CP1, CP5, CP8, CP10, CP11, CP12, CP13, CP15, 
CP17, CP18, CP20, and CP21 at the time of being interviewed believed that there 
are no expectations from other stakeholders for sustainability transparency. One 
thing that almost all these participants have in common is the fact that they 
considered shareholders as either the only stakeholder, or the most important one, 
giving them the highest level of priority (Figure 19). Therefore, I argue that the 
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claim of lack of expectation made by these companies is because their view of 
stakeholders is only narrowly focused on shareholders, especially the major ones.  
 
Figure 19. Major shareholders have high level of power and influence on the companies. 
 
In addition, the review of the corporate reports of these non-reporting organisations 
showed no evidence of direct engagement and communication with any of the 
stakeholder groups aside from shareholders were found. While many of the reports 
claimed to be in touch with shareholders, there was no indication as to how that 
engagement was made and what the important topics for the major shareholders 
were.  
In this section, using the Salience Model, I argue that different stakeholder groups 
have different levels of power to influence companies’ non-financial transparency 
in New Zealand. I believe a combination of genuine lack of understanding and 
choosing not to understand (consciously ignoring) what sustainability reporting is 







absence of communication and genuine engagement with what key stakeholders 
want, has made a major contribution to the apparent current lack of interest in non-
financial reporting in the country. In the next section, I draw on Bauman’s liquid 
modernity, discussed in Chapter 2, to explain how difference in levels of 
stakeholders’ power and the state’s lack of involvement in the market’s affairs have 
shaped current practices of sustainability reporting in New Zealand.  
7.2.2. Effects of absence of regulations on sustainability 
reporting in New Zealand  
As disused earlier, a neoliberal system supports market freedom, and its method of 
governance is to use regulatory and monitory practices which have been put in place 
to effectively infuse competition and principles of the market to all aspects of life 
(Gane, 2012).  In a system that has been built on the idea of individualism and 
individual success, companies avoid social responsibilities and are only required to 
provide a report designed to speed up their economic growth.  
The data gathered for this study support this claim. Some participants such as CP4, 
CP8, and CP9 explained that their annual reports are “compliance based” or are 
only designed to “comply with the listing rules”. CP4 even went on to say that they 
have already collected the non-financial information needed to produce a 
sustainability report for their own use, and although they report this information to 
global programs outside New Zealand, they do not disclose it in the country because 
“at this stage [they] are not required to disclose it to anybody else”.  
Similarly, OP1 also said the annual report “is for most a compliance document, it’s 
required to produce. The main thing is that it has to tick the boxes for the regulator”. 
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Another Participant (CP5) explained that because of the constant pressure from the 
regulators and their major shareholders, their financial reports have grown from 24 
pages to 80 pages over the years. While the expectations from powerful 
stakeholders are promoting constant growth of fiscal reporting in the country, the 
pressure is nowhere near the same when it comes to non-financial information. 
In section 7.2.1, I classified stakeholders into five groups and argued that in New 
Zealand, in most cases, little to no pressure is perceived by companies from 
stakeholders with the power attribute (Definitive, Dormant, and Dominant 
stakeholders) for non-financial transparency. I also established that in a neoliberal 
system such as New Zealand’s, where sustainability reporting is done voluntarily, 
only major shareholders have the absolute power to demand sustainability reports, 
and the disclosure of non-financial information, due to the high level of attention 
that they receive from companies, and their highly effective power. However, as 
discussed earlier, many of these shareholders do not see any financial benefits for 
releasing non-financial information (Nidumolu et al., 2009), and believe that 
addressing sustainability issues could have negative financial effects (costs) 
(Brown, Helland, & Smith, 2006). Therefore, they do not expect (or want) it, 
although the cost of preparing financial reports is not an issue since it is a 
“requirement” and comes with “being a public company” (CP5). 
While, in terms of financial transparency, companies go out of their way to comply 
with powerful stakeholders’ requirements, there is little attention paid to non-
financial transparency. After all, neoliberalism “is about market freedoms and 
forms of governmentality that operate through such freedoms and, moreover, 
through forms of surveillance and regulation that are designed to inject market 
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principles of competition into all spheres of social and cultural life” (Gane 2012, p. 
625).  
As discussed earlier, according to Bauman (2000) power was transferred from the 
state to individuals in the liquid modern era, due to processes of individualisation. 
The disciplinary power of the Panopticon era was replaced with unstructured or 
‘liquid’ power. The post Panopticon conditions, as Bauman (2000) argues, allow 
power to move freely without any constraints. Liquid power therefore enables 
companies or “free agents” to separate themselves from the government, and the 
state that has been enticed by the concept of individualisation in neoliberalism 
participates in order to weaken itself.  
I build on Bauman’s discussion of liquid modernity and argue that with individuals 
now having to take responsibility for their own wellbeing, each person or group of 
stakeholders will pursue their own interests, demanding different forms of 
disclosure that serve them best. Companies that now have lost their solid form use 
their liquid power to meet the requirements of the government (usually in a form of 
an annual report) and the demands of those stakeholders who only ask for financial 
transparency and still appear as legitimate (Figure 20). 
As Bauman (2000) explains, the important thing in a post-Panoptical era is that the 
people who have the power to shape the fate of their less powerful dependent 
partners, and the less fortunate, can escape beyond grasp whenever they want: 
  The prime technique of power is now escape, slippage, elision and 
avoidance, the effective rejection of any territorial confinement with its 
cumbersome corollaries of order-building, order-maintenance and the 
responsibility for the consequences of it all as well as of the necessity to 
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bear their costs. (p. 11).  
This process of escape and slippage is represented in diagrammatic form in Figure 
20 below, with the now ‘fluid’ corporate entity avoiding the demands of a range of 
stakeholders as well as the associated responsibilities. 
 
Figure 20. Companies taking advantage of their liquid power to escape social and environmental 
responsibilities, and different stakeholder groups’ demand for transparency. 
 
In the absence of regulations, and the lack of perceived expectation or demand from 
major shareholders, the dependent, dormant, and discretionary stakeholders do not 
have enough power to force companies to take notice of their demands. This allows 
organisations to have different levels of transparency (partial transparency) for 
different types of stakeholders (Figure 21), to satisfy stakeholders with higher levels 




Figure 21.  The liquid form allows companies to be flexible and provide partial disclosure that serves their 
interest best, thus escaping their responsibilities and any form of social responsibility.  
 
In addition, as discussed in chapter 3, the liquidity of power (Bauman 2000) allows 
companies to move operations that are deemed unacceptable to places where there 
are fewer constraints on their activities (Dicken, 2003; Zyglidopulos & Fleming, 
2011). The absence of regulations around non-financial transparency makes New 
Zealand a safe haven for companies that wish to hide their questionable actions. 
Non-financial reporting, when done correctly, has the potential to expose 
companies’ social, environmental, and economic impacts, and where they should 
be regulated (Milne et al., 2005). The current situation in New Zealand, however, 
allows companies to be able to use sustainability reports as legitimising tools 
(Tregidga et al., 2014), by responding to incidents covered by the media, or cover 
smaller matters while hiding major issues, and still appear legitimate, a practice that 
CP10, CP12, and CP15 exercised in their 2017 reports (these companies’ practices 
were discussed in chapter 5). 
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This is happening in an era when four developing countries (India, Malaysia, South 
Africa, and Indonesia) have the highest rate of corporate responsibility reporting in 
the world. While official requirements are driving the growth of CR and 
sustainability reporting worldwide and show positive development since 2013, New 
Zealand and its voluntary reporting system falls behind with countries such as 
Slovakia and Greece, well below the average and with little improvement (KPMG, 
2015). 
In a neoliberal environment the market, rather than the government, is given the 
power to manage societal growth. As a result, the market can dictate its own agenda 
and monitor itself. As discussed earlier, at the end of 2017, the NZX as the authority 
figure regulating the market in New Zealand introduced a new code of governance 
that included a “comply or explain” recommendation. I argue that while introducing 
such recommendation appears to be a positive step towards non-financial 
transparency, it is in fact a neoliberal act of misusing power (Peck and Tickell 2002) 
in order to strengthen the market and achieve financial goals, and in many ways 
could do more harm than good as “there are still a lot of [ways] out” (OP6). Giving 
the companies the option of explaining instead of complying is the market’s way of 
allowing some, such as investment organisations, to avoid having to be transparent 
about their social and environmental impacts. Thus, companies or free agents, as 
Bauman calls them, can justify the absence of non-financial transparency and 
legitimise their actions as their liquid power allows them to escape all forms of 
social responsibility (Bauman, 2000).  
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On the other hand, the Government, which owns large portions of some of the 
biggest and most profitable listed companies, directly or through “guardians of the 
superannuation” or “local government” bodies, is empowering companies to avoid 
compliance with the other stakeholders’ demands by creating this so called 
investment friendly environment through the NZCSD through not introducing a 
standard for non-financial reporting. Instead of acting as an enforcement authority 
as well as a key stakeholder with power to apply pressure on companies to address 
their environment and societal impacts, the government is in some ways supporting 
companies to disengage from such responsibilities. In this way the Government is 
undoing the efforts of those stakeholders who have rightfully demanded 
sustainability transparency, and reversing the small impact these responsible 
stakeholders with little power may have had. Some participants in this study admit 
that they used to publish sustainability reports, or were taking steps towards 
releasing non-financial information, but stopped due to lack of interest from 
important stakeholders such as the government.  
This absence of regulations also allows companies to use their size and type of 
industry as reasons not to publish a sustainability report. Numerous studies have 
looked at size as a factor affecting the content of corporate responsibility reports 
(Baumann-Pauly et al., 2013; Frias-Aceituno et al., 2014; Gallo & Christensen, 
2011; Morhardt, 2010), and suggest that there is a relationship between levels of 
non-financial disclosure, and size of the company. The findings in studies by 
Brammer and Pavelin (2006); Fernandez-Feijoo et al. (2014a); and Simnett et al. 
(2009) suggest that larger companies provide more information than smaller ones 
in a voluntary system. In line with these studies, some of the non-reporting 
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companies in this research see their “small” size as one of the main reasons not to 
publish non-financial reporting.  
For instance, CP16 stated that their company is “not big enough from a shareholder 
point of view”, because of their low share prices. He explained that they are 
“classified as penny stock” and that is the reason why they are “sliding under the 
radar”. He said that in the next two years, as their share prices increase, he expects 
that there will be demand for more information, and certain stakeholders such as 
“analysts and the market” will expect more disclosure. CP16’s product is taken 
from the ocean and has direct impacts on the environment. Yet because of its size 
from a shareholder’s point of view, and lack of regulation, they have not had to 
acknowledge any demands to disclose non-financial information.  
Similarly, CP5 considers his company to be a “very small corporate holding” with 
“10 people in their corporate office”. I argue that it is the nature of what they do as 
a holding company that should be considered, rather than size. In terms of 
employees who are directly employed by this company, they are considered small. 
However, this company as a holding corporation, owns several businesses that are 
responsible for more than 3,000 employees globally, and has total sales of nearly 
NZD 800 million. That is why, even though they consider themselves as a “very 
small corporate holding”, they are placed just outside of NZX 50. This company 
has significant social impacts because of the very large number of employees that 
they are responsible for (amongst other things). They also have environmental 
impacts as they own businesses that are active in the automotive sector and resource 
services, providing technical and maintenance services in the oil, gas, power, 
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agriculture, mineral, and petro chemical industries; and finally, economic impacts 
due to their value in the stock market.  
Therefore, while it is true that firms that are ranked in NZX 15 are much larger than 
the ones listed after NZX 50, and certainly have bigger impacts on society, the 
environment, and the economy compared to the smaller organisations, it does not 
change the fact that publicly listed companies, whether big or small, do affect the 
wellbeing of the country and need to disclose their impacts, regardless of what 
industry they are active in (KPMG, 2015). Consequently, size becomes an 
irrelevant factor in deciding whether or not a company should publish non-financial 
information.  In addition, being a smaller corporation can in some ways be an 
advantage. A smaller company can engage more easily with the community it is 
operating in, compared to very large ones (Draper, 2000) and can mould the 
reputation and the image they want.  
For whatever reasons, whether it is size or type of industry, the majority of the 
publicly listed companies in New Zealand are not disclosing non-financial 
information, and the impact of the new code of governance by the NZX which was 
introduced at the end of 2017 is yet to be seen. I challenge the common belief that 
stakeholders do not expect non-financial reports, and argue instead that the main 
barriers for growth of non-financial reporting in New Zealand are stakeholders’ lack 
of power to demand non-financial transparency, and the fact that they have not been 
sufficiently engaged and communicated with.  
Out of the 43 reports that were analysed for this study, the majority still do not 
include any non-financial disclosure (shown as red in Table 7). The representatives 
of these companies are the ones who claim that they have not felt any pressure from 
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any stakeholders for sustainability transparency. At the same time, no evidence of 
communication with any stakeholder groups aside from shareholders was found in 
any of these reports. In contrast, the sustainability reporting participants with 
comprehensive reports (shown as green in table 7) have engaged all stakeholder 
groups and asked them what is important to them. The fact that the less powerful 
stakeholders do not have an opportunity to speak does not mean that they do not 
have any such expectations.  
The absence of governmental intervention as the guardian stakeholder to protect the 
interest of other stakeholders has been a topic of discussion for years in New 
Zealand (Collins et al. (2007); Bebbington et al. (2009); Frame & Bebbington, 
(2012); Birchall et al. (2013). The result of this absenteeism is what Bauman warned 
us about: “what matters in post-Panoptical power-relations is that the people 
operating the levers of power on which the fate of the less volatile partners in the 
relationship depends can at any moment escape beyond reach - into sheer 
inaccessibility” (Bauman, 2000, p.11).  
Increasing the power of state through regulation for non-financial transparency will 
make companies present a sustainability report and to respond equally to all 
stakeholder demands for transparency in all dimensions of environment, society, as 
well as the economy (Figure 22).  
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Figure 22. Introducing mandatory expectations will create consistency in both financial and non-financial 
transparency. 
 
Whether the decision makers in organisations truly do not understand the purpose 
of non-financial reporting, or are deliberately ignoring it, having a mandatory 
standard would require them to educate themselves and engage with their other 
stakeholders in order to understand their needs and expectations and truly serve 
their purpose as an important part of society. Such regulation enhances performance 
by giving less powerful stakeholders the ability to have a say, and by requiring 
managers to make changes which do a lot more than just serve the short term 
interest of the shareholders (Maltby, 1997).  
 
7.3. A common standard and mandatory integrated 
reporting 
Similar to studies by Chapman and Milne (2003); Hackston and Milne (1996); 
Milne, Tregidga, and Walton (2009), I also challenge the reliability of some of the 
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sustainability reports published by companies in New Zealand. While the producers 
of comprehensive sustainability reports engaged with all their stakeholders, the data 
suggests that some companies rely only on the media to find out what issues need 
to be addressed. Some even admit that there is no direct communication with other 
stakeholders to hear their feedback and suggestions.  
In addition, despite having a full sustainability section, several reports either have 
been created without engaging with stakeholders, and/or there is evidence of 
attempts to de-emphasise the negative impacts of the company (these reports are 
shown as yellow in Table 7). These attempts include using smaller fonts, or 
excluding important facts about an issue. As in any other voluntary system, those 
who do this, or who do not report their negative impacts, cannot be punished for not 
disclosing the information regarding their effects (Nadesan, 2011). 
The way the participants from the reporting companies spoke of sustainability 
reports suggests that companies intentionally or unintentionally concentrate on 
certain aspects, mainly environment, less on society, and rarely on their impacts on 
the economy. Massive corporations’ effects on the economy should not be 
dismissed. For example, some large financial institutions collapsed during the 2008 
financial crisis because of weak risk management. They made a series of decisions 
that exposed their firms to significant risks and large losses (Erkens, Hung, & Matos, 
2012). When the big global institutions that were too big to fail got too close to the 
edge, they were bailed out by governments, but ultimately it is the taxpayer who 
paid the cost.  
A firm’s activities can harm the environment, society, and the economy in direct 
and indirect ways, destroying public goods and imposing costs on the people living 
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in the community. These costs (discussed in Chapter 2 as “externalities”) have to 
be calculated and the offending firm must be penalised and required to pay for its 
negative impacts to internalise the costs (Mosteanu & Iacob, 2009). However, many 
of the participants believe that their companies do not have any impact because of 
the type of industry they are active in, and the size of their corporation, dismissing 
the need for a sustainability report. Some even believe that the same guidelines 
cannot be used for all industries.  
To solve the challenges outlined above, in many countries sustainability reporting 
instruments are introduced directly by the government, or other regulatory bodies. 
According to a UNEP report  (UNEP et al, 2016), nearly 400 instruments (a 
complete list of the instruments is available on www.carrotsandsticks.net) are used 
in 71 countries, out of which more than 80% are introduced by the government, and 
65% are mandatory, the benefits of which were discussed in chapter 2.  
Companies’ impacts can be reported in different ways (Hughen et al., 2014). With 
the current absence of an official guideline in New Zealand, all reporting 
companies, and those which were in the middle of creating a report to be published 
soon, used the GRI framework as a guideline. While some just followed the 
guideline’s indicators, some others such as CP2 preferred to integrate it with their 
annual report, explaining that sustainability was integrated across their business, 
and that it created more value when combined with the annual report. These 
participants used the report to open a conversation with stakeholders, empowering 
them to provide feedback, rather than being used as a tool to achieve company’s 
strategic goals (Higgins & Coffey, 2016). 
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As discussed in Chapter 2, the concept of integrated reporting is relatively new. A 
framework has been in the process of being tested and developed since 2014 by the 
International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC) and was recently ready for early 
adopters (IIRC, 2016). Some of the participants of this study adapted the integrated 
framework for their latest corporate report (published in 2017).While the concept 
of integrated reporting is facing some challenges and has been criticised by a 
number of scholars (Dumay (2016); Flower (2015)), the data from this study shows 
that more and more companies are leaning towards using a mixture of GRI and the 
IR. Based on the analysis of reports, I found those that only used the GRI guidelines 
were hard to understand for a non-sustainability professional. Some of the 
professionals who participated in this study agree with this claim (OP4, OP5, and 
OP7). In contrast, where a combination of the GRI and IR frameworks were used, 
the report appeared more fruitful and easy to understand, since the GRI (normally 
used by sustainability professionals) was utilised to assess a company’s material 
issues raised by their stakeholders using complex indicators, and then the company 
used IR to explain how they create value and address the problems identified in an 
easy to understand manner.  
While this study suggests that mandatory non-financial reporting would be 
beneficial for the country as well as for the public companies listed on the NZX, 
the sustainability professionals who participated in this study all agree that the 
companies should choose their own framework(s) to report their environmental, 
social, and economic impacts. This allows companies to select a reporting tool that 
suits their values, the goals that they aim to achieve, and their budget. At the same 
time, participating sustainability experts all agreed that a combination of GRI and 
IR provides the most value for companies from any industry and size.  
 251 
7.4. Summary of the Chapter 
Even though the legal definition of material information does not exclude non-
financial information, nor specifically highlight financial information, it is 
generally accepted that in New Zealand only financial information is required to be 
disclosed by public companies. On the other hand, since most of the companies in 
the country do not provide any information aside from what is required, complying 
with the law and providing an annual report is regarded as being equal to full 
transparency. One of the major reasons for not producing a sustainability report that 
was highlighted by the participants from these non-reporting companies was the 
apparent lack of expectation from stakeholders.  
In the second section of this chapter, I used the Salience model of Mitchell et al. 
(1997), to categorise the most influential stakeholders named by the participants, 
using the three attributes of power, legitimacy, and urgency of the stakeholders’ 
claim. Based on the data gathered for this study and multiple other studies, I 
matched the characteristics of all the named stakeholders with the characteristics of 
the stakeholders’ groups identified by Michel, Agle, and Wood (1997), in the 
following format:  
• Dependent Stakeholders (customers and potential investors)  
• Dominant Stakeholders (retail shareholders, employees and board of 
directors, and the government)  
• Dormant stakeholder (Media)  
• Discretionary Stakeholders (NGOs and the SBC)  
• Definitive Stakeholders (major Shareholders)  
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Considering this classification of influential stakeholders and based on the data 
gathered for this study, I drew on Bauman’s liquid modernity concept to argue that 
instead of a lack of perceived expectation from the stakeholders, other factors such 
as stakeholders’ lack of power, and the absence of proper engagement with these 
groups of stakeholders, are the reasons why their demands are not considered by 
the companies. On the other hand, some stakeholders, especially major 
shareholders, possess so much power that they can dictate what the content of 
reports should be.   
Therefore, in the absence of legislation on non-financial disclosure, companies with 
negative impacts on the environment, society, and the economy do not need to 
report them or act on them. Corporate reporting in New Zealand is extremely 
compliance based, up to a point where some companies go to the trouble of 
collecting the non-financial information to report it outside New Zealand, but keep 
the same information away from the public’s eyes in this country. Introducing a 
standard such as the GRI framework or the integrated reporting (IR) (or a 
combination of both) by the Government of New Zealand or one of the regulatory 
bodies, could empower the other stakeholders to demand sustainability 
transparency, and create a dialogue between the stakeholders and the companies, 
which in the long run will benefit both the companies and the country. 
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CHAPTER 8: Conclusion 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I provide a brief overview of this study, discuss the original 
contributions of the research, point towards future research, and make 
recommendations for both public companies and policy makers.  
8.1. Overview of the thesis 
The focus of this thesis has been non-financial reporting of publicly listed 
companies in New Zealand, and the causes of its slow development over time. 
Special attention is paid to the ways in which some of the largest public companies 
in New Zealand are influenced by different stakeholder groups in the country for 
non-financial disclosure. As pointed out in the first chapter, while the discussion of 
whether or not corporate sustainability reports should be a major aspect of corporate 
communication is ongoing, the majority of significant corporations in the country 
have been avoiding releasing information regarding their social, environmental, and 
economic impacts.  
The analysis of the findings suggest that sustainability and non-financial reporting 
are viewed by the majority of the companies as costly disclosure activities with little 
to no benefits. In addition, with the absence of legislation around non-financial 
transparency, the authenticity of what is currently being reported can be questioned. 
As the data suggest, many companies only cover what has already been reported by 
the media regarding their impacts, rather than reporting unknown facts about the 
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company. Furthermore, some companies which already measure their impacts 
refuse to report them unless it is legally required.  
There also appears to be a perception or belief that stakeholders do not expect or 
want the companies that participated in this study, at least, to produce sustainability 
reports. The causes of this belief are: one, certain stakeholders have little to no 
power to influence the companies’ transparency levels; two, companies which 
claim that they have not felt any pressure from the stakeholders, have not properly 
engaged and communicated with these stakeholder groups; and three, powerful 
stakeholders such as shareholders of some of the largest organisations, due to their 
financial interest in the companies, do not demand sustainable transparency as they 
see it to be more costly than beneficial. In addition, the Government of New 
Zealand, as the guardian stakeholder and the only other stakeholder with the 
necessary power to demand change, has not exercised its authority to do so yet. 
Considering that the state owns big portions of a number of companies in New 
Zealand, there is a clear conflict of interest that could explain why no actions have 
been taken by the Government to require companies to disclose their non-financial 
information. 
8.2. Contributions of the study 
This thesis has important theoretical as well as practical implications. It contributes 
to the literature in a number of ways which are discussed in the first part of this 
section. The practical implications of this study include two sets of 
recommendations which are outlined in the latter part of this section; one for the 
public companies, the other for policy makers and the government of New Zealand. 
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8.2.1. Theoretical implications   
Previous studies have focused on factors such as the relationship between the type 
of industry and transparency of social responsibility, the relationship between the 
level of transparency and stakeholder pressure, the relationship between pressure 
from certain stakeholders and industries, in addition to size of the company, the 
industry they are active in, and their ownership structure (see for example, Adams 
et al. (1998); Alali and Romero (2012); Fernandez-Feijoo et al. (2014a, 2014b); 
Hackston and Milne (1996); Kolk and Perego (2010)),  However, this study sought 
to understand the causes for what is commonly known as a lack of expectation for 
sustainability reporting in New Zealand. This was achieved by utilising Mitchell, 
Agle, and Wood’s (1997) Salience Model to classify different stakeholder groups 
and then by drawing on Bauman’s (2001) notion of liquid modernity, to explain the 
distribution of power amongst different stakeholders which enhanced the depth of 
this thesis. In addition, it led to an original contribution through an expansion of 
both concepts, as described below.  
The Salience Model (Mitchell et al., 1997) facilitated the categorisation of different 
groups of a company’s stakeholders based on their level of importance for the 
company and how much influence they have over that company. The categorisation 
in practice is necessarily company specific and subject to change over time. 
However, the model, as put forward by Mitchell, Agle, and Wood, does not 
categorise the stakeholders per se but, rather, it introduces their characteristics, to 
be applied to specific contexts. I matched these characteristics with the stakeholder 
characteristics that were identified through the course of this research, to put 
different stakeholders introduced by companies in New Zealand into stakeholder 
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groups identified by the Salience Model.  This application of the model allowed 
time specific, but otherwise widely applicable categorisation of stakeholders as 
perceived by the participants of this study. 
This application of the Mitchell, Agle, and Wood’s model illustrates that the model 
itself is necessarily dependent upon a number of variables, a consideration that has 
not been pointed out by Mitchell, Agle, and Wood. That is, while the broad 
characterisation of “stakeholder” is particular to context, that characterisation needs 
further refinement to allow for the perspectives of those involved in applying the 
model, in this case, that of managers.  
Liquid modernity theory was used in this study to describe the shift of power from 
the state to individuals. In his discussion, Bauman (2000) argues that power in the 
post-Panopticon era has become liquid and moves freely, enabling free agents (the 
companies) to disengage from the government. This is, however, as far as Bauman’s 
discussion goes in regards to the transfer of power.  
Using this theory, I established how organisations in New Zealand’s neoliberal 
system are taking advantage of their liquid power to practice partial transparency 
by reporting just enough to pass the legal requirements and then responding to 
issues already covered by the media and known to the public, to manipulate the 
system in order to seem more legitimate.   
I extended Bauman’s theory by engaging in a discussion regarding the relationship 
between the government and the market in a neoliberal setting. I also illustrated the 
absence of equality amongst stakeholders’ levels of power and perceived 
expectation which is caused by the absence of government regulations for non-
financial disclosure, and how unevenly information was distributed amongst the 
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different groups of stakeholders which were identified by the Salience Model. In 
addition, I suggested a possible way to contain the corporations’ liquid power by 
introducing a mandatory non-financial reporting in New Zealand and how it would 
solve the unevenness of corporate transparency in the country.  
8.2.2. Implications for practice 
8.2.2.1. Recommendations for public companies 
Executives and managers need to be enlightened regarding the purpose and 
benefits of sustainability reports.  
As discussed previously, publishing sustainability reports improves companies’ 
reputations and gives them a license to operate. Further, previous studies show that 
sustainability reports have financial benefits, can create business opportunities for 
new projects, and add more value to companies (Lourenço et al., 2014; Nidumolu 
et al., 2009). They also help companies reduce their waste and manage natural 
resources. In addition, the reports can be used as marketing tools to attract more 
investors (Hussainey & Salama, 2010) and customers.  
This study presents evidence of a lack of understanding (or perhaps conscious 
ignoring) of the benefits of publishing sustainability reports amongst key 
representatives of some of the largest public companies in New Zealand. This 
unfamiliarity with the concept of sustainability reporting became even more evident 
when some participants believed releasing information regarding their 
philanthropic activities to be equal to publishing a sustainability report.  
In addition, companies which claimed that they feel no pressure for non-financial 
transparency are not engaging with all different groups of stakeholders. 
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Communicating with stakeholders to find out what is important to them can be 
beneficial to both parties.  
Since integrating sustainability practices in order to take advantage of its benefits 
requires cultural change in an organisation, and changing the culture starts with the 
leadership (Epstein et al., 2010), it is necessary for companies to invest in updating 
and cultivating their management teams regarding what purpose a sustainability 
report serves, and what benefits its presence can have for companies. This study 
can provide a guide of what could be expected from the New Zealand based 
companies in terms of non-financial reporting, and how integrated reporting could 
change the future of how information is communicated to different groups of 
stakeholders, using just a single report.  
In addition, organisations such as the Sustainable Business Council and the 
Sustainable Business Network need to add to their efforts to educate their members 
regarding the benefits of non-financial reporting, as the findings suggest that even 
members of these two organisations who participated in this study did not fully 
grasp the benefits of such reports.  
However, as discussed earlier, voluntary organisations such as the SBC and the 
SBN can only encourage (not require) the decision makers of their member 
companies to educate themselves regarding non-financial disclosure. In addition, 
companies that are not members of such organisations most likely will need more 
support in learning about the importance of non-financial reporting, something that 
can only be achieved by a body with authority taking the role of educating the 
mangers of some of the largest organisations in the country.  Therefore, in the next 
section, I suggest some recommendations for the government of New Zealand.  
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8.2.2.2. Recommendations for policy makers 
A clear, regulated standard for sustainability reporting needs to be introduced 
by the Government of New Zealand. 
One of the major tenets of neo-liberalism is the reduction (or, if possible, 
elimination) of government involvement in business and society, aside from the 
enforcement of law and order to protect private property, and the transference of 
social management to market forces. The problem with such an operating 
environment is that profit making becomes the number one priority for 
organisations. Therefore, something that is considered unethical, such as harming 
the environment, is somehow seen by some leaders as moral as long as the 
corporations create profit for their shareholders. This sums up the current situation 
in the New Zealand market.  
Due to the absence of any regulations for non-financial disclosure, many companies 
prioritise the satisfaction and happiness of their major shareholders (many of which 
are international companies), over sustaining the country. As a result, the concerned 
stakeholders’ voice to have a say in what happens to the environment around them 
is muffled. As Harris and Twiname (1998) write: “the more we strip down the state 
and the more we empower the corporates, the smaller the area remains in which 
people are able to exercise any form of democratic decision making about their 
society and their lives” (p. 209).  
On the other hand, a voluntary setting for some organisations is serving as a system 
that can easily be manipulated and tampered with by investor relations and public 
relations professionals for companies to seem legitimate, after they respond to 
issues that are already reported by the media and known to the public, and covering 
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up issues that never made it to the news because they simply were not known and/or 
newsworthy.  
Instead of being voluntary, I believe that for non-financial transparency to provide 
its full benefits for both organisations and all their stakeholders (including 
shareholders), it has to be applied as a form of observational control by the 
government where non-financial transparency is “represented in the policies of 
governmentally mandated disclosures through which corporate leaders and their 
organisations are held accountable for their decisions and words” (Flyverbom et al., 
2015, p. 390). This allows the public as well as the media to have access to corporate 
information which they can use to protect society and themselves against any type 
of misconduct by the companies.   
As of 2017, the NZX has preferred to recommend that listed companies should  
either release any material information that involves risk to the sustainability of the 
environment, the economy, and society, and explain what actions they have taken 
or intend to take to deal with the risk, OR explain why they are not disclosing such 
information. While this can be a good start, it still does not cover the financial 
sector, including banks and investment companies, as they believe they do not have 
any economic, social, nor environmental impacts. To avoid such confusion, a 
standard for sustainability reporting with a complete set of indicators that covers all 
three areas, and which is applicable to all industries needs to be introduced by the 
New Zealand Government.  
While there are hundreds of tools which can be used for this purpose, I suggest 
adopting the GRI standard and guidelines as the most comprehensive and globally 
accepted sustainability reporting tool, combined with an integrated reporting 
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format, as the only corporate report published by companies and which includes all 
financial and non-financial information that a company has to disclose.  
8.3. Recommendations for future research 
1. Companies’ lack of interest in sustainability reporting: An 
overwhelming absence of interest among corporations to discuss 
sustainability reporting was observed during the process of data collection 
for this research. The refusal to speak about this important topic, which is 
rapidly growing globally, and the way the key management personnel of 
companies treat sustainability as taboo, and the changes that organisational 
culture may need in New Zealand all require further examination. 
2. Media’s influence: The concept of CSR and corporate sustainability 
reporting in New Zealand seem to be perceived as additional activities that 
companies go out of their way to do, rather than as a necessity of 
organisational communication. These perceptions are also highly influenced 
by the mass media. If the issues have not been covered by the media, and 
the public does not already know about them, it appears that they will not 
be reported by the companies themselves, a strategic choice that is in 
contrast with the concept of transparency. Therefore, further research is 
needed on the influence of mass media on shaping non-financial corporate 
reports. 
3. The role of NZCSD: The work of New Zealand Central Securities 
Depository Limited (NZCSD), as an organisation that is fully owned by the 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the role that they play, and their impact on 
the transparency of publicly listed companies in the country also need to be 
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investigated. The current situation and the fact that it is classified in such a 
way that the public cannot know which members of NZCSD own what 
portion of which company also run counter to notions of transparency.  
4. The impacts of private companies: This study concentrates only on 
publicly listed companies. There is a considerable number of massive 
private companies in New Zealand, with significant social and 
environmental impacts. The exact impact of this group of companies that 
are not listed on the NZX needs to be studied as well.  
5. Preparing New Zealand for non-financial transparency: The findings of 
this study suggest a concern amongst corporations regarding the readiness 
of New Zealand and New Zealanders for a mandatory non-financial 
disclosure system. Therefore, further research is needed to address what 
needs to be done before such a system can be used in this country. Some of 
the recommendations made in the earlier section, may be considered for this 
purpose.  
6. GRI’s user friendliness: Some of the sustainability professionals who 
participated in this study suggested that reports created using the GRI 
framework are only read by “the people in the sustainability reporting 
community”. GRI’s friendliness towards an average reader, and who has 
been its audience has to be studied.  
Concluding remarks  
The remarkably low number of non-financial reporters in New Zealand was the 
driving force that motivated me to conduct this research. While this number has 
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been on the rise since I began my journey, it has certainly not grown enough in 
comparison with global standards.  
The step taken by the NZX to introduce a “comply or explain” recommendation 
may be a positive one. However, the fact that they are listed on the same market 
that they oversee, something that Bauman (2000) warns us about in a neoliberal 
system, raises some concerns of conflict of interest.  
 
In addition, the government of New Zealand (regardless of which party has been in 
power) has actively added to its efforts in creating an investment friendly 
environment by introducing systems such as NZClear. This provides a shelter for 
foreign companies outside the country to take ownership of some of the largest 
public companies in New Zealand with the ability to hide their identity through 
NZCSD, and to conduct their business without having to worry about the 
consequences of their actions.  For a mandatory not-financial reporting system to 
work, and for New Zealand to keep its “clean and green” image, the issue of the 
government’s conflict of interest needs to be addressed.  Further research on this 
issue is needed.  
 264 
Appendices 
Appendix A: Primary questions for sustainability 
reporting companies 
1. Does your organization prepare sustainability reports?  
If so, are these reports part of the annual reports or separate reports? How does your 
organization prepare these reports? Are there guidelines that you follow? 
2. Why does your organization prepare sustainability reports? Who are the 
audience?  
3. Who (which departments) are involved in writing sustainability reports in 
your organization? 
4. What are the factors that your company considers while 
designing/structuring a report? 
5. What have been some of the significant changes in your 
annual/sustainability reports over the last few years? What do these 
changes reflect? 
6. Who has the final say on the content of the reports? 
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Appendix B: Primary questions non- reporting companies 
1. How does your organization prepare an annual report? Are there 
guidelines that you follow? 
2. Who (which departments) are involved in writing annual reports in your 
organization? 
3. What are the factors that your company considers while 
designing/structuring a report? 
4. What have been some of the significant changes in your annual reports 
over the last few years? What do these changes reflect? 
5. Who has the final say on the content of the reports? 
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Appendix C: Example of follow up questions for Corporate 
Participants (CPs) 
1. How does your company define corporate transparency? 
2. What does sustainability mean to your company? What direction is it 
taking? 
3. Who are your stakeholders? 
4. How do you classify your stakeholders? 
5. How do you communication with your stakeholders?  
6. What actions does your organisation take to address the concerns of your 
stakeholders? 
7. How responsible is your corporation towards your stakeholders?  
8. What do your stakeholders expect to see in your corporate reports? 
9. How does the materiality process work? How are stakeholders engaged? 
10. Do you think there is pressure from your stakeholders for non-financial 
reporting? Has the level of expectation hanged over the years? 
11. Does being a member of SBC provide value for your organisation? What 
value does the SBC add? 
12. Are you using any guidelines to create your report? Is there a third party 
consultant who guides you through the process? 
13. What do you think of mandatory sustainability reporting? 
14. If the government does not require tax incentives n CSR activities, would it 
affect how you feel about mandatory sustainability reporting? 
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Appendix D: Questions for Other Participants (OPs) 
1. Are you aware of the number of publicly listed companies in New Zealand 
that produce sustainability reports? 
2. Do you think sustainability reporting has benefits?  
3. Do you believe that the management teams in public companies are aware 
of these benefits? 
4.  Why do you think the number of sustainability reporters in the country at 
lower than global average? 
5. Do you think there is enough pressure from companies’ stakeholders for 
them to produce sustainability reports? 
6. Where should the expectation come from? 
7. What should be the role of government in advocating sustainability 
practices in the country? 
8. How effective do you think organisations such as the SBC/SBN are in 
advocating sustainability reporting?  
9. What do you think about the current corporate transparency practices of the 
public companies in New Zealand? 
10. Would you change anything in regards with these practices? 
11. Do you think size of the company/the industry they are active in is of 
importance when it comes to sustainability reporting?  
12. Why do you think sustainability reporting in NZ has not become mandatory 
over the years?  
13. What standard/ tools are best to be used for creating a sustainability report? 
14. Are you familiar with integrated reporting? What do you think of it? 
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15. Do you think the material information that is provided in sustainability 
reports which use the GRI framework, can affect companies share prices in 
any way? 
16. How does the materiality process work? How are stakeholders engaged? 
17. Which group of stakeholders do you think can affect the material 
information in the reports? 
18. Do you believe the media plays a role in shaping what is included in the 
reports? In what way? 
19. When/if sustainability reporting is made mandatory, should there be a 
standard for all companies to use? Which guideline/s do you think should 
be used? 
20. Why is GRI the most used guideline for non-financial repotting globally? 
21. In your opinion, what are the main differences between GRI and IR 
guidelines?   
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Appendix E: Summary of the analysis for each 




2015 Report(s) 2017 Report(s) 
CP1 CP 1 is active in the health care and 
social assistant industry, has 
considerable social and environmental 
impacts. The term “stakeholder 
appears six times in the entire report. 
The report claims that company 
handles its business ethically and 
aligned with legal requirements. Aside 
from the material information by law, 
the company works towards providing 
adequate information for stakeholders 
and investors. The board of directors 
has been identified as responsible for 
providing transparency and protecting 
the interest of shareholders and 
stakeholders. This paragraph seems to 
be a standard practice which appears in 
many other reports.  
The company claims to have open 
communication with stakeholders 
including “shareholders, brokers, the 
investing community and the New 
Zealand Shareholders’ Association, as 
well as our staff, suppliers and 
customers”. Details of two ways 
communication with stakeholders 
(primarily by phone) has only been 
provided for communication channels 
with shareholders and does not include 
other stakeholders.  
Aside from shareholders employees 
are the only other group of 
stakeholders which have been 
mentioned in the report. However the 
discussions are mostly in terms of 
This report is very similar to 
the 2015 report with little 
difference around 
communication 
engagement. There is a little 
more on communication 
with shareholders.  
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employment benefits rather than 
engagement. The report is very 
financial based and there are no signs 
of environmental nor social 
information. The report includes 
information in regards with companies 
gender diversity with 9 male officers 
and directors compared to 2 females.  
CP2 CP 2 produces a separate sustainability 
report aside from their annual report 
(2015 was their first). The company's 
2015 sustainability report includes 
economic, social and environmental 
aspects. The company has set clear 
goals, priorities and targets for each 
element. To find out the right 
"sustainability strategy" the company 
engaged its employees across the 
business. The company has also 
identified where they stand regarding 
diversity, carbon footprint, safety, 
electricity and water use, and recycling 
rates, and has defined the goals that 
they plan to achieve for 2016 and 2020. 
Most of the engagement done to 
prepare this sustainability report 
appears to be internal and with 
company's employees. The report 
follows a narrative storyline. While it 
includes some of the negative impacts 
of the company (mostly in a smaller 
font and at the bottom of the page), it 
does not include all indicators 
identified by guidelines such as the 
GRI.  
Since the company produces a separate 
sustainability report, the annual report 
for the same year is entirely financially 
focused, with shareholders being the 
centre of attention. 
 
Compared to the 2015 
report, the company has 
clearly learned a lot from 
their reporting process as 
the 2017 report is much 
more detailed and addresses 
issues more directly. The 
language used in writing the 
report is more responsible 
as the company directly 
identifies the problems with 
statistics and explains what 
is exactly being done to 
resolve them. The report 
and has grown significantly 
in size (105 pages compared 
to 22 pages in 2015). This is 
due to the company’s choice 
of an integrated framework. 
The report has been written 
using both IR and GRI 
principles. It includes a 
complete GRI content index 
which was not used in the 
2015 sustainability report. 
Most importantly, the 
company has specifically 
mentioned the stakeholders 
they have engaged with to 
identify the material issues 
in the reports, the way they 
engaged them and what is 
important to each group. 
The term stakeholders has 
been used 37 times in this 
report compared to only 
twice in the 2015 
sustainability report. 
Suppliers, communities, 
employees, and NGOs are 




The company’s financial 
report for this year is also 
focused on financial 
transparency. However, the 
annual report refers the 
reader to the sustainability 
report created by the 
company: “Initiatives are 
pursued to inform all 
stakeholders of the 
company’s performance 
against broader objectives, 
including responsibilities to 
our communities, people, 
environment and economy. 
The company’s 
Sustainability Report 
reports on activities and 
achievements in these 
areas”.  
CP3 Despite the company’s significant 
environmental, social and economic 
impacts, there is no indication of non-
financial transparency nor stakeholder 
engagement in the 2015 annual report. 
The company even has a sustainability 
department and there is a section for 
sustainability on company’s website. It 
appears to mostly be for marketing 
purposes rather than communicating 
company’s impacts. 
The way the company 
communicates using its 
reports has majorly 
changed. While in the 2015 
annual report non-financial 
transparency was 
completely absent, in the 
2017 report the organization 
has identified “creating 
sustainable value for all 
stakeholders” as its long 
term strategy. The company 
has also introduced its very 
first sustainability report 
this year. The report which 
is in accordance with GRI 
standard, identifies all New 
Zealanders as stakeholders 
who “value their natural 
environment highly and 
they expect [the company] 
to continue to strive towards 
the highest standards of 
sustainability”. The 
company claims to have 
shaped the topics and 
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structure of the report using 
a materiality process which 
considered the 
stakeholders’ view on how 
important the topics are. 
The stakeholder groups 
have clearly been identified 
and the method of 
engagement with each 
group has been described in 
details.  
CP4 With 23 subsidiaries, the company has 
massive social economic and 
specifically environmental impacts. 
Yet at this stage, there is no sign of 
non-financial information in the 
corporate reports produced by the 
company. The term “stakeholder” has 
been mentioned once in the report 
where the board’s governance 
responsibilities are described.    
The report is virtually the 
same with no reference to 
non-financial information. 
In the past 3 years the 
company has taken no steps 
towards stakeholder 
engagement, social, and 
environmental transparency 
in their corporate reports.  
CP5 The company seems to define 
stakeholders as those who gain profit 
from it. The term “stakeholder” has 
been used only twice in the report and 
in both occasions in financial terms. 
The report reads: “With a back-to-
basics 
approach and strong focus on 
accountability, the group’s 
performance improved substantially 
over the following four years. This 
improvement resulted in higher profits, 
a recovered share price and winning 
back the confidence of many 
[company’s name] stakeholders. There 
is some information regarding gender 
diversity at the workplace. Other than 
that, no non-financial information has 
been presented in the annual report.  
Company has been delisted 
from the NZX.  
CP6 The first part of the report concentrates 
on some facts about the business. 
These include some non-financial 
information. most of the reporting that 
This is the company’s 
second Annual integrated 
report (first one was in 
2016). The report is written 
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is done on social and environmental 
impacts includes the things that the 
company is doing such as reducing 
carbon emissions. The language used 
concentrates on positive actions being 
taken without discussing the issues or 
any future plans or goals. For example 
the company claims that it is helping 
communities and creating two way 
relationship with different stakeholder 
groups. How this is being done is not 
explained however. Customers, 
employees and suppliers have been 
highlighted as stakeholders.  
based on IIRC’s framework. 
The report claims to cover 
the issues that are important 
to the company and its 
stakeholders which include: 
“customer relationships, 
financial 
performance, work health 
and safety, operational 
efficiency, energy and 
carbon emissions, transport 
resilience, commercial 
focus, employee relations, 
and public safety”. This 
report includes a complete 
and detailed section on who 
the stakeholders are and 
how the company engages 
with each group. There is 
indication of expectation 
from customers and some 
investors for non-financial 
transparency in the report.  
CP7 According to the annual report, 
sustainability is vital to the company’s 
reputation and their market 
positioning. Sustainability and 
transparency of non-financial 
information is also very important to 
many stakeholder groups including 
industry partners, Iwi, customers, 
shareholders, the government, general 
community, NGOs an, investors. The 
financial and non-financial 
information have been integrated in 
one report. company uses GRI 
framework to create the non-financial 
section. The company claims to have 
engaged with stakeholders to identify 
what is important to them. Each 
stakeholder group and method of 
engagement with them has been 
completely explained with details. At 
least one of the engagement methods is 
a kind of two way communication 
channel. The report also explains how 
key areas of concerns which were 
raised by the stakeholders have been 
This is another integrated 
report which includes both 
financial, economic, social, 
and environmental aspects 
of the business. The non-
financial information is 
once again in accordance 
with the GRI guidelines. In 
this report the company has 
been more clear about the 
stakeholders’ expectations. 
Transparent communication 
in regards with all the 
activities of the companies 
sits under the top important 
issues by “all stakeholder”. 
The demands of each group 
has then been mapped out 
separately. The report reads: 
“We know that strong 
stakeholder relationships 
are key to [company name] 
success, and a affect our 
ability to create value. We 
are committed to 
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addressed. Before the stakeholder 
concerns are identified, the line reads: 
“No specific external engagement was 
undertaken to prepare this report”.  
understanding their interests 
and concerns, responding 
accordingly, and providing 
honest and transparent 
communication”. The 
government (51% shares) 
and investors appear to be 
the main advocates of 
incorporating sustainability 
and stakeholders’ view into 
the business. 
A lot more attention is paid 
to non-financial information 
in this report compared to 
the 2015 report. 
CP8 The report consists of two major parts. 
The first section concentrates on 
financial reporting and the second part 
focuses on corporate governance. The 
report indicates that the company 
works towards managing the indirect 
economic impacts on different 
stakeholder groups. There is no 
indication that same is being done on 
social and environmental impacts 
(except a mention of encouraging 
recycling in the business). In the “other 
stakeholder interests” section of the 
report only customers are discussed. 
The report claims that customers and 
employees are engaged with. Although 
there is not much detail provided on 
how that has been done and what they 
demanded. Communication with the 
shareholders has been explained well.  
In terms of engaging with the 
communities around them, the 
company only reports on philanthropic 
activities that they have done on two 
occasions and sponsoring some events.  
In terms of non financial 
transparency and 
engagement with the 
stakeholders, no 
improvements have been 
done in the past three years.  
CP9 This company has some of the largest 
social and environmental impacts on 
the country. Yet, there is little to no 
non-financial disclosure in their 
corporate reports. In fact instead of 
identifying the issues that are cause by 
Since 2015 the organisation 
was taken over by another 
public company and the 
corporate report for 2017 is 
completely the opposite of 
what was produced 
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them and offering solutions, the 
company sees itself as a solution for 
other organisations’ problems. 
Sustainability is only mentioned in the 
report as a way of marketing the 
company. The report claims that the 
company manages the expectations 
and interest of all stakeholders. 
However, there is no indication that 
other stakeholders have been engaged 
aside from the shareholders.  
previously. The company 
claims to have “ultra long 
sustainability in mind” 
when they take any actions. 
Half of this report is on non-
financial information. 
While it incorporates 
aspects of integrated 
reporting framework,  it has 
been prepared in 
accordance with the GRI 
standards. Different 
stakeholders have been 
acknowledged and engaged. 
They include: customers, 
employees, partners, 
shareholders and investors, 
Iwi, the government, 
community, suppliers, and 
industry participants. The 
most important topics  
expected to be included in 
the report have been 






and mitigation, safety, and 
customer experience. The 
company has addressed all 
these matters by explaining 
what action they are taking 
to resolve issues related to 
these topics. Stakeholders 
have played a key role in 
what is included in this 
report.  
CP10 While the annual report includes both 
financial and non-financial 
information, it is not using an 
integrated reporting framework. 
Instead, the first half reports on 
financial outcomes and in the second 
part a GRI index is introduced. The 
GRI index by itself appears to be hard 
to read and understand for an average 
reader compared to other reports where 
The company has changed 
its direction towards their 
first separate and 
comprehensive 
sustainability report. This 
report however was 
published in 2016. GRI is 
still used to guide the core 
of the report. However in 
this report, the company 
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the index is used within an IR 
framework.  Stakeholder groups have 
been identified and engaged through 
different methods. These groups 
include: general community, Maori,  
Environmental groups and other non-
government organisations, 
shareholders, investors, employees, 
local government, central government, 
and industry partners and bodies. The 
most important issues to these 
stakeholders (both internal and 
external) have been around company’s 
investment plans for the future (making 
smart decisions that bring good value), 
and environmental responsiveness 
(climate change and environmental 
footprint).  While the report 
acknowledges the stakeholders’ 
expectation and the important topics 
for them, it has not addressed them in 
an easy to understand and clear manner 
and uses the GRI index to refer the 
reader to either a different link or an 
email address to find answers. For 
example one of the indicators which 
asks for direct and indirect greenhouse 
gas emissions by weight, the response 
is that “the report can be requested by 
email”. 
appears to address the issues 
that have been raised by 
stakeholders directly. The 
material issues have been 
recognized through 
conversations with the 
stakeholders and what the 
media has covered about the 
company in the past year. 
While the report has 
immensely improved, it is 
still difficult to understand 
what specific negative 
impacts the company’s 
activities have had socially 
and environmental and how 
they are addressing them. 
For example for major 
environmental issues such  
as waste and carbon 
emission, the report just 
says “data is not available at 
the time of publishing”. So 
once again, despite good 
engagement with the 
stakeholders and 
acknowledging their 
expectations, this SOE has 
not transparently discussed 
their negative impacts and 
what they are doing to 
resolve these issues.  
The 2017 annual report of 
the company has a short 
sustainability section which 
refers back to the 2016 
sustainability report which 
means the company has 
published one report for two 
operational years. 
CP11 Aside from a gender diversity 
discussion which includes engagement 
with employees, there is no sign of 
other non-financial information nor 
engagement with other stakeholders 
aside from shareholders can be found 
in the report. The term “stakeholder” 
comes up five times in the report and 
The report looks similar to 
the 2015 one. This time 
however the company 
identifies the stakeholder 
group as “regulators or 
government, the Electricity 
Commission, listed issuers, 
brokers or institutional and 
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mostly refers to “market stakeholders”. 
No other stakeholder groups have been 
identified in the report.   
retail investors”. The report 
acknowledges that the 
company does not have a 
social and environmental 
reporting framework but 
promises one for 2018. This 
may be because of the 
“comply or explain” 
recommendation of the new 
code of conduct released by 
the NZX at the end of 2017.  
 
CP12 The report includes a one page 
sustainability section. In this page the 
company explains that it has developed 
a sustainability policy which drives 
improvements in environmental 
performance and operational costs. The 
information disclosed in this page is 
only on company’s achievements such 
as reducing power consumption.  
The term stakeholder has not been used 
even once in the entire report. The 
report does not contain any information 
in regards with engagement with any 
stakeholder groups to understand their 
concerns.  
There are major changes 
made to the annual report 
compared to the 2015 one. 
According to the report, this 
is the first time that the 
company is using an 
integrated framework. The 
term “stakeholder” has been 
mentioned in this report 12 
times. However in parts it 
appears to refer to mostly 
financial stakeholders. The 
report reads: “The company 
has a wide range of 
stakeholders including 
small and large 
shareholders, bondholders 
and other debt holders”. 
The sustainability section of 
the report has grown from 
one page to 7 pages and 
includes a GRI content 
index. Nearly half of the 
indicators are not currently 
provided in the report as the 
“decisions of stakeholders 
are still being reviewed”. It 
is unclear which 
stakeholders have been 
engaged and what method 
was used to communicate 
with them. Only two of the 
indicators have been 
externally assured. The 
report promises to improve 
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the sustainability aspect of 
the report in the future 
years.  
CP13 There is no sign of any form of non-
financial disclosure. The report does 
not contain the term “stakeholder” at 
all. There is no sign of any form of 
engagement with any stakeholder 
groups. Only some information about 
charity work has been included in the 
chairman’s report section.  
The report is almost 
identical to the 2015 report 
in terms of non-financial 
information. Again, there is 
none, nor is there a sign of 
engagement with any 
stakeholder groups.  
CP14 This company is one of the pioneers of 
sustainability reporting in New 
Zealand which has been publishing one 
for many years. The reports used to 
separated from annual reports but 
recently the organization decided to 
disclose their financial and non-
financial information together using an 
integrated reporting framework.  The 
report is also using the the GRI 
guidelines (G4). The company chose 
an IR framework because they believe 
it creates a complete picture of how 
they create value. The stakeholders are 
identified as people (employees), 
shareholders, customers and suppliers, 
community, government, and industry. 
The stakeholders were engaged 
through survey and interviews and 
were asked to ask 19 issues. These 
issues were selected based on ongoing 
engagement with stakeholders. The top 
issues that the stakeholders are 
concerned about were: [product] safety 
and quality, sustainable [raw material] 
stock, leadership and values, 
developing and wellbeing of people 
(employees), customer relationships, 
community engagement, and financial 
performance.  
The report has comprehensively 
explained company’s negative 
impacts, and what is being done to 
resolve the issues. For each of the 
material issues raised by the 
This report also uses a 
combination of IR 
framework and GRI 
indicators. In this report, the 
company has been more 
specific about their 
stakeholder groups. The 
stakeholders have been 
identified as: People 
(employees), shareholders 
and investors, Government 
and regulators, Industry and 
business associations, 
suppliers, customers, 
communities, NGOs, civil 
society, and Iwi. The 
stakeholders were asked to 
rank 30 issues which they 
flagged as concerns 
(compared to 19 in 2015). 
Due to the high number of 
issues identified, the 
company grouped them 
under the following 
outcomes: sustainable 
business, heathy [source of 
raw material], employees, 
community and partnership, 
healthy [product], and 
protecting the environment. 
Most issues belong to the 
sustainable business and 
healthy [source of raw 
material] categories. The 
most important issues for 
the stakeholders include 
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stakeholder groups, the company has 
identified goals, targets, and enablers. 
This report is by far one of the most 
comprehensive reports amongst the 
participating companies.  
product safety and quality, 
health and wellbeing of 
employees, profitability, 
and social license to 
operate.  
37 stakeholders (22 external 
and 15 internal) were 
selected and engaged 
through semi-structured 
interviews. They were 
selected based on factors 
such as  
“dependency, 
responsibility, tension, 
influence and diversity”. 
Each issue is then discussed 
together with the 
company’s planes to 
address them. This report is 
even more comprehensive 
than the 2015 one.  
 
CP15 The company operates in the 
horticulture industry with 9 
subsidiaries. While there is people, 
community and environment section in 
the report, there is no actual non-
financial disclosure present. This 
section only claims that the company 
cares about the community, its 
employees and the environment. There 
is no explanation of what the impact of 
the organization’s activities are and 
how they are being managed. In 
addition, there is no sign of any 
stakeholder groups (aside from 
shareholders) being engaged or 
communicated with. The term 
“stakeholder” has only been used once 
in financial terms.  
In their latest annual report, 
the company has taken a big 
step towards sustainability 
reporting by using GRI 
indicators and engaging 
with internal and external 
stakeholders to find out 
what issues are important to 
them. The top issues 
include: Employment, 
health and safety, supplier 
requirements, water use, 
and carbon. There is no 
indication of who the 
stakeholder groups which 
have been engaged are or 
what the method of 
communication used with 
them was. 
While in the first part of the 
sustainability section the 
report claims that the 
material topics are the result 
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of stakeholder engagement, 
later in another section the 
report reads as though the 
topics were based on GRI 
indicators and not what is 
important to stakeholder 
groups. It reads:  
“We have identified 16 
sustainability topics which 
we believe reflect key 
sustainability concerns for 
[the company]” (CP 15, 
Annual Report). 
Even the material topic 
mentioned have not been 
discussed in the report.  
CP16 This company’s product has 
everything to do with the ocean. The 
report opens by committing to 
sustainability and environmental 
responsibility. Although there is no 
explanation of what is being done to 
achieve this. There is no non-financial 
disclosure taking place in the report. 
The report does not contain the term 
“stakeholder” and there is no indication 
that any groups of stakeholders have 
been engaged. 
No non-financial disclosure 
component have been added 
to the 2017 report and it 
completely keeps its 
financial core. A line has 
been added to the report that 
“the Board seeks to balance 
the interests of shareholders 
with the interests of other 
stakeholders, as 
appropriate” (CP16, Annual 
Report). Despite company’s 
major environmental 
impacts, there is no sign of 
future plans for a 
sustainability report.  
 
CP17 The company owns 11 major 
international franchises in New 
Zealand. The report claims that the 
company is committed to using 
practices that minimize social and 
environmental impacts such as 
recycling and only using suppliers who 
use sustainable resources. The 
company also claims to take part in 
supporting the community and 
charitable events. There is no evidence 
This report is a little 
different from the 2015 one. 
It acknowledges that there 
are other stakeholders such 
as the public, customers, 
team members, suppliers, 
and shareholders, and the 
company aims to conduct its 
business in a way that the 
results are positive for all 
these groups. How this is 
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of any of these presented in the report 
nor is there any non-financial 
disclosure which include the 
company’s negative impacts. There is 
no sign of stakeholder engagement. 
The report appears to present the 
minimum required information to 
comply with the listing rules.  
done is not explained. The 
only sign of engaging with a 
stakeholder group, is a line 
that explains the company’s 
efforts to communicate with 
the customers to understand 
their needs for the product 
better.   Once again aside 
from promising to manage 
their social and 
environmental impacts, 
there is no non-financial 
information included in the 
report.  
CP18 Majority of this company is owned by 
the local government. The organization 
has major social, environmental, and 
economic impact on the region. The 
report claims that the company is 
continuously working on minimizing 
its impacts, and provides some 
examples such as 60% power 
reduction, recycling, and identifying 
and disposing harmful chemicals. The 
report does not include any negative 
impacts of the company and how they 
are being managed. According to the 
report, the company engages with one 
major customer which contributes to 
10% of total revenue, the regulators,  
and permanent employees. The 
outcome of the engagements have not 
be described in the report. 
The report has kept its 
financial nature and no 
improvements have been 
made in terms of non-
financial disclosure.  
CP19 Investors, employees, customers, 
suppliers, creditors, and local 
community have been identified as 
stakeholders in the report. There is 
claims of engagement with 
shareholders and employees. Although 
it is not clear how the engagement was 
done and the outcome of it. This large 
organisation which is mainly owned by 
an international company does not 
disclose non-financial information in 
their corporate reports.  
The company claims that 
100% of their suppliers 
have environment plans and 
are sustainable. Once again 
other than gender  diversity 
no other non-financial 
information is included in 
the report. There is no 
indication of stakeholder 
engagement in the report. 
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CP20 Despite being active in the forestry 
industry and having major 
environmental impacts, the company 
does not provide any non-financial 
information. No stakeholders have 
been engaged (except shareholders) to 
create the report. The report appears to 
present the minimum required 
information to comply with the listing 
rules.  
 
Company has been delisted 
from the NZX. 
CP 21 The report is completely financial 
focused. No stakeholders have been 
engaged while writing this report. 
There is no non-financial information 
presented.  
This report is similar to the 
2015 report. Except here the 
company acknowledges 
other stakeholders. There is 
some information regarding 
companies charity work for 
the community and gender 
diversity. There is no 
mention of stakeholders 
being engaged. Company’s 
economic, social, and 
environmental impacts have 
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